Using features for automated problem solving by Heneveld, Alex
School of Informatics
University of Edinburgh
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9LE
UVf
o
Using Features for Automated Problem Solving
Wemotivate and present an architecture for problem solving where an abstraction
layer of "features" plays the key role in determining methods to apply. The system
is presented in the context of theorem provingwith Isabelle, and we demonstrate
how this approach to encoding control knowledge is expressively different to
other common techniques. We look closely at two areas where the feature
layer may offer benefits to theorem proving — semi-automation and learning
— and find strong evidence that in these particular domains, the approach shows
compelling promise. The system includes a graphical theorem-proving user
interface for Eclipse ProofGeneral and is available from the project web page,
http://feasch.heneveld.org.
Keywords: problem solving, cognitive science, Al, computer science, planning, CBR,
schema abstraction, features, retrieval, analogy, symbolic integration, mathematical
reasoning, automated reasoning, Isabelle
Alex Heneveld
alexSheneveld.org







Part One: The Possibility of Features
Chapter 1. The Psychology of Human Problem Solving
1.1. Memory-based Problem Solving
Gestalt Psychology 1
Schemas 1
Similarity and Categorisation 1
Analogy and Retrieval 1
1.2. Logical Accounts 2
Logics for Non-logicality: The Wason Selection Task 2
Production Rules 2
Cognitive Architectures: Soar and ACT-R 2
1.3. Strategies for Problem Solving 2




Chapter 2. Computational Approaches to Problem Solving 3




Guidance and Control Strategies 4.
Learning 4,





2.3. Theorem Proving 5
2.4. Conclusions 5:
Chapter 3. Feasch — A System for Problem Solving with Features 56
3.1. The Possibility Hypothesis (PH) 57
3.2. The Architecture 58
Specification 59
Implementation 62
3.3. Execution Strategies: Testing (PH) on Noughts-and-Crosses 65
A Simple List Executor Strategy 67
Weighted Lists 71
Networked Weighted Lists 74
Discussion 78
Part Two: The Expressivity of Features
Chapter 4. Feasch and the Theorem Prover Isabelle 80
4.1. Motivation 80
4.2. About Isabelle 80
Automation and ProofAssistants 81
User Interfaces 83
The Eclipse ProofGeneral Environment 87
4.3. Integrating Feasch with Isabelle 91
Java 91
IsabelleML 96
The Feature Description Language (FDL) 97
Tying it All Together: The Feature Wizard 101
Chapter 5. Interactive Theorem Proving with the Feature Wizard 102
5.1. Globally Useful Features for Isabelle/HOL 102
Cueing the Obvious 103
Heuristic Recommendations 105
Hierarchical Executive Control 106
5.2. Causal Information for Natural Language Proofs (EH1) 113
5.3. Interactive Theorem Proving (EH2) 116
The Graphical User Interface (GUI): "Point-and-Click" 117
Utility Evaluation 117
Discussion 119
Chapter 6. Automation in Differential Calculus 121
6.1. A Formal Theory of Calculus 121
6.2. Automated Theorem Proving (EH3) 122
A Decision Procedurefor Differentiation 123
GUI: "Fast-Forward" Automation 126
Evaluation and Discussion 128
6.3. Modularity (EH4) 132
Meyer's Criteria 133
Evaluation 133
6.4. Conclusions about the Expressivity of Features 134
ii
Part Three: The Benefits of Features
Chapter 7. Semi-Automated Theorem Proving: Integral Calculus 135
7.1. Background to the Problem 135
History: SAINT, SIN, and a Decision Procedure 135
Methods for Human Integral-Solving 137
Features for Human Integral-Solving 139
7.2. A Feature Wizard for Integration 140
GUI: Crossing the "Auto-Run Threshold" 140
Evaluation 141
Conclusions 142
Chapter 8. Learning with Features 144
8.1. Learning Mappings from Solved Derivatives 144
Training Methodology 145
Experimentation 146
Results and Analysis 146
8.2. Discussion 147
Part Four: The Future of Features
Chapter 9. Critical Analysis and Future Work 148
9.1. Isabelle with Feasch 148
Usability Analysis 148
Non-Syntactic Features 149
Issues with Mappings: Numeric Weights and the Compositionality ofFeatures 150
Planning by Continuation: Persistent Features 151
Teamingfrom Experience and Analogy 152
9.2. Establishing a Computational Architecture 154
Natural Language and the Importance ofStructure 154
Game Playing, Go, and the Importance of Explanation 155
9.3. Psychological Experiments 156
Modelling Experts at Solving Integrals 157
Challenging the Use ofProduction Rules 158
Chapter 10. Towards a New Paradigm 160
10.1. The Feature-Schema Architecture 160
The Schema Model 162
Planning and Search 165
Features in the Schema Model 169
Relation to Other Work 170




Without the unflagging support of a great many individuals and organisations, it would
not have been possible forme to undertake this research. I am grateful to the Marshall Scholarship
programme for encouraging and fundingmy study in the UK, and to the University of Edinburgh
for providing additional funding for my third year of study. I appreciate the time, wisdom,
and challenges that my principal supervisor, Prof Alan Bundy, has shared with me ever since I
began the research in 1998. I have also benefited immeasurably from the involvement of other
supervisors along the way: Julian Richardson, Corin Gurr, and Paul Schweizer. The feedback of
my examiners, Prof Bruno Buchberger and John Lee, was extraordinarily helpful and supportive.
Countless other conversations and publications have guided my thinking to this place where I
am happy with the product ofmy research— "countless" meaning, of course, that I could not list
them all if I tried. I hope it suffices for me to thank everyone who so contributed, whether they
be aware of it or not, and to express particular gratitude to Michael Ramscar, Prof Keith Stenning,
and the whole of the Discovery and Reasoning in Mathematics (DReaM) group.
During the long and wee hours spent working for this thesis, I have been sustained by
love and joy frommy family and friends. I thank every single one of them enormously. Two very
special people deserve credit for this sustentation above all: my partner Laura and my son Lucas.
This thesis is dedicated to you.
iv
Declaration
As per regulations of the University of Edinburgh, I, Alex Heneveld, attest to the following:
(a) that the thesis has been composed solely by myself;
(b) that the work is entirely my own; and
(c) that the workhasnotbeen submitted for any other degree or qualification.
All text and images herein, associated source code, and other products indicated herein or on-line
under http://feasch.heneveld.org, are © 2007, Alex Heneveld, with all rights reserved. A








The Possibility of Features
Recent research in cognitive psychology has introduced new theories of human problem
solving where features play a key role. In Part One of this thesis we motivate and test the
possibility of basing a computational system for problem solving on these theories. In subsequent
parts of the thesis we explore how this approach differs from other computational techniques, and
we identify three major benefits of using this approach for complex problem solving in AI.
We begin in Chapter 1 by reviewing several cognitive accounts of problem solving. We
focus particularly on recent analogical (memory-based) theories (e.g., Sobel, 2004; Gentner et ah,
2000) where problem solving is described as a three-step process, using features and schemas:
(1) Features are detected in a problem space.
(2) Features cue problem solving schemas from memory.
(3) Cued schemas are applied to the problem.
A feature is an enrichment to the representation of a problem state, formally defined in our
work as "a known label or structured entity which can be associated with a problem state".
Crucially, it does not include any information about how to act in that state; this is recorded in
schemas, "knowledge elements which describe an action which can be taken in a problem state".
This theory is illustrated by examples and experiments from the literature and contrasted with
traditional approaches including the production rules theory and its two-step "generate-and-test"
process (Newell & Simon 1972).
Following this review of the psychological literature, we give a summary of many
important problem solving techniques in artificial intelligence (Chapter 2), observing that
structural features, given such a prominent role in recent cognitive theories, are rarely used
in AI systems1. This leads us to formulate our first hypothesis, in Chapter 3, which we call "the
possibility hypothesis":
(PH) Features can be the foundation of an AI problem solving system.
We have tested this hypothesis by building a general system for problem solving, called Feasch,
based on features and schemas2, with particular support for structural features. To solve a given
problem, our system takes a problem state as input and first runs a number of "feature detector
1 The nearest approximations are the use of "hidden layers" in neural networks and "indexes" in case-based
reasoning. We, however, typically use features which have an explicit, recognisable meaning (in contrast to
hidden layers) and require that their detection be an integral part of the process (in contrast to CBR, where they
are used for optimisation but are not at the heart of the system.
2 Formal specifications are given in §3.2 in the form of corresponding Java interfaces IFeature and ISchema,
together with abstract implementations, concrete examples, and discussion.
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schemas" (akin to step (1) above). Whenever a feature is detected, a "mapping" describes how to
modify likelihood values attached to a feature-dependent set of schemas (step (2) above). After
many features have been found, the system has a list of candidate "problem action schemas"
(schemas which act in the problem state) which are tried on the current problem state (step (3)
above), typically in best-first order on the likelihood value. If one is successful, the system repeats
the cycle on the new problem state, recursing until either a solution is found or there are no more
cued schemas to try locally. Within the system, several execution contexts are described offering
different implementational capabilities, including whether features are permitted to cue other
types of schemas — such as more specialised feature detection schemas, in which case step (2)
leads back to step (1) in the same problem state — and whether mappings are implemented as
lists, weights, or more sophisticated dependencies. (The Feasch System and a User's Guide is
available from this project's web page, http: //feasch.heneveld. org.)
Chapter 3 also describes experiments using Feasch on the canonical noughts-and-crosses
problem (also known as tic-tac-toe). Valid moves are expressed as schemas, and control knowledge
is expressed as features with numerical weight mappings. We confirm (PH) by showing that the
system can be used to implement a solution. As yet in the thesis we have made no claims
about any benefits of this approach, nor is it even clear whether it is substantially different to
other approaches, although this experiment does suggest how features seem to encode control
knowledge is ways that appear qualitatively different.
The Expressivity of Features
Part Two explores to what extent the Feasch approach is in fact different to other
approaches by applying it to the domain of formalised mathematical reasoning. If features are a
substantially different way of expressing control knowledge, we would expect it to have unique
performance properties in this domain. Based on the way features seem to encode knowledge,
as suggested in Chapter 3, we propose four such potential performance properties, collectively
referred to as our "expressivity hypotheses":
(EH1) Features provide reasoned explanations for method selection, e.g. for use
in generating natural language proofs with causal information.
(EH2) Features enable useful guidance for interactive theorem proving.
(EH3) Features can encode control knowledge for automated theorem proving.
(EH4) Features contribute to modular design of control knowledge.
We argue that the expressive properties described in hypotheses (EH1), (EH2), and (EH4)
are generally not true of pre-existing control knowledge techniques used in theorem provers
(including production rules, programmatic tactics, and plans); consequently, establishing them
for the Feasch System would highlight several ways that the feature-based approach is unique.
(In Part Two, our interest is confined to testing this uniqueness; benefits which may be suggested
Heneveld 3
in the course of this exploration will be explicitly hypothesised and tested more thoroughly in
later parts of this thesis.)
Before testing the four expressivity hypotheses we introduce the theorem prover we use,
Isabelle, and describe ourwork integrating itwith the Feasch system (Chapter 4). The result of this
integration is an end-user Isabelle plug-in called the Feature Wizard, including an Isabelle-level
"feature description language" and a graphical user interface as shown in the figure below. (This
system is also available for download and public use from the project web page, http: //feasch.
heneveld. org/.)
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In the above example, we've defined a new feature that tests
whether some assumption matches a conclusion. However, instead
of setting this as a 'top_level_schera', it is cued by the
detection of the 'forall assumption* feature.
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Figure: The Feasch-on-Isabelle Feature Wizard
Chapter 5 examines how this tool can be applied to thewidely-used Isabelle theory "HOL".
We put forward a number of features and method mappings that express the appropriateness
of certain HOL rules and methods. We then show how this form of expression allows us to
extract programmatically from existing proofs an explanation of why certain methods may have
been chosen, and we establish (EH1) by using this information to automatically generate natural
language versions of proofs that include causal information (i.e. efficient cause, or motivation, in
addition to the final cause provided by other systems). The use of the system for guiding interactive
theorem proving is then presented, and experiments concerning utility and usability are described.
These experiments give strong evidence that the system is helpful to users, confirming (EH2) and
distinguishing our approach from other major tools where this type of guidance is not readily
available.
Next we turn our attention to the domain of calculus (Chapter 6) and attempt to
show (EH3) by implementing a decision procedure for evaluating derivatives (of differentiable
functions). The experiment is successful in the sense that the system is able to solve differentiation
problems, but we find that it is cumbersome to use Feasch to express some types of control
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knowledge, particularly those containing multiple sequential steps. This suggests that other
techniques are more appropriatewhere complete decision procedures exist. The benefits of Feasch-
on-Isabelle appear to be for those areas where problems cannot be discharged by a straightforward
automated program. In these cases, groups of people are likely to have to work together, sharing
and building upon each other's control knowledge code. The "black-box" approach of most
control knowledge techniques is inappropriate here, for in these instancesmodularity— including
inspectability and reusability — is especially important. We test whether features contribute to
modularity (EH4) in part through an experimentwhere Isabelle users are asked to debug derivative
control knowledge expressed in different ways; as subjects are substantially quicker with Feasch
than with other ways of encoding control knowledge (even though subjects are less familiar with
the Feasch approach), the results support the modularity hypothesis.
Of the four expressivity statements, the only one which generally can be made for other
control knowledge techniques— automation (EH3)— is the only one which was not conclusively
shown for the Feasch system3. This strongly suggests that the feature-based approach is different
to other control knowledge representations used in theorem proving, with different attendant
strengths and weaknesses, and — it appears — most suited to problem solving in complex
domains where decision procedures are not available.
The Benefits of Features
Having established that features yield a different approach to problem solving, we turn our
attention in Part Three to characterising the benefits of this approach. As Part Two suggested that it
appears suited to complex problems, we explore the challenging task of finding anti-derivatives4.
Chapter 7 introduces the implementation of an integral solver in our system and puts forward
the first major "benefit hypothesis":
(BH1) The inspectability and modularity properties of feature-based control
knowledge are beneficial to multi-agent theorem proving.
We take "multi-agent" to include either human or machine agents because we are hypothesizing
strong integration benefits of using features — whether one agent can re-use intermediate
information in addition to complete results of another agent, irrespective of the animacy of
the agents involved. Specifically, the capabilities demonstrated in Part Two are tested in an
environment where problem solving is performed in a theorem prover (a machine agent) guided
by a user (a human agent) with and without the assistance of the FeatureWizard (another machine
3 Many of these approaches are Turing-complete programming languages, and so their expressive capabilities are
theoretically equivalent. In these instances, we say an expressive property is not generally true of an approach
if the property is not true of how the approach is typically used, if developing the property in the approach
requires a significant amount of overhead work, and if this overhead work is tantamount to implementing a
different recognised approach.
4 Although there are complete methods for finding anti-derivatives if they exist (§7.1.1), they are computationally
expensive, not inspectable, and not sensitive to boundary conditions— some implementations will even return
erroneous solutions. As a result there is interest in inspectable solutions. Previous efforts along these lines
(§7.1.1) have had limited success and are used as a baseline for comparing our approach (§7.2.3).
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agent); it is shown that the partial automation of our system collaborating with the other two
agents yields significantly better performance, as measured both by timings and by percentage of
problems solved. We also show by experiment that it is easier for a user to become familiar with
a new theory (i.e. one written by a different human agent) when control knowledge is expressed
using features as opposed to other control knowledge representations. A further suggestion is
made (without experimentation at this point) that the causal information that features provide
could be used by other machine agents to improve their capabilities.
One such agent is investigated in Chapter 8: a learning agent which monitors this causal
information and attempts to generate improved control knowledge. We look at learning for
two reasons. Firstly, in a complex domain where the problem is not always solved (or solved
inefficiently), there is scope for improving the control knowledge. Secondly, as features encode
control knowledge differently, we might be able to apply learning techniques which have not
been successful with other control knowledge representations. Specifically, the introduction of
an abstraction layer (the features) between the problem statement and the methods distinguishes
three areaswhere learning could be attempted: automatically computingmappings, automatically
finding useful features, and automatically constructing new methods. We propose the second
benefit hypothesis:
(BH2) Feasch allows the use of learning mechanisms not applicable to other
systems, simplifying the encoding of control knowledge and yielding
improved performance.
and we test this hypothesis on the first area of learning, that of optimising mappings between
features and methods. (The other two areas are substantially more difficult, and also more
applicable to other control knowledge techniques. They are discussed as future work, §9.1.5.)
We show that a learning agent in our system is able to find good mappings both for the calculus
theory and the general HOL theory, as measured by performance. This demonstrates (BH2) and
offers further support for (BH1). From the point of view of a user, this capability means that a
developer needs only to define features for a problem domain, and our system can build powerful
control knowledge from those definitions.
The Future of Features
Part Four first looks at weaknesses and limitations of the feature-based approach that we
have encountered in this research and outlines future work which could be done to overcome
them (Chapter 9).
In Chapter 10 we introduce a generic formalism in the spirit of Newell & Simon's classic
Generalised Problem Solver (1972), where we use features and schemas to reveal commonalities
among many AI techniques. We suggest that this may be a new paradigm for viewing
computational problem solving, and we argue three broad claims along the lines of the benefit
hypotheses. Whilst some compelling evidence is available for this new framework for problem
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solving, we conclude thatmuchmore research is necessary to establish it as a decisive improvement
on its antecedants; and that this research is worth doing, given the practical advantages
demonstrated in Part Three.
Chapter 10 concludes by recapping the seven hypotheses tested in this research and
reviewing the ideas which motivate us, the accomplishments we show, and the possibilities
we hope to explore. Driven by intriguing recent theories in cognitive science, we set out to
invesigate whether features could be used as the foundation of an AI system. Finding that this is
possible (PH), we then look at how itmight express control knowledge in a different way to other
approaches, specifically in the area of formalised mathematical reasoning. Experiments testing
four hypotheses (EHn) demonstrate that this approach has unique expressive properties: these
properties distinguish it from other techniques in the literature and suggest that it is particularly
well-suited to complex domains. Focussing on one such domain within theorem proving —
evaluating integrals— we are able to establish two major benefits of the feature-based approach:
(1) improved machine-assisted and collaborative theorem proving
(2) simplified development and improved performance through learning
We close by reflecting on how cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence can support each
other by testing problem solving hypotheses in different ways: in our research, a recent cognitive
theory has lead to a powerful new problem solving system. Our experiments with this system
have provided support for it as a computational architecture for theorem proving, and further
experiments are planned and described to explore its relevance to other problem domains, both
with regards to other AI techniques and to the original psychological theories. We are excited
about the prospect of future work in both fields which will continue to develop our understanding
of problem solving and the role of features and schemas.
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Part One: The Possibility of Features
Chapter 1. The Psychology of Human Problem Solving
Human problem solving has long been a subject of fascination for philosophers, and the
various theories developed have affected all our lives, from how we were taught in school to
how political and business leaders go about making key decisions. We will begin our account
of the subject with two important — and highly contrasting — historical theories, after which
we will trace the development of these two traditions through to the state of the art. Following
this discussion, wewill review the space of possible directions of such cognitive science research,
introducing the vocabulary of cognitive modelling, and we will conclude by motivating our own
views on an avenue of research which appears fruitful.
Associationism
The study of cognition is often traced back at least as far as Aristotle, who, in On Memory
and Reminiscence and On the Soul (both c. 350 BCE), holds the mind to be composed of elements of
experience organised by "associations". He gives the example of mnemonic devices, where some
piece of knowledge can be reinforced in memory by frequent repetition or, more significantly,
by constructing a mental image associating it with other elements. He proceeds to set out four
principles by which elements are organised in the mind:
• Contiguity: two elements, perceived near each other in time or space, will be
linked together in the mind ("associated")
• Frequency: the more often an element is perceived (or imagined), the quicker it
is to recollect it; and the more often an association is encountered, the stronger it
becomes
• Similarity: two elements which are similar will be associated, regardless ofwhere
and when they are experienced
• Contrast: experience of one element may trigger recollection of something
completely opposite; or experience of A in association with B may trigger
recollection of an experience of A in association with Z, where B and Z are
opposite in some sense
The theory of Associationism underwent significant developments during the Enlightenment,
beginning with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who posited that complex experiences are merely
associations of simple experiences (in Humaine Nature, 1650). Hobbes focuses on contiguity
("coherence" or "continguity", in his terminology) as the basis for associations and identifies
frequency as the basis of Association's strength. David Hume (1711-1776) reinserts similarity
("resemblance", in his terminology, which has become an accepted standard) as a basis for
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the "connexion" of ideas and investigates one more basis, powerful yet elusive (in An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, 1748):
• Causality: two elements, where the occurrence of one often leads to the
occurrence of the other, will be associated (Hume notes that this cannot be
established absolutely, but can be strongly supported by inductive reasoning
on repeated contiguity as well as a number of other factors)
James Mill (1773-1836) extended Hume's approach and added another factor for the strength of
associations (Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 1829):
• Vividness: elements and associations will be stronger if the experience where
they occurred is intense (also called "liveliness")
Thomas Brown (1778-1820) added two other "secondary laws" for the strength of associations
(Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 1828):
• Recency: the more recently that an element is perceived (or considered), the
stronger will be its associations; and the more recently an association has been
followed, the stronger it will be
• Duration: the longer that an element is perceived (or considered), the stronger
will be its associations and the more likely it is to be retrieved later
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the son of James Mill, continued the study of causality, specifying
methods of inductive generalisation— of which the method of difference is preeminent: if A and
B cause C, but B does not cause C, then it is likely that A causes C (in A System ofLogic, 1843). As
suggested by this summary of his "logic", his approach has more to do with Associative learning,
and less to do with the deductive tradition introduced in the next section, than the title of his book
might indicate.
Logic
Starting in the late 18th Century, the Associationist approach, and the Empiricist School
which developed it, faced growing challenges from philosophers convinced that there must be
more structure to knowledge and reason. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) rejected the empiricist
premise (of Hume and others) that knowledge is necessarily rooted in experience, and sought to
develop an a priori classification of knowledge (A Critique ofPure Reason, 1781), based on rationalism
and logic. George Boole (1815-1864) followed the Kantian tradition, seeking to identify "laws of
thought" that would be independent of experience. In the introduction to An Investigation into the
Laws of Thought (1854), he writes:
The design of the following treatise is to investigate the fundamental laws of
the operation of the mind by which reasoning is performed; to give expression
to them in the symbolical language of Calculus, and upon this foundation to
establish the science of Logic and construct its method; tomake that method itself
the basis of a general method for the application of the mathematical doctrine of
Probability; and, finally, to collect from the various elements of truth brought to
view in the course of these inquiries some probable intimations concerning the
nature and constitution of the human mind.
Boole develops the syllogistic logic of Aristotle, as well as the work of Chinese, Indian, and
Arabic scholars, relating truth-valued propositions as sets and identifying properties of their
conjunctions (A, fl), disjunctions (V, U), and negations (—■). By the end of the thesis, however,
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he concludes that his Logic does not account for the breadth of actual human thought. Instead,
he argues, it is a normative description of how correct thinking should proceed. His Logic,
of course, was fundamental to the development of computers and digital technology; and
successive developments, chiefly the work of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925; Begriffsschrift [Concept
Script], 1879) and Charles Pierce (1839-1914; "On the Algebra of Logic", 1885), has led to widely-
used current forms of logic, using predicate notation,with formalised universal (V) and existential
quantification (3) of variables and, in some logics, higher-order predicates and quantifiers.
Predicate logics have become a defacto standard of representation, used in a vast range of
AI systems (§2) as well as an increasing number of knowledge corpora (due largely to the use of
XML and XSL, which are closely related to predicate logic). Our interest in this chapter, however,
is in the use of such logics to describe human cognition and problem solving. Although the logical
tradition and the associationist tradition have levelled criticisms back and forth — from Kant's
critique of Humean empiricism (1781), to Brown's attack on Kantian philosophy in the Edinburgh
Review (1803), through to present day rivalries discussed in subsequent sections — we do not
view them as necessarily incompatible. In the following sections, we use the dichotomy of the
two traditions to group recent developments in cognitive science, but we note that the distinction
is not always clear, and our choice of where to place theories is at times a subjective one. Our
grouping is based on whether a theory is built fundamentally upon logical rules of inference (not
necessarily axioms) or built upon associationist principles (which may be incidentally expressed
in a logic).
1.1. Memory-based Problem Solving
One of the most well-known examples of associationist principles is Pavlov's theory of
behavioural conditioning (1928), where a dog can be trained to associate a bell with food, and will
thereafter salivate merely at the sound of a bell. Contiguity of the bell and food is necessary for
the association to take place, and the "secondary laws" of frequency and recency can be shown
to have a measurable effect on the learning of the association, or at least upon a behavioural
manifestation.5
At levels above reflex actions, however, and particularly with regards to cognition and
problem solving, the interpretation of Associationist principles is unclear. What constitutes an
element or an experience? What is the quantitative effect of frequency, or the elusive notion of
vividness, on the likelihood of retrieving something from memory? And, crucially, how is the
similarity established?
5 This behaviour could be expressed logically, through a statement such as "bell —> food", with formulas for
frequency and recency addressing the strength of this "rule"; Pavlov, however, did not couch his result in this
way, and the use of logic is neither explicit nor implicit in the theory, whereas the principle of contiguity is, so
we group it in the Associationist tradition.
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1.1.1. Gestalt Psychology
By focussing on specific and simplified domains, early 20th Century psychologists in the
Gestalt School began to provide answers to some of these questions. Early experiments looked
at the perception of shape and interpretations of dot patterns, confirming that the mind forms
associations and interpretations based on proximity and similarity, and identifying shape, colour,
and size as factors used for judging similarity (the German word gestalt means "put together"
or "form"). More interestingly, it was observed that where some of these components are the
same, the similarity judgment can be invariant of other factors, including symmetries (rotation,
reflection, and translation) and lack of "closure". Closure, here, refers to a tendency of the mind
to perceive entities in a holistic way, "filling in" details as necessary. "Pragnanz" (a German word
meaning precision), is the Gestalt principle that "when things are grasped as wholes, the minimal
amount of energy is exerted in thinking." It is by these principles, under Gestalt theory, that
people are able to interpret the following images in sophisticated and extremely consistent ways
(Wertheimer, 1923):
Figure 1.1: Closure in Gestalt Perception. By proximity, the six small black
objects will be perceived together on the left. The principle of closure states that
twowhite triangles will be perceived, and the similarity of shape, colour, and size
will associate the two triangles independent of their orientation. The amorphous
black blobs on the right hand side are interpreted as a separate, single image, by
proximity, and the holistic form of a dog is made out even though none of the
dog's constituent parts are individually recognisable.
The importance of holism is championed in Wertheimer's address to the Kant Society
(1924), stressing its advance over Associationism of the previous centuries and its advantages
over logical approaches:
For centuries the assumption has prevailed that our world is essentially a
summation of elements. For Hume and largely also for Kant the world is like
a bundle of fragments, and the dogma of meaningless summations continues
to play its part. As for logic, it supplies: concepts, which when rigorously
viewed are but sums of properties; classes, which upon closer inspection prove
to be mere catchalls; syllogisms, devised by arbitrarily lumping together any
two propositions having the character that ... etc. When one considers what a
concept is in living thought, what it really means to grasp a conclusion; when one
considers what the crucial thing is about a mathematical proof and the concrete
interrelationships it involves, one sees that the categories of traditional logic have
accomplished nothing in this direction.
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Categorisation
Gestalt theory maintains that perception attunes to the essence of an observed reality, at
least insofar as it is able to. Perception tends towards "optimal organisation" using associative
connections and the "Gestalt qualitat" (ibid.). The principles of pragnanz and closure, imply that
conceptual categories both curtail and inform the act of perception. In other words, people do
not view the world as it is, but rather they perceive it through a set of conceptual filters. It is by
having a concept of "triangle" and "dog" that people are able to make the potentially more useful
interpretations of the images in figure 1.1. As Arnheim succinctly puts it, "eyesight is insight"
(1954).
The prospect of perception being any other way is humorously explored in the story of
"Funes the Memorious" (Borges, 1944), a man who perceives and remembers every detail, but
without any abstract conceptualisation or holistic understanding:
We, in a glance, perceive three wine glasses on the table; Funes saw all the shoots,
clusters, and grapes of the vine. He remembered the shapes of the clouds in the
south at dawn on the 30th of April of 1882, and he could compare them in his
recollection with the marbled grain in the design of a leather-bound book [...] .
These recollections were not simple; each visual image was linked to muscular
sensations, thermal sensations, etc. He could reconstruct all his dreams, all his
fancies. Two or three times he had reconstructed an entire day. He told me: I
have more memories in myself alone than all men have had since the world was
a world. And again: My dreams are like your vigils. And again, toward dawn:
My memory, sir, is like a garbage disposal.
Borges's account is, sadly, notwithout its real-world analogue. Luria, in his studies ofmnenomism
(1975), observed patients with excellent memories but extraordinary difficulties in synthesising
them. "Each word calls up images; they collide with one another, and the result is chaos. I can't
make anything out of this" (ibid., cf. Eysenck 1984).
The process of categorisation is fundamental to cognition, and is inseparable from concept
formation and similarity judgments, so unsurprisingly it has been one of the most active areas
of cognitive science research. Some of the more influential theories are: feature sets (Katz &
Posner, 1964), where categories are defined in terms of features that elements must possess; family
resemblance (Wittgenstein, 1953; Rosch & Mervis 1975), where categories are defined as flexible
entities based on similarity; prototype and exemplar models (Posner & Keele, 1978; Nosofsky,
1974), where prototypical members define the category; and explanation-based categorisation
(Murphy & Medin, 1985; Komatsu, 1992), where categories can be defined by arbitrary theories,
and in some accounts affected by contextual situation (Barsalou, 2003).
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Insight
With regards to problem solving, we note that in some instances, merely finding the right
category is the solution. (Identifying the triangles and dog in figure 1.1 is a trivial example.) It is
clear, however, that in many instances, and particularly with complex problems, there is a great
deal of cognitive work to be done after perception.
In one classic Gestalt experiment, a chimpanzee is placed in a roomwith bananas hanging
beyond his reach and several crates scattered about the floor (Kohler, 1925). The chimpanzee tries
standing on a crate, but still cannot reach the bananas. After several moments of apparent
frustration and deliberation, the chimpanzee excitedly rearranges and stacks crates, and climbs
them to reach the bananas. Kohler hypothesises that a gestation period occurs, during which the
structural essence of a problem is identified, and after some gestation, an "insight" may occur. It
is only by understanding the functional parameters of a problem that one achieves crucial insights
that enable a solution (Koffka, 1935).
In another experiment, human subjects were placed in a room with a table, a candle, a
box of matches, a wooden tray of nails, and a hammer; theywere asked to attach the candle to the
wall above the table in such a way that it would burn without dripping onto the table (Duncker,
1926). Most subjects failed to solve the problem, for as Duncker concluded, they get stuck on the
idea that the tray is there only to hold the nails. Those who solved the problem did so by nailing
the tray into the wall. The failure of most subjects to reach this solution Duncker attributed to the
principle of "functional fixedness": people's problem solving is restricted by the context in which
they are set. Insight is often made possible by overcoming these restrictions.
Further examples of this principle were shown through the nine-dot problem and the
pendulum problem. In the first of these, familiar to many schoolchildren, nine dots are given on a
piece of paper, in a three-by-three grid, and subjects are asked to draw four straight line segments
which pass through all the dots, without retracing lines and without lifting the pen. The elusive
solution famously involves "thinking outside the box" (Maier, 1930). In the pendulum problem
(Maier, 1931), two strings hanging from the ceiling have to be connected to each other; various
objects can be used including a pair of pliers. The strings are too far apart for both to be reached,
even using the objects as arm extensions. The solution involves the insight that a string can be
made to move as pendulum, overcoming functional fixedness to view the pliers as the pendulum
weight.
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Transformation and Productive Thinking
Although functional fixedness is a useful concept in explaining obstructions to insight, it
does not explain the positive factors that contribute to insight. Maier (ibid.) found that subjects
were much more receptive to the insight needed for the pendulum problem if he brushed against
a string, setting it in motion; this result was true even for subjects who reported no awareness of
having witnessed him do this.
Further exploration into the nature of insight was performed with a series of experiments
where subjects are asked to think aloud while trying to solve the following radiation problem
(Duncker, 1945):
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant tumour in
his stomach. It is impossible to operate on the patient, but unless the tumour is
destroyed the patient will die. There is a kind of ray that can be used to destroy
the tumour. If the rays reach the tumour all at once at a sufficiently high intensity,
the tumour will be destroyed. Unfortunately, at this intensity the healthy tissue
that the rays pass through on the way to the tumour will also be destroyed. At
lower intensities the rays are harmless to healthy tissue, but they will not affect
the tumour either. What type of procedure might be used to destroy the tumour
with the rays, and at the same time avoid destroying the healthy tissue? (version
from Gick & Holyoak, 1980)
Duncker recorded the problem solving methods as subjects recounted them, and found that
highlighting the structural constraints was a key step in nearly all the solutions. By restructuring
the problem in a waywhich clarified the issues, subjects were able to find the insight: in the Gestalt
theory of "productive thinking", the process of transformation— "looking for structural rather
than piecemeal truth" by "realizing structural features and structural requirements" (Wertheimer,
1945) — is a key step in enabling insight. (The solution to the radiation problem is described
below, after a visual hint.)
As suggested by the pendulum experiment, however, the use of the speak-aloud protocol
entails certain risks. Even assuming honest intentions, people are not necessarily aware of their
cognitive processes, and so what is spoken aloud will not tell the whole story. Furthermore, the
process of speaking aloud may affect subjects' performance. This was shown in an experiment
with the Tower of Hanoi problem, where disks must be moved among pegs subject to given
constraints, with interesting results pertaining to problem transformation and transfer (Ewert &
Lambert, 1932). Those subjects who spoke aloud while performing the task had markedly worse
performance than thosewho did not, possibly due to the unfamiliar additionalburden it entailed or
interruption to their concentration. However, when the same subjects were later given a different,
related problem, the subjects who had previously verbalised their thoughts performed markedly
better than those who had not. The Gestaltist interpretation is that the process of verbalising
thoughts provides greater familiarity with structural features, enabling problem transformation
that leads to a solution.6
6 More recent experiments have generally validated these early findings, using improved methodology that is
not dependent on the speak-aloud protocol (e.g. Knoblich and Wartenberg, 1998; and Gick & Holyoak, 1980).
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The power of this transformation is highlighted by a more recent experiment using
the radiation problem, sometimes with the following diagram and sometimes without (Gick
& Holyoak, 1980):
Figure 1.2: A Diagram Useful for the Duncker Radiation Problem
By providing the problem transformed into its essentials, the problem is made much easier:
subjects given the diagram outperform those without by a wide margin.
1.1.2. Schemas
Productive thinking was initially viewed as an alternative to Associationism, which
accounted merely for "reproductive thinking", where a new problem is solved by copying a
similar problem with a known solution (Wertheimer, 1945). The distinction between productive
and reproductive thinking is not clear cut, however. We have seen that by including a diagram for
the radiation problem, by showing the string sway in the pendulum problem, and by encouraging
verbalisation in the Tower ofHanoi problem, researchers were able to assist subjects in productive
thinking. A recent interpretation of these results is that, in each instance, structural features are
cued which support the structural transformation needed to solve the problem. Furthermore,
the strength of the effect can be shown to vary in accordance with each of the secondary laws
of Associationism, recency, vividness, frequency, and duration (Rnoblich & Wartenberg, 1998;
Kershaw & Ohlssen, 2001).
In current literature on problem solving, these results are often explained in terms of
associative, memory-based schemas. Whilst the term dates back at least as far as Bartlett (1932)
and various other closely-related terms have been used (frames by Minsky, in Johnson-Laird &
Wason, 1977; scripts by Schank & Abelson, in ibid.; and templates by Millikan, 2000) we will start
with the definition given by D. E. Rumelhart in "Schemata: the building blocks of cognition"
(1980);
[Schemas are] the fundamental elements upon which all information processing
depends. Schema[s] are employed in the process of interpreting sensory data,
... in retrieving information from memory, in organizing actions, in determining
goals,... in allocating resources, and generally in guiding the flow of processing
in the system ... . A schema ... is a data structure for representing the generic
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concepts stored in memory. ... [Schemas represent knowledge] about ... objects,
situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and sequences of actions, (ellipses
and summarisations as quoted from Sabella, 1999)
According to this theory, structural features— such as the swaying string and the vocabulary for
the Tower ofHanoi task— correspond to schemas in one'smemory, and the spreading activation of
these schemas along associative principles constitutes the Gestalt transformation. In "reproductive
thinking", the internal representation of a problem activates previously solved example problems
or schemas. Where problems require "productive thinking", "Gestalt psychologists ... explained
their difficulty in terms of Gestalts, schemas that supposedly organize perceptual information"
(Kershaw & Ohlssen, 2001): "the defining characteristic of [these] insight problems is that
they activate seemingly relevant prior knowledge which is not, in fact, relevant or helpful"
(ibid.). The "insight" that is necessary is the activation of schemas which cue helpful prior
knowledge, i.e., schemas corresponding to key structural features. Association between certain
features in a problem and a relevant schema can be taught (ibid.) or strengthened in other ways
(Knoblich & Wartenberg, 1998; and others, as discussed earlier), and doing so appears to change
difficult "productive thinking" problems into easily solved problems that seem to require only
"reproductive thinking".
Experiments studying expertise provide more evidence of the role prior knowledge plays
in making problems easier to solve and solved better. De Groot (1946) showed arrangements
of pieces on a chess board to expert and amateur players, finding that the experts are
significantly better at recalling positions from actual games, but no better than amateurs for
chance arrangements. His conclusion was that experts have a larger store of relevant "chunks"
— common arrangements of pieces in functional relationships — which enables them to better
remember positions from actual games. For random arrangements, de Groot argues, this prior
knowledge is completely unhelpful. Experts in chess, it is estimated, have around 50,000 such
chunks (Chase & Simon, 1973), of which approximately 7 ± 2 (Miller, 1956) can be active in
workingmemory; or possibly even fewer assuming strong associative links (Halford et al., 1998).
Association can affect the use of chunks, by explicitly cueing appropriate or inappropriate contexts
(Eisenstadt & Kareev, in Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1977). The two games Go and Gomoku use
identical boards and pieces, although different rules give rise to very different board positions. By
telling subjects which game a position was from, their recall ability was improved, and conversely
telling them the wrong game gave rise to worse recall performance.
In the Gestalt view, these chunks are examples of "structural features" which contribute
to holistic understanding of a problem. In the schema theory view, these chunks are the actual
fundamental schemas through which problems are interpreted. It has been argued, however,
that this process, interpreting problems through schemas, is in fact a central facet of all cognition:
"cognitive features are not added by previous, separate processes; they are expressed in perceptual
schemas that are constantly participating in the ongoing activity of perception" (Ben-Zeev, 1988).
The "theory of perceptual schemas" (ibid.) develops the Gestalt view that "eyesight is insight",
recasting it in the modern language of schemas. Expertise, in the schema theory of cognition,
is explained by having more schemas, better schemas, and better associative cues for accessing
schemas, involved in all aspects of problem solving.
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1.1.3. Similarity and Categorisation
The nature of these "better associative cues" merits closer scrutiny. In the schema theory,
we can specify that one experience is associatedwith another if they both activate certain schemas,
perceptual or otherwise. The two experiences can be said to be similar with respect to the activated
schemas; or as discussed in §1.1.l.i, we could say that they both belong to a common category.
This view is supported by experiments where physics students were asked to partition
a set of physics problems into groups. It was found that students who were generally better at
physics performed the grouping using structural features of the problem, such that similarly-
solved problems were placed together. The less adept students seemed to pay more attention
to superficial features unrelated to the solutions. The authors conclude that "[experts'] problem
schema were organized around the principles, whereas novices approached problem solving on
the basis of the problem's literal surface features". (Chi et al., 1981) Several years later, upon a
remark that this workwas the singlemost cited article in the Cognitive Science journal, the principal
author notes:
The basic expert-novice result, that experts' knowledge is represented at a
"deep" level (how- ever one characterizes "deep"), while novices' knowledge
is represented at a more concrete level, has been replicated in many domains,
ranging from knowledge possessed by scientists to taxi drivers. This result can
also be used to interpret findings in many related cognitive science topics, e.g.,
analogical reasoning, and concepts and categories. (Chi, 1993)
In a further experiment, Chi et al. (1989) found that speaking aloud while studying "solution
schemas" can lead to improved solving ability on physics problems. Two reasons for this "self-
explanation effect", similar to the findings of Ewert & Lambert (1932) in §l.l.l.iii, are suggested
in the literature: speaking aloud leads to a more thorough schema (VanLehn & Jones, 1993) and
to a more easily accessible schema (Pirolli & Anderson, 1985).
What this shows is that having detailed schemas, and having them available when given
a problem, are central factors that play a role early in the problem solving process. The use
of "literal surface features" for classifying problems is consistent with many of the theories of
categorisation from §1.1.l.i. However, the fact that complex schemas are involved in experts'
grouping of problems gives strong support for explanation-based categorisation, where schemas
"encode the typical properties of instances of general categories" (Anderson, 1985) and include
definitions based around a theory. Activation of a schema, through perceptual or post-perceptual
processes, can suffice to associate a category with a problem. For novices (and in "productive
thinking" examples), the schema or category may be merely unhelpful, superficial features, but
for experts, the category corresponds to an important concepts in the problem, and the defining
schema may directly cue a schematic solution.
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1.1.4. Analogy and Retrieval
The Importance of Structure
As noted in §l.l.l.ii, many problems do not have the schematic textbook solutions of
college physics, and categorisation — whether on the basis of surface features or structural
schemas — does not always lead to a solution directly. Identifying a category (concept) can
lead to the activation of a previously solved problem from memory, and the solution might apply
analogically to the target problem. In the process of analogical reasoning, mappings are established
between the two cases and used to draw inference between them, transferring knowledge from
the source to the target in such a way as to provide (one hopes) a solution or insightful structural
understanding. Several theories of analogy have been proposed to explain the process (Gentner,
1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989a; Hofstadter et ah, 1995), using different structural representations
(predicate logic, connectionism, and arrays, respectively) and sometimes introducing additional
steps {e.g., retrieval, re-representation, evaluation), but nearly all agree that structural similarity is
what essentially defines analogical reasoning.
One of the simplest and most influential models for this structural transfer is the theory
of structure mapping (Gentner, 1983; implementation described in Falkenheimer et ah, 1989).
When drawing an analogy, the theory suggests that people seek the best mapping from entities
in one case to entities in the other case such that the structural relations between the entities
are preserved by the mapping. The fact that "in the solar system, planets revolve around the
sim" is thus analogous to "in an atom, electrons revolve around the nucleus"; the structural
relationship in (M, revolve-around(A, B)) is identical under entitymatches (e.g., A <-* planets
<-> electrons).
In another experiment involving Duncker's radiation problem (§l.l.l.iii), an analogous
story is presented to some subjects, where a general is attacking a fortress on a hill, but if he
ascends from any one direction his troops will be wiped out. The solution is also presented: the
general has his troops attack from all directions at the same time. Gick & Holyoak (1980) found
that whilst only 10% of subjects solved the Duncker problem spontaneously without the story, the
rate increased to 40% when subjects were told the story of the general, and increased to 70% when
they were specifically told that the story related to the problem.
An interesting observation is that the majority of subjects who were presented the story
did not spontaneously find the analogy. The structural transfer is a thought-intensive process,
according to most accounts, and as has been shown throughout many of these experiments, the
activation of relevant schemas or analogues is particularly important. Other studies show that
finding and using analogues from the same domain as a problem — "near transfer" — is much
easier than retrieving analogues from other domains — "far transfer" (Gick & Holyoak, 1983).
This distinction is reminiscent to the split between "reproductive" and "productive" thinking,
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and again association by similarity provides some explanation, since the domain constitutes a
schematic category.
Analogical mechanisms apply to abstracted solution schemas in memory just as well
as they do to individual previously worked problems (experience). In some instances, such as
"textbook solutions", the two cannot be distinguished, and there is little psychological evidence
that abstractions are used any differently from experiences—memory experiments in fact suggest
the opposite, that we cannot recall events as they were, but only in terms of our schemaas
(Schank, 1986). Briefly considering the level of perception and grounded representation, we
observe that it would be impossible to have an abstracted schema without prior experiences, and
equally impossible to have a meaningful representation of experience without prior abstractions.
Although many authors prefer the use of the word "schema" for knowledge that has been
abstracted, such a distinction is neither psychologically nor philosophically grounded. As it
simplifies discussion to allow the word to include actual experiences (this could be considered
"the identity abstraction", as opposed to "a proper abstraction", cf. proper subsets), wewill follow
Rumelhart (1980) in doing so.
Retrieval: Availability and Similarity
The activation of relevant schemas— retrieval— is often considered as a separate process,
and the apparent effort involved in analogy certainly suggests the necessity of pre-processing to
focus attention within the enormous library of one's entire prior knowledge. Associationism
provides some explanation for this retrieval; the importance of vividness, frequency, and recency
has been repeatedly shown and, in many instances, quantified (see Squire, 1992, for a good
overview); these secondary laws have come to be known collectively as "availability" (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973).
As for the vital element of similarity in retrieval, some much-needed clarification is
provided by one series of experiments in particular (Gentner & Landers, 1985; Ratterman &
Gentner, 1987). Subjects were told a story of "Karla the Hawk"; two weeks later, each subject
was told a "similar" story, which was either superficially similar (a very different story but also
involving birds), analogous (but superficially dissimilar, not involving birds), literally similar
(analogous and about birds), or unrelated (neither analogous nor about birds). The superficially
story involving birds tended to trigger recall of the original story, but the analogous story and the
unrelated story did not. However,when shown all four stories, subjects judged the analogous story
muchmore similar to the original than the superficially similar story. This double dissociation, it is
argued, shows that superficial features play the prominent role in governingwhat people retrieve
from memory, even if these features may not always be the best cue. A computer simulation
following this principle gives a good match to human performance in the story domain (Forbus et
al., 1994). Other experiments show that people prefer to use structural similarity to form categories,
but identifying structural similarities is difficult (Ramscar & Pain, 1996); and that familiarity with
a structural concept facilitates retrieval of a case involving the concept but only if the concept is
learned prior to the case (Humphreys et al., 1994).
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Abstraction
How do people acquire these concepts? Many accounts for "schema formation" have
been given in the literature, and a common view is that they are abstracted from commonalities
across experiences (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). By preface, we note that a schematically-defined
category need not necessarily be invoked directly in order to perform an analogy. If the target
problem shares enough known features with some source case in memory, that might be enough
to retrieve the source even if the deeper common structure was not observed or remarkable
beforehand. This was found, for example, when students were given particularly difficult physics
problems and it was observed they preferred to follow well-defined examples (VanLehn, 1996).
Once a source analogue is found, the thought-intensive process of transferring the solution (such
as through structure mapping) can lead to an abstraction of the common principle; this abstracted
general representation can be stored as a schema. This process of abstraction has been intensively
studied, from early principles of induction (Mill, 1829) through to causal learning (Sobel, 2004)
and explanation-based generalisation (Schank, 1986).
Some theories posit that the abstractions may not even be stored or made explicitly.
According to exemplar models of categorisation (Nosofsky, 1984), a family of similar elements
can be constructed without a defining schema being made explicitly, as evidenced by humans'
use of categories without names and without vocalisable definitions. The entire analogy-making
process, some argue, is merely a part of "high-level perception" (Chalmers et ah, 1998), and all
the illustrations are simplified approximations. Others find the question of whether feature-
perception and schema-representation are explicit to be a moot point:
I suspect that the argument about whether concepts and knowledge are really
perceptual or symbolic will turn out not to be a substantive issue, but instead an
argument about what should be called "perceptual". (Murphy, 2002)
Even if these entities are not necessarily explicit in themind, the fact that people share a vocabulary
of concepts — and the speak-aloud experiments demonstrating the self-explanation effect —
suggest that they are at least natural artefacts of communication. In models trying to explain
cognition, treating perception as part of the process and making features and schemas explicit, we
feel, greatly extends the inspectability of the process even if they are approximations to a much
more complicated neural phenomenon.
What unites the theories described in this section — beyond details such as whether
abstraction is explicit or implicit and whether problem solving occurs through perception,
categorisation, or analogy— is the view that all problem solving is shaped by prior experience.
Features in a problem are identified and these features cue schemas from memory. The cued
schemas may be known textbook solutions to physics problems, which apply directly to the
problem, or analogous stories which suggest inferences useful for the problem. The processmight
not be explicit, and the solver might have no awareness of any concept to explain the cues. The
process might iterate over and over, and of course the process might give poor results, at times.
Applying prior knowledge to a new domain can be difficult. However, the capability of retrieving
relevant knowledge, from a vast store of acquired schemas and experiences, is a much more
difficult task which the mind does effortlessly.
Heneveld 20
1.2. Logical Accounts
Another common facet of thememory-based theories just described is that the knowledge
is the problem solving mechanism. Perception, categorisation, analogy, and learning are all
explained in terms of the existing contents of one's memory. Logical accounts argue against this
tabula rasa of the Empiricists, maintaining that a formal mechanism for thought is hard-wired in
the brain— or at least that such an abstract mechanism is the best high-level approximation. Prior
knowledge affects this process only insofar as the logical mechanism uses the knowledge or (in
"production rule" formulations) when it is abstracted enough to become a general rule in a logical
form.
In developmental psychology, Piaget famously identifies "formal operations" as the
characteristic of the fourth and final stage in child development (1983). The challenge of
determining the logic of these formal operations, continuing Boole's original goal (§l.ii), was
taken up by Jaskowski (1934) and Gentzen (1935). It is the latter's system of natural deduction,
based on 13 rules of "introduction and elimination", which has been particularly important:
Ich wollte zunachst einmal einen Formalismus aufstellen, der dem wirklichen
Schlieen moglichst nahe kommt. So ergab sich ein „Kalkul des natiirlichen
SchlieSens". (First I wished to construct a formalism that comes as close as
possible to actual reasoning. Thus arose a "calculus of natural deduction".) (ibid.;
translation fromWikipedia, "natural deduction")
Its import, however, has been primarily among logicians, just as with Boole, because even if it is
not a descriptive model of human thought, this style of natural deduction is regarded as relatively
easy to understand.7
1.2.1. Logics for Non-logicality: The Wason Selection Task
One reason for the divergence between strictly logical and psychological accounts has
been the repeated confirmation that untutored subjects perform very badly on logic problems.
Classic evidence for this is given by the Wason Selection Task (1971), where subjects are shown
four cards:
A K 4 7
Subjects are told that each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other, and their task
is to turn over as few cards as possible to determine whether the statement "if a card has a vowel
on one side, it has an even number on the other" is true or false. The expected answers— A and
7— are given by less than 10% of subjects in typical experiments (ibid.).
Proponents of the logical approaches, however, maintain that people's systematic errors
can be predicted by logical rules. The modus tollens rule allows inferring -iP from P —> Q and
-iQ; in the Wason Selection Task, it means a card showing an odd number must have a consonant
overleaf, and corresponds to the most commonly overlooked violation of the rule. Various models
7 It has, however, fallen out of favour among many contemporary logicians because it is not convenient for
meta-logical reasoning.
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suggest that people prefer other inference rules to modus tollens or that it is not a primitive rule
but rather a lengthy chain of other rules (Braine, 1978; Rips, 1994). Errors and human response
times in logic problems can be correlated with the use of non-preferred rules or with the length
of the inference chains required to solve them; computer models using sets of primitive rules can
give a good fit to human performance data (ibid.).
A very different computational approach to explaining the data is the theory that people
construct mental models (Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1977) enumerating certain possibilities in
certain rule-definable ways; these enumerated possibilities frequently exclude the modus tollens
case. Yet other theories postulate that people interpret the problem with varying semantics, such
as a biconditional "if" (cards have both a vowel and an even number or neither; Wason, 1968) or
deontic rules (whether a rule has been violated, as opposed to its truth value; Geis and Zwicky,
1971; Cosmides, 1989), correctly using consistent logics appropriate to those semantics.
1.2.2. Production Rules
One of the most influential theories of human problem solving takes a related view of
cognition, hypothesising that instead of completely abstract natural deduction rules, real-world
knowledge is "compiled" into procedural production rules expressed in the logical form "if
<precondition> then <action>". Logic Theorist (Newell & Simon, 1956), an early computer
program discussed more in §2.3, used "transformation rules for logic", expressed as productions,
to automatically prove theorems in formal logic. Whilst LT was one of the first inspiring successes
of artificial intelligence, its behaviour differed quite markedly from human subjects'; extensive
observation of speak-aloud protocols led to the development of a novel system, General Problem
Solver (Ernst & Newell, 1969), and an accompanying theory (and groundbreaking book) ofHuman
Problem Solving (Newell & Simon, 1972).
This research, in its early days, looked at finitely-specified domains where little or no
outside knowledge need to be brought to bear on the problem — including the Tower of Hanoi
problem. Whilst such a condition may seem severely restricted in light of the memory-based
theories described in §1.1, it had the advantage of simplifying the issue to an extent that striking
commonalities could be concluded across many problem domains:
• Problem solving is a search for a "goal" solution within a space of states possible
in a problem domain.
• Production rules describe the operators for valid state transformations.
• Production rules may also encapsulate procedural knowledge about which
productions are appropriate to the current goal.
• Heuristic strategies guide the selection of productions and the search process.
Using production rules, Newell & Simon are able to give a close account of human performance
in a variety of tasks, including crypt-arithmetic, water jug problems, and river-crossing with
constraints (ibid.). These models, however, frequently relied on the use of strategies, such as hill-
climbing, means-end analysis, or best-first search (§1.3, §2), and these strategies are not accounted
forwithin the theory itself. The productions and the strategies had to be hand-coded in the system,
with domain-specific productions necessary for each problem type such that solutions resembled
decision procedures written in any programming language. Crucially, the theory did not explain
where the production rules or the strategies came from, and it did not provide any explanation
for problem solving in knowledge-rich domains.
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1.2.3. Cognitive Architectures: Soar and ACT-R
Since this seminal work, production rule systems have been extended with the aim of
providing "cognitive architectures", a "fixed system of mechanisms that underlies and produces
cognitive behaviour" (Newell et al., in Posner, 1989). Two major examples of this approach are
Soar (Laird et al., 1986) and ACT-R (Anderson, 1985). In both architectures, prior knowledge is
stored in associatively-cued memory (as relatively fine-grained elements, in contrast to schemas;
Newell et al., in Posner, 1989), and in both architectures, productions guide behaviour to achieve
specified goals.
The most basic difference between the two is that Soar maintains all knowledge as
productions, whereas ACT-R maintains distinct "declarative" and "production" memories. The
developers ofACT-R base the distinction on a commonly accepted dichotomy in neurophysiology,
where declarative ("memory that stores facts and events ... textbook learning", Wikipedia) and
procedural ("implicit memory ... of skills and procedures", ibid.) memories are dissociable (there
are cases of brain damage where one functions without the other, and vice versa) and localisable
(different brain regions are involved for each). This dichotomy, however, usually places procedural
memory as a lower cognitive sub-system (e.g., learning motor skills) having very little to do with
conscious problem solving. The distinction in ACT-R seems to correspond more closely to a split
within declarative memory between "episodic" and "semantic"; this split is neither dissociable














Figure 1.3: Problem Solving in ACT-R (adapted from Anderson, 1995)
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A second difference between the two architectures is in their mechanisms governing
the selection of production rules. ACT-R uses a "conflict resolution" phase to select a single
production, by weighing rules according to "expected effort and expected success" (Anderson
& Schunn, 2000), parametrised formulas based on past success and the time taken to verify
(and instantiate) preconditions. In Soar, all associatively cued productions fire, affecting what
are effectively compartmentalised problem representations; a subgoal is created to select among
the productions, using a production subsystem to compare the results and identify a unique
continuation. Subgoaling is also the principal learning mechanism of Soar:
All long-term knowledge in Soar arises through chunking, a learning mechanism
that compiles the results of subgoal search into a production rule that can produce
the result without subgoaling. This implies that Soar can only acquire long-term
declarative memory by learning a rule that encodes the appropriate conditions in
which the declarative memory will be needed. (Johnson, 1997)
In ACT-R, there are a number of learning mechanisms. Conflict resolution entails some "passive
learning", as does the addition of new experiences to declarative memory. The crucial step,
however, is the transfer from declarative memory to procedural memory, described recently as
follows:
With respect to procedural knowledge, production rules are learned in ACT-Rby
a process we call analogy. For analogy to work in the ACT-R theory two things
have to happen. First, the ACT-R must come upon a situation where it wants to
solve a goal. ... Second, the learner needs an example of the solution of such a
goal. ... In this situation, the ACT-R analogy mechanism will try to abstract the
principle in the example and form a production rule embodying this principle
which can then be applied in the current situation. Once formed this production
rule is then available to apply in other situations. (Anderson & Schunn, 2000)
The description is very similar to schema theories of analogy; in practise, however, the majority
of models rely on four simpler means of forming productions:
• Proceduralization. If a rule accesses declarative memory, and uses the knowledge
from declarativememory in its action, then learn a new rule that is identical to the
old rule but has the retrieved knowledge instantiated into the rule, eliminating
the declarative retrieval.
• Composition. Collapse a sequence of rules into a single rule that performs all the
actions of the individual rules of the sequence.
• Generalization. If there are two rules that are similar, create a generalized version
of these rules. This can be done by removing conditions or by substituting
constants by variables.
• Discrimination. If a rule is successful in one situation but not in another, add
conditions to the rule to make a more restrictive version that only applies in
successful situations. (Niels & Taatgen, in Nadel, 2000)
Thesemechanisms are all implemented as internals to ACT-R; they are not described byproduction
rules and are not "learnable" within the theory. Nevertheless, the number of tasks that have been
modelled by productions in ACT-R is impressive, and nearly all models are able to give a very
close fit to data on actual human performance in problem solving tasks (Anderson & Lebiere,
1998).
It isworth noting that analogy mechanisms have also been implemented as explicit ACT-R
models, using inspectable production rules (Salvucci & Anderson, in Anderson & Lebiere, 1998),
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and providing one of the only illustrations of "far transfer" in a production architecture (Murdock
et ah, 1998). In these instances, the production rules are hand-coded and no attempt is made
to show either that they lead to the learning of productions or that the analogical productions
themselves can be learned. The same is true for means-end analysis and other heuristics identified
in §1.2.2 and §1.3.
In general, "different strategies are simply represented with different productions (or sets
of productions)" (Anderson & Schunn, 2000), which are hand-coded; or they constitute an internal
part of the underlying cognitive architecture. Both ACT-R and Soar develop the theory of cognition
as using production rules by specifying how this can be done more fluidly than in the original
statement (§1.2.2). The theories have been attacked for having too many tunable parameters
in their implementations (latency times can — and frequently are — indicated for every single
production in ACT-R, leading some to wonder if the degrees of freedom would permit modelling
of nearly any behaviour), but there is little question that they have greatly increased support for
the logic-based view that "if ... then" productions are the best basis formodelling cognition.8
They have also provided computational specifications for how the memory-based doctrine of
associationism could work9.
1.3. Strategies for Problem Solving
Whether they are implemented as schemas, productions, or internal control knowledge,
nearly all of the theories presented here insist on the importance of certain common strategies
for problem solving. Newell & Simon focus on search, with various best-first heuristics; this
technique has been fundamental in machine problem solving (see §2.1.2), but evidence suggests
people's capacity for search is limited to small state spaces (e.g., the children's game of "noughts
and crosses", §3.3) or to a small "lookahead" portion of large state spaces.
The literature on attempts to teach problem solving is one of the richest sources of
identifying practical strategies for problem solving. These accounts havemainly been anecdotally
acquired by educators with relatively little interest in proving the actual use of these strategies (or
in identifying their origins). Though thatmay be, their effectiveness is undisputed. The strategies
— and the books — have proven popular among students as well as everyone from business
coaches to AI researchers (Mayer, 1983), and experimental evidence shows that they can, in some
instances, improve problem solving ability (§1.3.ii).
8 As in § 1.2.1, productionsneed not correspond to logically valid connectives (although they normally do) andmay
bear no resemblance to "natural deduction" systems. Issues of soundness and completeness are fundamental in
logic and are important from a standpoint of complexity, but have been largely ignored in cognitivemodels after
Logic Theorist (and it is debatable whether LT is a cognitivemodel, even if itwas inspired by and led to principles
of human cognition). There is, however, no reason to expect these issues to be applicable to human thought. The
essential character of production rules is their form as boolean precondition —> action propositions; systems
of these rules are normally hand-crafted for certain domains, in the same way that natural deduction and LT
were crafted for the domain of propositional logic, and the use of long-termmemory isminimal inmost models,
so we view production architectures as primarily continuing the "logical" tradition.
9 Such an account is otherwise severely lacking in the schema theory literature. This is but one ofmany ways that
the use of production rule architectures has contributed far beyond the "logical" tradition, to nearly all areas of
cognitive science including memory-based approaches. This point is elaborated in §1.4.2.i.
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Strategies in Mathematics: Polya's Process
Gyorgy P61ya's Hozv to Solve It (1945) stands as one of the most important contributions
to the problem-solving literature in the twentieth century. Even now, as we move into the new
millennium, the book continues to be a favorite among teachers and students for its instructive
heuristics. (Michalewicz & Fogel, 2002)
The small book is a compendium of techniques that P61ya found useful, both personally,
in his own career as an eminentmathematician, and pedagogically, through a prodigious amount
of mentoring and collaboration. He starts by outlining a four-step problem solving process:
(1) Understand the problem
(2) Devise a plan
(3) Carry out the plan
(4) Looking back
"In order to solve this differential equation you look at it till a solution occurs to you,"
he jokes, introducing the first step. Understanding the problem is the same first step as in the
Gestalt process, where "eyesight is insight" (§1.1.1). Polya asks "How do the data relate to the
unknown?", and he suggests introducing suitable notation or drawing a figure; these are all means
for probing Gestaltist "structural features" of the problem.
Devising a plan, the next step, involves trying to find related problems that have been
previously solved or known techniques or theorems that might be relevant (analogy, §1.1.4, and
solution schemas, §1.1.3). When adapting and evaluating these sources to the current context—
or if the solver cannot think of anything relevant— P61ya suggests a number of further strategies,
including:
• Does it use everything? A good solution will often incorporate all supplied
information, or if not, a clear case should be made why some piece is irrelevant.
By looking at unused pieces, a new insight might be suggested. (This technique
is indirectly used in structure mapping (Gentner, 1983), where mappings using
more information are preferred.)
• Work backwards. Focus on how the "unknown" quantity could be reached; this
can cue previously solved problems which are superficially different but share a
common method of solution. (This may trigger "deep" structural features, of the
sort which characterise expert sorting and solving as in §1.1.3. The technique
is also implicit in goal-driven production and planning systems, e.g., where
production rules are matched against the desired end state as opposed to the
starting state.)
• Generalise. If a problem appears difficult, it may be because it is an unusual,
special case of an easier, more general problem.
• Try a more specific problem. Example instances of the problem may be easier to
solve, and these might suggest a generic solution.
• Find subproblems. Formulating prospective intermediate lemmas might help
understand the problem domain, and bymoving in small steps, the final solution
might be easier to reach. "Wishful thinking" is a related technique where one
sees a change to the problem that one expects will make it easier; in practice, this
can lead to a subproblem. (These techniques are akin to subgoals in AI planning,
§2.1.3.)
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What is noteworthy is that Polya explicitly concentrates on techniques for retrieving prior
knowledge that will be relevant, withmost of step (2) devoted to these techniques and most of the
book devoted to step (2). (In contrast, most schema theory accounts appeal to "associationism"
and leave it at that, and production rule models tend to use built-in mechanisms for selecting
among hand-coded, domain-specific rules.)
"Carrying out the plan" is the next stage in the process, done only after the plan or
strategy has been formulated and considered. Every step in the plan should be checked carefully,
by multiple formal means if possible, and also compared against simple cases and intuition.
Obstructions or new insights might suggest changes to the plan; if so, one should repeat stage two
of the process rather than rushing into the changed plan.
Once a plan has been completed, Polya stresses, it is important to look back on one's
work. This provides an additional validation that the result is correct, but more significantly
it can increase one's understanding of the solution (c/. the self-explanation effect, §1.1.3, and
compilation/proceduralisation, §1.2.3). Where possible, solvers are encouraged to relate the
solution to concrete instances, checking units ("always!") and seeing whether some simple
instantiation can be easily verified (e.g., x = 0, or using right angles). Solvers might look for
simpler solutions, symmetries used, or some characterisation of the sort of problems where the
solution might apply (cf. feature abstraction, §1.1.3 and §1.1.4.iii).
Cognitive Strategies
Although How to Solve It is intended for mathematics problems, "mathematics" can be
interpreted quite broadly and P61ya's process can be applied even more broadly. The Productive-
Thinking Program (Covington et al, 1966), consisting primarily of the same ideas as in Polya's book,
used detective stories to train students aged ten to twelve. In a similar vein, Patterns of Problem
Solving (Rubinstein, 1975) served as a textbook for a university-level course in problem solving at
UCLA, attracting over a thousand students yearly for over a decade (Mayer, 1983). Although no
studies conclusively demonstrate the effectiveness of these large-scale projects, their popularity
is a powerful testament, and better controlled experiments (Bloom & Broder, 1950; Schoenfeld,
1979) found that teaching such general heuristics can improve problem solving ability.
Application of strategies to dissimilar problems tends to be more difficult, and evidence
that teaching strategies supports "far transfer" is scarce (Mayer, 1983). "Thinking outside the
box", as suggested by the Gestaltists, is a shift in emphasis from Polya's book to more general
cognitive training programs10. The Productive-Thinking Program tries to facilitate creativity
through instructions to "keep an openmind" and "think ofmany new ideas", including "unusual"
and "unlikely" ones.
10 The point was not overlooked by P61ya, and one strategy for "devising a plan" is simply to "be ingenious".
He describes the importance of creativity and discovery to mathematics in greater detail in other— longer and
more philosophical — writings, including the two-volume set Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning (1954) and
Mathematical Discovery (1962).
Heneveld 27
Critical thinking extends the strategies in yet another direction, stressing the importance of
distinguishing between non-judgmental "exploration" (Halpern, 2003; Grudin, 1990) and "black
hat" (de Bono, 1985) logical analysis. Logic it identifies as a strategy useful for many types of
problem solving. In self-monitoring, one reflects critically on personal tendencies, biases, and
recent activity so that habit does not restrict the breadth of strategies and knowledge one can
bring to bear on situations (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Of course it is widely recognised that none of
these strategies are a quick fix for expertise; as we have seen, expertise requires intense domain-
specific experience, with chess masters familiar with "50,000 chunks" (§1.1.2) and expert cooks
with 50,000 "kitchen facts" (Norman, 1980). Studies of musicians (Hayes, 1981), chess (Simon,
1980) and other fields (ibid.) has led to the so-called "ten-year rule", that it takes at least this
much time, in addition to luck and regardless of domain-general strategies, to become an expert
at anything11.
In memory-based theories, these strategies — including the use of logic and self-analysis
— can be viewed as schemas, and their acquisition can be accounted for by abstraction across
repeated experience or by direct instruction. These accounts are, however, undeniably vaguewith
regards to these high-level strategies. In production systems, their use ismore concretely specified,
but even here, although they can be conceptualised as "executive productions" (Newell & Simon,
1972; e.g., means-end analysis, §2), their implementation is usually outwith the production rules
framework or else specialised, ad hoc, for a specific domain. The means for choosing appropriately
between high-level strategies is something which has received very little attention at either the
theoretical or practical level (Michalwicz & Fogel, 2002).
1.4. Critical Evaluation
Over-generality and over-specificity are two of a number of common criticisms aimed
at these approaches. Before reviewing them let us examine what, precisely, they are trying to
achieve. Each theory ostentiably tries to aid understanding of problem solving, but what does
this mean? There are many legitimate and distinct ways of contributing to this goal:
• Pedagogical. Can the theory assist human problem solvers?
• Modelling. Can the theory predict human behaviour?
• Physiological. Can the theory explain how the physical structure of the brain facilitates
problem solving?
• Computational. Can the theory be used to build artificial (e.g., machine) systems?
• Philosophical. Can the theory offer vocabulary which assists in the other aims?
A "complete" theory of cognition will give affirmative answers to each of these questions — and,
to be sure, many more which are not listed. It is clear from the limited survey in this chapter
that the field is a long way from such a "complete" theory, but each experiment and every new
approach sheds new light on at least one of these questions.
11 The rule, of course, is facetious but the principle stands.
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1.4.1. Levels of Description
A common philosophical distinction in the literature is the identification of three levels of
organisation within cognitive systems:
• The Semantic (or Knowledge) Level. At this level we explain why people, or
appropriately programmed computers, do certain things by saying what they
know and what their goals are and by showing that these are connected in certain
meaningful or even rational ways.
• The Symbol Level. The semantic content of knowledge and goals is assumed
to be encoded by symbolic expressions. Such structured expressions have parts,
each ofwhich also encodes some semantic content. The codes and their structure,
as well as the regularities by which they are manipulated, are another level of
organization of the system.
• The Physical (or Biological) Level. For the entire system to run, it has to be
realized in some physical form. The structure and the principles by which the
physical object functions correspond to the physical orbiological level. (Pylyshyn,
in Posner, 1989)12
In computer science, the physical level is the hardware; the symbol level may be viewed as
the assembler instructions and byte codes; and the semantic level as high-level programming
languages (although often the semantic level is taken as extra-systemic). When looking at the
various aims of cognitive theories, we can align pedagogical theories with the semantic level
and the physiological with the physical. Theories with philosophical aims might apply at any of
the three levels. Predictive and computational approaches involve all three, but their grounded
inspectability places them primarily on the symbol level. Semantics, in the practise of these
approaches, is usually hand-coded for a particular domain and not theoretically important, and
the physical level is usually dictated by available machinery (in the psychology world, almost
invariably a computer13). Specifying all three levels leads to a unified cognitive architecture,
a framework for modelling a wide range of cognitive tasks, this philosophical approach will
be discussed in §1.4.2. For now, let us note that this approach is promising — because it gives
simultaneous answers to many of the questions set out in the last section— but also potentially
confusing — because of the breadth of answers they provide (design choices which are merely
incidental at one level, e.g., the use of XML, might be taken as definitive answers at another, e.g.,
the conclusion that concepts in the mind can be defined by a DTD).
The strategies in §1.3 and memory-based theories in §1.1 have tended to focus on
pedagogical and philosophical questions. Of these, Gestalt theories address the semantic level
almost exclusively and schema theories do so primarily, although some concrete demonstrations
have addressed the symbol level {e.g., SME, MAC/FAC, ACME; Forbus et ah, 1995; Hummel &
Holyoak, 1997). It is production architectures which have given the most attention to the symbol
level, yielding a compelling means of answering the predictive question without neglecting a
thorough account at the semantic level. The resulting cognitive models will be reviewed in the
next section.
12 These levels are closely related to Marr's "computational", "algorithmic", and "mechanical" levels (1982).
13 There is an enormous literature on neurophysiological models (see, e.g., Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992) which
is beyond our present scope. Such "bottom-up" approaches to cognition will hopefully one day meet the "top-
down" psychological approaches covered in this chapter, but the gap between them is currently quite large.
One promising development has been the AI technique of neural networks, introduced in §2.2.2.ii, which has
influenced "spreading activation" models used in some systems, both analogical and production rules.
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1.4.2. Cognitive Modelling
A principal objection to many of the accounts described so far is that while they may be
appealing, they are frequently too vague, too general, and/or too convoluted. As abstract theories
"explaining" cognition, they are "non-scientific" according to observations of Popper (1963):
(1) It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory — if we
look for confirmations.
(2) Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is
to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event
which was incompatible with the theory — an event which would have refuted the
theory.
(4) A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific.
Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
(7) Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by
their admirers — for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or
by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a
procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price
of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing
operation as a "conventionalist twist" or a "conventionalist stratagem".)
Confirmations are held up for all the theories, but this comes far from proving them (insofar as
"proof" is even possible outwith an axiomatised domain); ex post facto supporting observations
are empirically invalid, and as far as experiments to "test" theories, surprisingly few are "risky"
in the sense of (2). The strategies of §1.3 are undoubtedly a useful summary of techniques, but
they do not comprise a scientific theory— Polya and other proponents never attempted to claim
that they did. Schema "theory" introduces vocabulary thatmany have found attractive, but for its
vagueness, we feel, it must be struck down by (4). Production systems, having undergone such
significant "evolutions" and "revisions" in response to numerous "refutations", can likewise be
attacked on the grounds of (7). If "the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability,
or testability" (ibid.), how are we to evaluate any of the approaches in this chapter on any of the
grounds introduced in §1.4?
A second objection is ambiguity between "strong" and "weak" equivalence. A theory
could be realised in a testable model and demonstrated in a "risky" experiment, but obtaining
results that correspond to human performance still does not imply that the underlyingmechanisms
are the same. In "weak equivalence", a model is acceptable if it provides the same "output"
as human subjects for a given "input" set. Assuming expert (or even idealised) human
performance, this approach characterises many of the AI systems covered in the next chapter
(and understandably so, for these systems are judged almost exclusively on how well they solve
problems). The method by which the results are reached in the model might bear no resemblance
to human cognition; it might even be a "black box" whose method even the developers do not
understand. "A stronger claim might be that the model realizes some particular function using the
same method as the person being modeled" (Pylyshyn, in Posner, 2005). For any theory purporting
to explain human problem solving in an understandable fashion, this method must be explicit and
this "strong equivalence" is essential. Unfortunately, it can be very hard to establish.
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The Theory / Implementation Divide
Researchers can — and have begun to — overcome these objections by constructing
"cognitive models" which offer both a theory and an implementation, with a clearly distinguished
line drawn between them. The theory, "above the line", should set out the conceptual explanation
for the phenomenon is being addressed — we will take problem solving as the example. The
theory should be concrete enough to be implemented, tested, and falsifiable; but beyond this it
should retain as much generality as the authors envisage.
Illustrations provide some insight into what is meant by a general theory and have
been common in the psychological literature since Aristotle. They are typically confirmations
in the sense of Popper's criticism (1), rather than a systematic attempt at scientific verification.
By providing a complete, fully-specified implementation, "below the line", a model allows the
empirical exploration of the theory. To be scientifically useful, this exploration must include the
sort of risky experiments in (2) and leave itself open to the prospect of failure in (4). Moreover,
constructing models (and making them publicly available) facilitates the sociological factors that
determine the scientific Zeitgeist (Kuhn, 1962), including independent verification, replication in
other domains, and ultimately widespread adoption.
Unfortunately, implementing a theory is rarely straightforward. Computers are currently
a longway from realising the parallel processing ofbillions of neurons (and amodel so complicated
would likely be an uninspectable black box anyway), so it is frequently necessary to approximate
aspects of a theory when working below the line. "Simplifying assumptions", as they are
often called, are a key part of a cognitive model, allowing many different implementations
without impacting what authors propose to be a theory's full generality. If the model fails
in experimentation, an author can, of course, stand by the theory and blame the simplifying
assumptions; but in the philosophy of cognitivemodelling, a theorywith a flawed implementation
is no worse than a theory with no implementation. Both are non-scientifically vague, and the
former, at least, admits it.
As an example of the analysis that the cognitive modelling methodology affords, let us
look again at the General Problem Solver (Newell & Simon, 1972). While Newell & Simon propose
production rules as a very formal technique, their notion of "strategies" is a very general one. Part
of the theory leads to an extraordinarily powerful system, and the implementational details— such
as the use of the IPL programming language — do not preclude other varied implementations.
Other parts of the original theory (e.g., change representation, choice of strategy or heuristics for
control) were vague and either unrepresented or hand-selected in the implementation. These
aspects of the theory, the authors make clear, were not the focus of the project14. Recent
systems, ACT-R and Soar, have taken the original theory "above the line", extended it, and
14 We propose extending the line metaphor, twisting it a bit, to say that unrepresented parts of a theory are "to the
left of the line" and hand-coded parts of a theory are "to the right of the line".
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provided alternative, much more complete implementations. In so doing, they have founded
the approach of "cognitive architectures", models where the theory and the implementation are
together available as frameworks within which other cognitive models can be developed.
By requiring the implementation of some version of a theory, the discipline forces at
least one concrete interpretation. As cognitive theories are frequently very general and terms
overloaded, this helps communicate what is intended. At times, it can also help identify
tautological claims (e.g., claiming "schemas are the fundamental unit of thought", after defining
them as "the fundamental unit of thought") and facilitate meaningful hypotheses ("cognitive
architectures can be realised by treating experience, abstractions, and concepts in a uniform
way"). Commonly, the creation of a model highlights weaknesses in a theory, forcing the author
either to remedy them or to acknowledge them.
Psychology straddles between science and philosophy, and many unscientific "theories"
have had great import despite vagueness and non-falsifiability. The chief value of cognitive
modelling, in our view, has been to bolster general philosophical approaches with scientifically
testable models, without limiting the generality of the theory. Such models can support — or
challenge— weak equivalence hypotheses:
• Models find the same solutions as the people they are modelling.
They can also provide evidence for strong equivalence in many ways:
• Models reproduce errors typical of humans.
• Slight variances in a model correspond to individual differences in people's
performance in a task (a generalisation of accounting for errors).
• Models match timing data for how long people take on different problems.
• Models can be inspected to show intermediate steps in the process which
correlatewith human problem solving activity (e.g., eye-tracking and speak-aloud
protocols).
Cognitive models have made use of each of these types of evidence, aswell asmany others. ACT-R
models have an especially broad base of such support, providing accounts ranging from mistakes
in arithmetic and saccades in word recognition to capacity and activation in associative memory.
Yet however extensive this evidence is, it can only be described as circumstantial; it can never
prove that a model is strongly equivalent. The introduction of simplifying assumptions, essential
as it may be, further separates theories from their models, and means that sociological factors will
be the overriding determinant of acceptance15. These sociological factors, including perceived
utility and appeals to elegance, can be greatly enhanced through cognitivemodels, of course, and it
is unlikely that the psychology of problem solving would have advanced asmuch as it has without
the specificity demanded by cognitive modelling. By drawing a line between general theories,
with philosophical appeal, and specified implementations, with predictive and computational
utility, cognitive modelling broadens the bases of evaluation: the line serves, orthogonally, as a
bridge between theory and implementation.
15 This conclusion has been applied to the entirety of science (Feyerabend, 1987) butwe feel it is particularly strong
as regards the psychology of problem solving.
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The Turing Machine Critique
Despite their concrete implementation, cognitive models are not immune to being over-
general. Anymodel satisfying a small set of computational properties is isomorphic to a Universal
Turing Machine, and is therefore capable of any finite state computation (Turing, 1936), subject
only to limitations of memory and time. Models for specific tasks usually do not have these
properties, but most cognitive architectures, including GPS, ACT-R, and Soar, do have the
necessary properties. It would be difficult to imagine any model of schemas which did not
also fall into this category.
This does not invalidate many of the benefits of cognitive modelling: specificity and
understanding as well as a greatly increased base for evaluation. What the Turing Machine
critique emphasises, however, is that final arguments for theories ormodels can never be made on
their performance— in weak or strong equivalence— alone. The case must also be made that the
model transfers, or the architecture applies, with minimal modifications, to alternative domains.
Formostmodels in the literature, this case has not beenmade; evenwith ACT-R, perhaps themost
widely used such framework, there is a great deal of domain-specific programming involved to
model any novel problem. In our own experience, the use of production rules can lend itself to
persuasive timing results (albeit normally not without some tuning), but the cost in development
effort is extensive, particularly as compared with other Turing Complete languages such as Java
or Lisp.
Implementing the strategies described in §1.3 presents additional challenges in nearly all
cognitive modelling environments. Although Newell & Simon reiterate the use of such strategies
(1972), the implementation of the strategies has nearly always been done as an integral part of
the system — and not in the terms of the productions the system advocates. This has been the
case from early means-end analysis (ibid.) through to the recent analogy learning mechanism
(Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). In the few instances where a general strategy has been implemented
as an explicit cognitive model (Salvucci & Anderson, in ibid.) Murdock et al., 1998), the projects
required large sets of productions for retrieval (restricted in all the models to exact matches of a
very small number of explicitly named entities) and structural mapping (which again looked at
only a limited number of named entities in fixed or nearly-fixed positions). Prospects for their
general applicability are daunting:
In a scaled up version of this model ... this mechanism would become
overwhelmingly cumbersome and would not generally support tractable
retrieval. (Murdock et ah, 1998)
Performing Sternberg's (1977) basic "A: B: : C: D" analogy task (over four binary attributes) in
ACT-R required over 1000 lines and 25kb of ad hoc source code; what is more, this was based
on a pre-existing model and held up as a model example to "illustrate how the [pre-existing]
model can generalize to other tasks" (Salvucci & Anderson, in Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). Each
of these efforts are unquestionably impressive feats; however, there has been no attempt to re-use
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any of them in other problem solving contexts, and without applications to multiple domains it
is difficult to make the case that they are anything other than computer programs in an obscure
language, and it is impossible to make the case that any of these are general models of analogy.
Where cognitive architectures are Turing Complete, modular re-use is an important sociological
factor in their evaluation.
To realise the stated goal of "a unified theory of cognition" (ibid.), it must be possible to
maintain a vast number of models simultaneously, with appropriate knowledge retrieved and
re-used efficiently. Under certain circumstances, it must be possible for this prior knowledge to
be applied spontaneously in novel domains ("insight" or "far transfer", §1.1). From a Universal
Turing Machine one should expect nothing less! ACT-R appears to us to come closest to the
goal (although we strongly dispute proponents' claims (ibid.) that it has been achieved), yet
it suffers from intractable scalability problems (Murdock et al., 1998) and its capacities for far
transfer (Miiller, 1999) and abstraction (Anderson & Schunn, 2000; Eysenck, & Keane, 2004; v.a.
§ActRContextualPriming) are far from adequate. In nearly all current cognitive frameworks, the
composition and transfer of individual models is exceedingly difficult, but until this becomes both
easy and widespread, the methodology of cognitive modelling is incomplete.
The Critique of Curious Domains
A further difficulty in the use of cognitive models is that frequently the simplifying
assumptions narrow the scope of application. Focussing on certain problem domains is necessary,
but the validity of the theory is bolstered only to the extent that experiments are risky (Popper's
criticism (2)) and, especially for Turing Complete implementations, to the extent that the selected
domains are representative of a larger class to which the theory and model generalise. In many
instances, however, the simplifying assumptions tacitly restrict the classes of problem domains
where the model is applicable:
The researchers [from the Gestalt School through to many current practitioners] made
the underlying assumption, of course, that simple tasks such as the Tower of Hanoi
captured themain properties of "real world" problems, and that the cognitive processes
underlying participants' attempts to solve simple problems were representative of
the processes engaged in when solving "real world" problems. Thus researchers
used simple problems for reasons of convenience, and thought generalizations to
more complex problems would become possible. Perhaps the best-known and most
impressive example of this line of research remains the work by Newell and Simon
(1972). (Wikipedia, "Problem.solving")
What has since become clear is that these generalisations are not as easy as many researchers
thought. The components necessary for human expertise (§1.3.ii) would also be necessary in
any corresponding "strong" cognitive model — viz., 50,000 domain-specific facts and ten years'
experience (or equivalent). In a hypothetical such model, is the "above the line" / "below the line"
distinction relevant? In practical terms, would any result justify the work involved in coding such
a model?
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The answer may lie in yet another of Polya's strategies (1945) — "lazy thinking" — or
the aphorism — necessity is the mother of invention16. The only feasible solution is the "lazy"
one of letting the cognitive model acquire the facts from experience. Being lazy, however, is not
easy. By focussing mainly on simple tasks, problem solving architectures have largely bypassed
the problem of large-scale learning from experience. The cognitive architecture with the most
extensive capabilities on this front appears to be ACT-R, and even they are severely limited, as
mentioned in the last section. Furthermore, the theoretical aspects of learning in ACT-R, "above
the line", are not clearly distinguished from the implementation, and the implementation "below
the line" is complicated to the point of near-opacity. It is doubtful whether ACT-R's learning
mechanism would be suitable for the task and unlikely that any other cognitive architecture
would fare any better.
1.4.3. Subjective Conclusions
Cognitive Modelling
In view of the critiques of the Turing Machine and curious domains, we suggest that
one promising direction of research would be an alternative "below the line" implementation
of a cognitive architecture. The project could adhere to a well-known current theory — such as
ACT-R — but seek to address issues of abstraction, retrieval, scalability, and model re-use. In
the philosophy of cognitive modelling, having multiple implementations of a theory serves two
purposes: it expands the scope of the theory's demonstrated applicability, and it clarifies how
much of an existing model is actually "above the line".
Another promising direction of research, it seems to us, is the construction of a cognitive
architecture based on schema theory. These theories have been almost universally "non-
scientifically" vague; in the relatively few attempts to flesh out memory-based theories with
cognitive models (e.g., MAC/FAC, ACME; §1.4.1), the focus has been on quite specialised theories
and very domain-specific implementations. A general architecture, corresponding to ACT-R or
Soar but implementing a schema theory view of cognition, is lacking and, in our view, is one
of the chief causes of the under-specificity in alternatives to production architectures. Where
models have been developed for memory-based theories, the results have been impressive (ibid.);
an architecture could seek to extend this work. It would also, certainly, do well to take ideas from
ACT-R and Soar, particularly about modelling associative memory.
How differentwould such an architecture be, wewonder, from ACT-R and Soar, or from an
alternative implementation of their underlying theories? These systems have changed enormously
since production architectures were first proposed: they have incorporated many memory-
based ideas, and they have evolved to account for a vast range of experiments in perception,
categorisation, and analogical reasoning. Our suspicion is that the use of "production rules" in
any of these systemsmightwell be found now to be vestigial— products of a pre-Object-Oriented
programmingworld which can comfortably slide below the line or, in amodern re-implementation
of the core theory, abandon their logical insistence of "if . . . then" conditionality. Such a re-
implementation would begin to look like a cognitive architecture based on features and schemas.
16 cf. "If necessity is the mother of invention, then analogy is the father." (Ruth & Hannon, 1999)
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Approaches to Problem Solving
Memory-based theories, in our opinion, have tended to be too vague to be useful from
an applied, predictive, or modelling standpoint. Production rules have proven extraordinarily
attractive because of their success in certain concrete domains with respect to each of these
criteria. We concurwithmany authors, however, in being unconvinced that this successwill scale,
and we observe that memory-based theories have made notable pedagogical and philosophical
contributions to problem solving, despite their vagueness.
It seems to us that the role of context may be far more pervasive than most theories
acknowledge. Among the experiments in this chapter, wherever context was investigated as a
factor, it was found to have an effect. The Wason Selection Task (§1.2.1), in particular, has been
performed in an impressive variety of studies; one consistent finding has been that the use of
thematic content ("If a person is under 21, he or she is not drinking alcohol.") leads to marked
improvements in performance, particularly where the content is familiar. This has been explained
by various theories (e.g., "pragmatic reasoning schemas", Cheng& Holyoak, 1985; "task-semantic"
interpretation, Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2001), nearly all ofwhich align with the memory-based
tradition.
Although these explanations could be modelled in production systems, reliance on
numerous "if ... then" rules offers us very little (apart from laborious representations).
Attempting to get by with a small set of such logical rules (§1.2.1, e.g., Braine, 1978; Rips, 1994),
on the other hand, seems wholly inconsistent with "real world" cognition:
If one tries to describe processes of genuine thinking in terms of formal traditional
logic, the result is often unsatisfactory: one has, then, a series of correct operations, but
the sense of the process and what was vital, forceful, creative in it seems somehow to
have evaporated ... there is the danger of being empty and senseless, though exact.
(Wertheimer, 1945)
Soar and ACT-R, as described in §1.2.3, have explicit memory stores as core components. They
incorporate prior knowledge through well- specified associative techniques (pattern matching
and semantic nets, respectively); in practice, this may well be one of their main benefits (e.g.,
Murdock et al., 1998). The need for further separate internal techniques— heuristic mechanisms
for conflict resolution and learning, not expressed as productions — strikes us as an inelegant
(and possibly redundant) bit of shoehorning.
Prior knowledge is the fundamental ingredient in human cognition. From this ingredient,
the formation of concepts — meaning — is the fundamental action of cognition. The simplest
coherent theory of concept formation, in our view, is that of explanation-based categorisation
(§1.1.l.i; Murphy & Medin, 1985). A schema ("a data structure for representing the generic
concepts stored in memory", §1.1.2; Rumelhart, 1980) captures this notion in its generality, and
induction by analogy suggests a compellingmeans for how theymay be formed (Gick & Holyoak,
1983; Gentner, 1983). In problem solving, the recognition of certain features, both as superficial
attributes and structural relations, seems to associatively cue retrieval of schemas and experience
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which govern human behaviour (Chi et al., 1981; Ratterman & Gentner, 1983). Based on this
outline, we would expect fundamental entities in a cognitive architecture to be:
Schemas: experiences, concepts, and intermediate abstractions
Features: the recognition of schema-based concepts in a particular problem instance
Instead, when we look at existing architectures, they are nowhere to be seen. This is surely a
mistake!
We note with wonder the historical primality of Associative theories of mind: after two
millennia, the theory and terminology are recognisable and relevant. We observe that the definition
of "schemas" accommodates concepts, templates, and high-level strategies for problem solving.
Although some argue that its definition is so general as to be unhelpful, we believe that it is usable
(as demonstrated in §3.2), and we further believe that past attempts to enforce further high-level
distinctions have been more misleading than helpful (e.g., abstract "solution schemas" versus
"worked examples", §1.1.4; or ACT-R's unusual interpretation of the declarative/procedural split,
§1.2.3). A simple unifying theory that still needs specification is preferable to an over-encumbered
theory which has been complicated numerous times in response to successive objections and
flaws. One immediate benefit of this generality is that such memory-based schemas can represent
logical rules and productions, but the converse is not true. Production approaches uniformly
rely on complex control strategies that are not implemented within the framework of the theory.
Associative secondary laws — i.e., similarity (through the presence of identical features) and
availability (vividness, frequency, and recency) — offer a theoretical underpinning for schema
selection which seems much stronger than the heuristics (and innumerable parameters) which
have evolved for the selection of production rules. Production rule architectures, furthermore,
rely on external mechanisms for learning, make representing concepts difficult (especially theory-
or explanation-based categories), and are clumsy or incomplete when explaining the effects of
context; yet somehow they are extraordinarily popular. We can only attribute this to their focus
on fully specified, usable cognitive models: sadly, there is no implemented alternative.
Although memory-based theories are often criticised for being underspecified, we believe
that they are now mature enough to encourage an attempt at a "below the line" cognitive
architecture. The use of features in cueing schemas seems an area that is particularly well described
and powerful enough to merit the development and exploration of a problem solving framework.
Efforts to do so, we are sure, would both further understanding in the area of problem solving
and focus research questions on aspects of cognition that remain underspecified.
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Chapter 2. Computational Approaches to Problem Solving
In contrast to psychological theories of problem solving, where goals are nearly as diverse
as the ideas, computational approaches have had a clear and narrow focus: results, results, results.
In this chapter, we will give an overview of many of the principal techniques used in problem
solving with computers. The field is vast, and we will necessarily omit some techniques, but we
will endeavour to cover the most pervasive and influential ideas and give references where we
have had tomake omissions. We also cover in extra detail those approaches which, although not as
common as others, are specifically related to the memory-based paradigms introduced in §1.1. As
a means of tyingmany of the computational approaches together, including production rules and
planning, and to give background on one problem solving domain relevant to our experiments,
we review systems for theorem proving in §2.3.
One significant topic that we will cover only in passing, despite its great importance, is
how knowledge can be represented in a computational system. We will typically assume the
use of predicate representations (q.v., §l.ii) with fixed domain-specific meanings, as is common
in many systems, but this is in no way intended to limit the immense spectrum of techniques
that have been used for representation and semantics, nor the potential applicability of other
representations for the techniques described here. (For comprehensive coverage of issues in
knowledge representation, the reader is referred to Brachman & Levesque, 2005.)
For some types of problems, algorithms can be completely specified which will solve them
reliably, and for many more problems, established mathematical techniques (e.g., Apt, 2003) can
be used off-the-shelf to deliver automated solutions. Where problems are easily solved through
such algorithms or as domain-specific programs, we judge that it is the human developer who
has actually "solved" the problem, in a generalised (algorithmic) fashion. While these solutions
are powerful and worthy, they are relevant to our present purpose only where they suggest
techniques that apply to a varied set of problems, leading to computational solutions far beyond
what the initial developersmay have considered. Consequently this review looks only at generally
applicable techniques and not at the wealth of libraries implementing these techniques (and others)
for particular programming languages. (The reader is referred to Michalewicz & Fogel, 2002, for
a review of implementations and for a good account of certain canonically "hard" problems —




The discipline of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been profoundly shaped by the work
of Newell & Simon (1972) presented in §1.2.2 as an exploration of Human Problem Solving.
Production rules— irrespective of their cognitive applicability (§1.4.3) — have an "if . . . then"
structure which fits neatly with the logical architecture of CPU's. This fact, together with the
compelling capabilities of early production rule systems, has led to an explosion in their use
in computational problem solving. Current definitions of production systems typically identify
three main components:
The Set of Production Rules: the basic knowledge unit is the "production", i.e.,
"a [prejcondition-action pair [which] defines a single chunk of problem-solving
knowledge" (Luger, 2005)
Internal Representation: "the current state of the world" or "problem state" is
described symbolically; also called "working memory" (ibid.)
Control Plane: the selection ("firing") of productions and corresponding changes to
the problem representation are managed by a system-specific process
The "action" part of the production rule updates "working memory": in the simplest instance,
"operator productions", defined by the problem domain, describe the valid elementary changes
in a problem state. More complex production rules might express the result of several operators
applied sequentially, or in some systems, enrich the problem state but without fundamentally
changing it, e.g., by updating a "blackboard" with notes which might enable the conditions
of other productions. Predicate logic (§l.ii) is often used for the problem representation and for
specifying preconditions, and in "rewrite rules" which specify how the action changes the problem
representation.
applies methods to the problem until an answer is found. The rectangular
entities correspond approximately to the three components described in the text,
(adapted from Newell & Simon 1972)
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The control plane is themost varied component, as was observed in cognitive architectures
(§1.2.3). Commonly, it follows a "recognise-act cycle", where a production is chosen and
applied to the problem state, with the process repeating on the new problem state. A "conflict
resolution" strategy is usually provided to choose uniquely if multiple production rules have
validated conditions, and some systems also provide a pattern-matching strategy (e.g., the Rete
discrimination network algorithm, Forgy, 1982) to optimise the process of checking conditions.
Beyond this general description, however, there are numerous mechanisms used for control in AI
production systems, including general techniques for search (§2.1.2) and planning (§2.1.3) as well
as — for all but the simplest problems— domain-specific heuristics (§2.1.4).
Finite States
One attribute common to many production systems — particularly early ones — is the
reliance on "well-defined" (deterministic) problems, where a problem is defined by an explicit
initial problem state, a goal state, and a finite set of operators which change one problem state to
another. Tower of Hanoi and noughts-and-crosses are two well-studied examples. An attraction
of this type of formulation is that the resulting state space can be easily defined mathematically:
it can be represented as a directed graph where the origin corresponds to the initial state, edges
correspond to operators, and a vertex at the target end of an edge is the state that results from
applying that operator. The space of all reachable problem states is then the set of vertices with
which the origin is path-connected. If the goal state is in this set, any path leading to it corresponds
to a solution, and the shortest such path is the optimal solution.
For many problems the set of problem states is finite, and even when it is unbounded,
formal guarantees of completeness — that a solving technique will find a solution, if it exists —
can be provided. Within finite state domains, explicit bounds can be given for time and memory
use, and any solution is assured to be found within these bounds. Conversely, if a problem cannot
be solved, the systemwill be able to demonstrate this (in theory) by exhaustively enumerating the
state space. Such properties can be extremely useful in computational systems.
Expert Systems
As discussed in the critique of a curious domain (§1.4.2.iii), not all problems possess the
nice structure characterized by a finite state space, and manywhich do have such large theoretical
bounds that they are of no practical use. Problems in the real world, it has been found, frequently
have this "ill-defined" or inordinately large character: any feasible solution technique, in many
instances, will require the use of a great deal of domain-specific knowledge. Production rules
have been adopted for such domains by combining a great many facts — each expressed as an
"if ... then" rule — and scalable precondition pattern-matching techniques. This comprises
an "expert system".
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Dendral, one of the earliest such knowledge-rich systems, took hundreds of rules observed
from how stereochemists analyse spectroscopy data to solve problems in molecular structure.
Mycin, in the field of medical diagnostics, has expressed thousands of concise medical facts as
productions to infer causes— and treatments— relating to blood disease. (Wikipedia) From these
progenitors, two frameworks are especially popular in current usage. Prolog (Clocksin &Mellish,
1994) is a programming language closely related to the precondition-action distinction, working
backwards and adding support for generality in rules through unification-based instantiation; it is
often considered one of the core theoretical systems in AI and is used in numerous knowledge-rich
applications. Finally, CLIPS, "the C language integrated production system", offers object-oriented
support for production rules and selection and customisation of conflict resolution strategies, and
is "probably the most widely used expert systems tool" currently available (Wikipedia).
Despite their frequent successful performance, expert systems have faced and continue
to face serious challenges. Mycin was able to outperform most physicians, but the medical
community was not prepared to embrace it: even though it could present the causal chain of
rules leading it to its conclusion, the chance of an errors therein could not be eliminated. A
mis-diagnosis by a "thinking machine", even if it is statistically less likely than a mis-diagnosis
by a physician, is for many, a far more disturbing prospect. Thus human review was and is still
necessary, in any mission-critical setting.
These prejudices against machines are not entirely unfounded; because systems are only
as good as the rules they are given, for any infinite real-world domain, they will be necessarily
incomplete. Human experts can compensate through techniques such as "far transfer" (§1.1.4)
and structural understanding, but expert systems flounder. Mycin, for example, has been known
to ask patients whether they are pregnant, even if a patient has already indicated that he is
male. Such "ignorance" would not endear the system to patients, and although that individual
issue could be repaired, there is no such thing as "total knowledge" in a field such as medicine.
Expertise requires, in addition to a great many facts, good common sense, specifically conceptual
understanding and strategies for problem solving; however "expert systems [apply] heuristics
in inappropriate situations, such as when a deeper understanding of the problem would have
indicated a different course" (Luger, 2005).
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2.1.2. Search
"If at first you don't succeed, try and try again." One of themost basic strategies in solving
problems, if the answer is not immediately apparent (such as a unique production rule match)
is to try different possibilities. The processing power of the computer magnifies the reach of this
approach, and the atomic nature of production rules means it is not difficult to implement.
Newell & Simon (1972) popularised the technique of searching a state space to find a
path to the goal state. This can be done depth-first — applying productions sequentially until
none apply, and then backtracking to the first alternative (common in Prolog) — or breadth-first,
where all productions are tried against the initial state, then against all adjacent states, and so
forth (guaranteeing the shortest path to a solution).
For all but the simplest domains, however, these approaches both lead to combinatorial
explosion, as the number of states can grow exponentially with depth. To overcome this problem,
search can be "informed" by heuristics which encourage selecting likely productions and, in
best-first search, focus on the problem states which appear closest to the goal. Strategies such as
"hill-climbing" or "means-end analysis" estimate this proximity to the goal and are demonstrably
effective for a wide range of problems (ibid.). They can be used in conjunction with a wide range
of different search techniques as well (Pearl, 1984), specialised for various problem domains.
The drawback of these heuristics, however, is that they are inherently representation-
or domain-specific. A perfect heuristic is tantamount to solving the problem, and even finding
a useful heuristic entails sophisticated knowledge of the domain: both are nearly always the
province of the human developers.
2.1.3. Planning
When interactingwith a non-deterministic real world, a more flexible approach to problem
solving is needed than search alone. The area in AI of "planning" has historically concentrated
on independent machines — "intelligent agents" such as robots — which must operate in
environments with uncertainty. The actions they choose affect this environment, and the agents
themselves must be adaptable to unexpected encounters. This is facilitated by making actions
part of a larger plan, formulated so that it is robust enough to cope with probable intermediate
outcomes and reparable in the face ofmany other events.
Whilst search is an important component of planning, the need to be easily adaptable has
introduced important strategies into AI problem solving. A major component in most planners
is the identification of intermediate subgoals which lead to the final goal. By doing this, an agent
can often respond better if the plan breaks down: if a new plan can be found leading to any of the
subgoals, the remainder of the original plan can be reused.
STRIPS (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971), the Stanford Research Institute Problem Solver, is one of
the first attempts at such an "embodied" problem solver, using a stripped-down predicate logic to
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represent "the world" and the operators (precondition-postcondition rules) which can be used in
the world. The STRIPS language has been used for a wide variety of planning problems, although
modern planners such as Prodigy (Veloso et ah, 1995) and SHOP (Nau et al., 1999) use more
complex description and temporal logics or propositional logic with SAT-solving techniques.
In specific problem domains where planners are used, control of the process uses many
of the same techniques as systems previously described; some of these will be covered in the next
section. In the context of domain-independent planners, some important general problem solving
techniques have been developed. The first of these, partial-order planning recognises that "goals"
can sometimes be decomposed into mutually-independent sub-parts; these subgoals are usually
simpler to solve than the original, and when effecting the plan, recognising that the subgoals can
be resolved in either order — or even concurrently — leads to greater flexibility. The Hybrid
STAN planner (Fox & Long, 2001), for example, can identify when specialised techniques might
apply to individual problems; by having decomposed a complex goal, these amenable problems
are more easily recognised.
A second general technique which has emerged is the use of hierarchical task networks
(Nau et al., 1998): instead of solving the problem by searching in the space of atomic actions, this
approach analyses compounds of actions (usually performed sequentially) and dependencies
between them. This facilitates planning at a larger granularity, bottom-up, and also the
hypothesising of likely intermediate steps, top-down. This domain-independent technique has
proven useful in many real-world domains and has resulted in, inter alia, one of the leading Bridge
programs (ibid.).
2.1.4. Guidance and Control Strategies
The problem solving approaches described thus far in this section all use the general
framework of specifying the operators available in a domain and, for a given problem, trying
to find a sequence of operators to lead from an initial state to a goal state. We have thus far
described several strategies for achieving this using search: working forwards from the initial
state, backwards from the goal state, or fixing one or more intermediate states which break the
problem into sub-parts, hopefully more easily solved. However, the choice of which of these to
do — and, crucially, how to do it — is typically very difficult in practice. With fast computers
and small state spaces it may not matter, but for most complex problems this choice becomes the
central question facing computational solving systems.
A common solution is to allow the programmer to represent fixed orders in which
productions should be tried. In Prolog, for example, productions are tried in the order they
were entered. Other systems may use other strategies encoded in the system (e.g., the Generalised
Problem Solver), or encoded by the user as an extension to the system. The approaches varywith
programming languages, production systems, and planners, but a very common one essentially
uses expressions in a temporal logic or a regular expression grammar, e.g., using "tacticals" in
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theorem proving (Gordon et ah, 1989). As an example of the regular expression syntax, we might
write "A(B+) ((CID)*)", meaning apply A once, then apply B as many times as possible and
at least once, and lastly try C, or if that fails D, as many times as possible. An attraction of
this approach is that where they exist, exact solutions (such as decision procedures) can often be
concisely expressed in this way. This approach can also be used to express plans, i.e., standard
ways in which problems can be decomposed, by permitting holes or "gaps" where the strategy
does not specify a technique for several steps, although it may be resumed later.
Another common means of controlling the selection of productions or search is to rank
candidates according to some weight function. This might be an internal part of the system,
preferring productions which have a history of success or which have been used recently (as
in ACT-R, §1.2.3); or this might be a developer-supplied heuristic which evaluates the predicted
utility of applying a production. This domain-specific "evaluation function" is similar to heuristics
used in best-first search (q.v. §2.1.2), but invoked earlier in the process and used to inform the
selection of productions or operators. (It is possible — and not uncommon — to use the same
heuristic for both ranking productions and guiding search.) The domain-independent heuristics,
as noted in §1.2.3, are reminiscent of the Associative secondary laws (§l.i); the domain-specific
heuristics, likewise, can be viewed as a programmed association between the evaluated problem
components and the relevant productions.
Unfortunately, these control strategies are nearly always implemented in ad hoc code; they
are usually written at the level of the system as an extension to the system, rather than within the
system as a module of knowledge for a given domain. Control knowledge — knowing when to
use certain rules or operators— is an important part of domain knowledge. For problem solving,
it is arguably the most important part of a system, but there is little standardisation in how it is
represented. Procedures in programming languages can be very effective for individual problems,
but they can be very hard to read; these strategies are typically kept separate from the core domain
knowledge (e.g., production rules), and are muchmore difficult to understand and re-use. We will
return to this issue in §2.4.
2.1.5. Learning
One important aspect of a problem solving system is the prospect for it to improve its
performance on the basis of experience or training. One technique has already been mentioned:
by adjusting the likelihood of a production firing in response to past performance, a system can
learn which productions are most effective in certain domains. Other heuristics— e.g., evaluation
functions— can also sometimes be tuned in this way, depending on their design: a large number of
statistical and evolutionary methods have been used for this purpose. (These learning techniques
are used inmany other contexts, as well; some of these techniques stray from the logic-based focus
of this section and will be reviewed again in §2.2.2.ii and §2.2.3.)
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Chunking
Another learning technique common in production and planning systems is the
"chunking" of atomic steps, introduced in §1.2.3. Where a system can identify a pattern of rules
being applied in the same sequence, several times, it can improve performance by introducing a
single "macro-operator" to perform the sequence. This technique is used in both ACT-R and SOAR
(§1.2.3), and to a more specialised and powerful extent, in hierarchical task networks (§2.1.3).
A common variant on chunking is to do the sequence analysis, but then, rather than form
chunks, store an n-gram probability model, recording the frequency of sequences of productions
in a training set. With this n-gram model, the system can use history to inform the selection of
productions: the previous n — 1 steps give a probability estimate for selecting what should be tried
next. This technique — and more powerful extensions such as Hidden Markov Models — are
common in high-performance production systems as well as many bespoke systems for specific
problems (e.g., speech recognition).
Induction
A more powerful — but more difficult — learning technique is to attempt to synthesize
compound tactics, e.g., "A(B+) ((CID) *)", from a corpus of solutions or from experience. In
contrast to chunks or probabilistic models, these tactics use tacticals which enforce a logical
structure on the resulting plans or control strategy. Ideally, they will isolate a small number of
sophisticated tactical expressions that generalise to a large class of problems; by finding these
tactics off-line, systems can potentially skip the expensive step of searching through all atomic
productions. This approach has been used in game-playing (Heneveld et ah, 1999) and theorem
proving (Duncan, 2006), as well as many other areas. It can also be learned to generalise plans from
solution sets, e.g., a compound tactic "A (. *) ((CID) *)", where the "." stands for an unspecified
step (either an operator production or another tactic).
In practise, however, this type of analysis is typically very time-consuming, and the
results are not always useful. The complexity of looking for inductive generalisations in a set
of N solutions is 0(2jV), both in time and in memory usage, as opposed to O(IV) time and
0(Nk) memory for chunking models (of length k). Furthermore, the results of such analysis
can include a lot of noise. While "(C\D)" above might represent a useful heuristic, it might
instead represent two very different and unrelated solutions. Without taking contextual factors
into account, and specifically without a "deep" understanding of the underlying causal structure,
the generalisations will be of limited assistance. Moreover, if solution steps are independent
— for example, if "A(B*)" and "(CID)*" act on separable parts of a problem — the tactical
expression combining these two words is irrelevant. Most systems would function better if they
are kept separate, but without very sophisticated domain-specific analysis, it is very difficult to
prevent these compounds, and the time- and space- complexity is potentially factorial. Finally,
the technique offers little insight into the fundamental question ofwhen a strategy or tactic should
be used. An analysis of the underlying problem states is necessary to have meaningful induction,
and even though other techniques can help— notably evaluation functions— this context analysis
then becomes an integral part of computational problem solving, which production and planning
systems do not specifically address.
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2.2. Non-Logical Techniques
The approaches described so far, modern incantations of logic-like rules and finite state
search, go a long way towards solving a lot of problems, but where they fail, they do so in a
major way. Many other approaches have been devised, and although none of them currently have
the breadth of application of search and production systems, they do offer promise where search
and productions do not, particularly when the approaches are combined. Unsurprisingly, many
of these other approaches mirror some of the non-logic-based theories described in Chapter
1 for analogy and classification. Formal specification for these approaches is necessary for
implementation in contemporary software or hardware, but we distinguish these approaches
from those in §2.1 in that the use of logic is incidental: one might imagine these techniques
running just as well on computational hardware not based on boolean bits— such as the brain.
Specialised logics can be developed to describe some of these approaches. In fact, this
has been done, such as fuzzy logics where values are real numbers, and Bayesian networks where
alternate formulas are used to compute probabilities. Here, we will label these techniques as
"non-logical", even if a logic has been formulated for them, because these logics are very different
to traditional approaches and rarely offer the same utility: properties such as completeness,
termination, and even soundness may not exist. While these properties are attractive when
reasoning about approaches, e.g., to guarantee correctness or to prove complexity bounds, they
need not necessarily hold for a system to be effective in practice. Furthermore, there is no reason
to expect that these should hold for a good problem solver: they almost certainly do not for the
most sophisticated computational system, the human mind.
2.2.1. Case-Based Reasoning
Case-based reasoning (CBR) is one of the earliest knowledge-rich problem solving
techniques. By creating a library of specific case solutions, a CBR system can attempt to solve
new problems by finding similar relevant cases and adapting the solution. As with psychological
theories of analogy (§1.1.4), the important ingredients in these systems are:
Retrieval: find an appropriate case from memory, typically by building an index on
the problem goals or some analysis of problem type
Modification: adapt the retrieved case so that it applies to the problem at hand (cf.
mapping, §1.1.4)
Application: if the adapted case can suggest a solution which transfers to the problem
at hand, apply it to see whether it works (cf. transfer, §1.1.4)
Case-based reasoning has been successfully applied in many prominent domains, including law
(Rissland & Ashley, 1987), and medicine (Koton, 1988).
In spite of this success, and in spite of its cognitive parallels, CBR is frequently excluded
from the mainstream of AI research: recent textbooks give only a handful of pages, far less than
for logic, productions systems, and search. One reason for this, in our view, is that there is no
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standard technique for each of the three steps above. As the size and number of libraries can
grow very large, good solutions for each of these steps becomes essential, but the solutions in
the literature are varied and often specialised for certain applications. As a theoretical idea, then,
CBR is inspiring but lacks the specificity and systematisability of the techniques in the previous
section.
The most complex of these steps is retrieval. Although many different retrieval methods
are used in current CBR systems, the two most common techniques are attempting tomatch on the
problem goal or performing a look-up in a case index using certain dimensions {e.g., keywords).
If the goal is unique, or if the indices are relevant to the problem's "deep structure", this can lead
to useful cases being retrieved, but as with human problem solving (§1.1.4) having the right index
is frequently the key to expertise. In practice, CBR cases are often tagged by hand with certain
pre-determined goal attributes or indices (or computed automatically on those dimensions, e.g.,
using feature vectors described in §2.2.2.i). Finding the right tags for a problem domain and
associating these tags with the cases can be a laborious task, and the retrieval methods are often
not as flexible or extensible as users would like.
One retrieval method which is noteworthy for trying to address this shortcoming is the
use of fuzzy "appropriateness conditions" for cases, introduced in the system Runner (Seifert et
al.r 1994). These conditions resemble the formal preconditions of productions, but their formal
applicability to a case is temperedby a computed utility of selecting that case (cf. successweighting,
§2.1.5), and the result is used in building the case index. These "predictive features" display
"greater success in recognizing when a past plan is in fact relevant in current processing" {ibid.);
but in spite of its promising results, and the close correspondence to psychological theories, there
has been relatively little follow-up on this work. Additionally, just as nearly all systems require
developer-specified indices, Runner requires developer-specific appropriateness conditions, and
so while it goes a long way towards making the best use of the retrieval indices provided, it has
the same challenges to scalability and flexibility.
Anothermajor obstacle to the uptake ofCBR is the divergence— and often incompatibility
— of CBRwith the enormously powerful techniques of planning and iterative search. Production
rules offer a means of describing abstract pieces of knowledge where applicability and
consequences are clearly defined: such rules can be chained together and the result is a
deterministic state space that systems can adeptly explore, in a narrow but thorough fashion,
as a smart mouse might move through a maze. Cases, on the other hand, are usually difficult
to decompose and difficult to abstract into general principles, but their richness provides many
hints for assessing applicability and applying in diverse ways; consider an elephant faced with
the same maze, who might remember it (as the proverbial elephant never forgets) or might pay
it no mind and walk over it, but is not likely to explore its myriad twists and turns, backtracking
eight steps and trying an alternate path. To return to gestalt terms, production rules encapsulate
structural understanding at the smallest piecewise level, but without a holistic view; CBR goes
some way to providing this holism, but at a cost of explicit deeper understanding. The use of
appropriateness conditions has begun to merge the two, but still suffers from rigid, hand-coded




Continuing a Gestalt analysis, we recall that the all-important "first step" in problem
solving is "understanding the problem". In many analogical theories (§1.1.4), this is the crucial
determinant of whether a solution is found: if a relevant concept is recognised, or a "deep"
structural feature identified, itwill help with the retrieval of useful prior knowledge; without this
understanding, the utility of one's knowledge is purely aleatory. Although selection strategies
have been described both for CBR (indexing) and the more logically structured techniques
(production rules, search; §2.1.4), these strategies are usually ad hoc heuristics and nearly always
inflexible. Remarkably, although the hardest part of a problem lies in choosing the right thing to
do, the problem solving methods themselves (e.g., search, production rules, CBR) do not inform
this selection. As with the cognitive architectures in §1.2.3, these approaches (and systems) all
require a developer to use pre-supplied control mechanisms not central to the theory or to write
an ad hoc selection strategy.
Fortunately, a number of powerful techniques have been developed for classifying and
retrieving knowledge. Although this has largely been in the context of either search engines or
machine perception, we feel that its relevance to problem solving has been largely underrated,
particularly in light of memory-based psychological theories in §1.1. Case-based reasoning is the
one area which has most directly looked at using classification for retrieval, although there are
others; we will review some of these hybrid systems in §2.2.4, after we review the techniques
themselves.
Feature Vectors
Some of the earliest classification work associated a binary vector to entities, where each
bit indicates the presence of a pre-defined feature in the entity. These "feature dimensions" can
be placed in rank order of how well they partition the set of entities, or organised into a more
complex structure. "Binary decision trees", a common such technique reminiscent of the game
"twenty questions" and the taxonomy of species in biology, uses a hierarchy of features where the
root node divides the set of known states as evenly as possible, into a group with the feature and
a group without. For each group, the next most evenly dividing feature is found, and the result is
a tree-like guide to questions which typically classifies all entities exhaustively, using only a tiny
fraction of the potential features.
Many recent vectormodels allow "fuzzy features", where each feature's applicability to an
entity is a real value in [0,1]; techniques such as principal component analysis will identify a small
number of dimensions (features or weighted groups of features) which optimally distinguish the
entities. Entities whose feature vectors are similar after this dimensional reduction are likely to be
similar, with regard to the space of entities; because the dimensional reduction focusses on themost
relevant features, it will preserve important differences while removing irrelevant differences. Of
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course, it is necessary for the important features to have been present in the first place, and a
very large set of entities is needed for the results to be generalisable, but many domains have
seen excellent results with this technique. Analysing language is a major example, where models
such as latent semantic analysis (Landauer & Dumais, 1997) have analysed large corpora of text
measuring the number of times a word X "co-occurs" in a passage near word Y, for all word pairs
X and Y in some dictionary. This sets up a matrix of word entities (X) with a feature for each
word it might co-occur with (F): proponents argue that dimension reduction establishes a high-
dimensionalmodel ofword meaning,with certain parallels to human cognition, and although this
claim is contested, it is widely agreed that the technique achieves good performance in judging
word synonyms and certain more sophisticated tasks in word semantics.
Neural Networks
One of the most celebrated innovations in AI has been the advent of neural network
programming. Inspired by biological models of learning, this technique uses layers of nodes
linked to form a network. An input vector from a training set is fed into the first layer of the
network, and nodes in that layer "fire" signals of certain weights to nodes in the next layer. If
an "activation" level of a node in the next layer passes a threshold, it fires to the subsequent
layer, until eventually some output pattern is presented by the final layer in the network. The
output pattern can be compared against the desired pattern for the input vector, and weights
throughout the network are adjusted accordingly. Over repeated training instances, the neural
network will — hopefully — converge to an arrangement where the right output is presented
for each input. Provided this happens, and the training set is much larger than the size of the
network, this convergence represents a general solution where relevant aspects of the input vector
are being used to produce the output. If the network is given a new problem, not in the training
set, it will apply the generalised solution to it, and assuming the training set was representative
of the problem space, the outputwill correspond to the specific solution for this problem. Neural
networks have been used successfully in many areas where conventional techniques have failed,
often in classifying input as some canonical form, such as analysing handwritten digits or words,
or recognising faces. (Kung, 1998)
Evolutionary Algorithms
Another metaphor which has shaped classification techniques is that of evolution. Code
fragments can be treated like genes, with a large variety placed into a pool where they are
mutated and combined to form programs which are then evaluated on some performance task.
Those mutations and combinations which work well are kept from one generation to the next.
After a great many iterations, good programs emerge from the process, with this "genetic
programming" creating the solution from constituent pieces. This technique can be applied
to synthesise algorithms for many purposes, but is particularly good for classifying data.
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What unites all of these approaches, beyond their usefulness for finding categories or
clusters of similarity, is their reliance on large sets of data. They do very well at finding explicit
patterns of organisation, but they are all highly dependent on the input data and on the initial
conditions, either the features chosen for the feature vectors, the topology of the neural network, or
the starting set of code fragments. They do less well at finding subtle or highly structured patterns,
and as with the techniques in §2.1.5, they can often attribute importance to accidental biases in the
input data. These techniques are all essentially statistical engines, extremely powerful for finding
classifications based on attributes, but rapidly weakened as the classification rules grow more
complex.
2.2.3. Learning
As with the logical approaches in §2.1, the approaches described thus far in §2.2 all offer
scope for automatically improving performance. Some of these learning areas are obvious —
even implicit, such as a classifier "learning" the classification, or adding each new experience as
a case in CBR — and others are more ingenious. Let us begin by noting that both availability
and past performance, as described in §2.1.5, can be applied directly to CBR and to some of the
classification techniques. The relevance of a pre-defined feature to some action (e.g., selecting
a category, or applying a specific case or rule) can be computed based on the frequency and
recency of training exemplars where they are correlated. The learning techniques used to adjust
neural networks often follow the same approach: a training set of inputs and outputs (e.g., the
desired classification) are provided, and firing patterns are reinforced if they lead from an input
to the desired output. Intermediate ("hidden") layers in a neural network allow the learning of
more complicated and subtle associations, and dimensionality reduction (e.g., through principal
component analysis) accomplishes a very similar function.
In a similar butmore interesting vein, these correlations can sometimes be computed in an
"unsupervised" setting. Some neural networks, given only a set of inputs, will "self-organise" so
that the inputs are classed according to certain automatically found features; there is no guarantee
this will be a useful classification,but surprisingly often it is (given a rich enough set of input data).
If the classification is tied to an underlying action, such as, for example, using features to select
cases or production rules, a system can automatically evaluate the applicability of the selected
action and compute correlations appropriately. It should be noted that this formal applicability
falls far short of indicating appropriateness; meaningful feedback on appropriateness, frequently,
is only available after multiple sequential actions have been applied, making "credit assignment"
(identifying the degree to which the appropriateness reflects on individual actions) difficult.
One other important area where learning has been applied to cases is the formation
of generalised cases inductively (Muggleton, 1992). This technique has some relevance to the
bottom-up learning of compound tactics (§2.1.5.ii), and some of the same mechanisms, but it
focusses top-down on identifying common schematic solutions, from a number of cases. The
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result might be a complete solution stripped of irrelevant detail and applicable to a wide range of
problems; or it might be a fragment, akin to a tactical expression; or it might be a sketch, having
lost some details essential to the individual solutions but providing a patternwhich is particularly
common, akin to subgoals in a plan. Using such a sketch for a problem requires filling in certain
steps, but this can be easier than the original problem. Forming schematic cases in this way often
leads to the same problem of too many generalisations as the inductive learning in §2.1.5.ii. There
is one extra ingredient, however, which can help filter the results: detailed cases may include
reasons why solutions work, and including these reasons in the abstraction, in explanation-based
generalisation (§1.1.l.i), leads to fewer spurious inductions. Analysing the explanations to ensure
the results are sensible requires yet more work (and inductive generalisation is time-intensive to
begin with), and also relies on detailed semantics for cases, but in some specialised domains the
technique has worked well (ibid.).
2.2.4. Hybrid Models
Much work has been done in AI which combines several of the approaches we have
reviewed. Of particular interest to us are hybrid models which combine principled retrieval
mechanisms (e.g., classification) with powerful rule or case applications. Feature vectors, co¬
occurrence models, and neural networks have all been used in case-based reasoning to find
potentially relevant cases for a problem at hand. A problem is first analysed with respect to the
specified classification routine, and cases which are most similar, according to the classification,
are retrieved.
A second interesting synergy is the use of associative techniques in ACT-R. A semantic
network of "concepts" (usually keywords) is maintained and linked to productions. In a process
of "spreading activation", concepts from a problem state or goal state — or from an element in
"focus" — trigger other concepts in the semantic net, and this "contextual priming" leads to an
increased likelihood of choosing associatively-linked productions.
As used in hybrid CBR and other types of hybrid models, however, the classification
techniques capture only surface features of a problem. The retrieval mechanism is strictly
separated from the structural case- or rule-based processing. As a consequence, the retrieval
can neither be controlled through the use of cases and rules nor enriched by the results of this
structural processing (apart from adjusting availability). A co-occurrence feature vector, for
instance, would never distinguish between sin2 a: and sin x2, even if thousands of cases relied
crucially on the structural difference; similarly, ACT-R's contextual priming would treat "sin"
and "cos" as entirely different, even if thousands of productions were found to depend only on
the presence of trigonometric functions. Thus retrieval in these hybrid models, as sophisticated
as it is in comparison with other control heuristics, remains unable to recognise deep structural
features. In Gestalt terms, they cannot do step one, "understand the problem", and without this,
they cannot begin to do "productive thinking".
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2.3. Theorem Proving
One domain we will focus on in depth in this thesis is proving mathematical theorems.
This has been an attractive and active area of Artificial Intelligence for many reasons: it naturally
permits formal specification; small formalisations can lead to a vast range of problems from simple
ones,with short, known proofs, to tremendously difficult problems, with enormous proofs or even
without any known proof; and success at automationwill have many potential applications, from
theoretical mathematics through to every discipline that relies on provably correct theorems.
Indeed, one of the first published AI programs was Logic Theorist (Newell & Simon, 1956), as
mentioned in §1.2.2, which used "inference rules" in first-order logic, tantamount to productions,
to prove theorems automatically. Setting the stage for nearly all approaches since, Logic Theorist
followed a hard-coded "executive routine" which, for a given proposition, attempts to apply the
inference rules in certain pre-defined ways, in a heuristically-defined order.
Decision Procedures
Logic Theorist was an impressive success in its day, automatically proving many
important theorems in first-order logic, but, in common with many such ad hoc control strategies,
the success did not scale. Shortly after, the problem of theorem proving was solved, in a sense, by
the discovery of "resolution theorem proving" (Robinson, 1965): resolution is a technique where
a proposition is proven by showing that its negation leads to a contradiction; for many forms of
logics, the technique can be implemented as a decision procedure guaranteed to solve the problem,
often with guarantees on the time and memory required.
Decision procedures have been found for many types of problems in mathematics, from
solving integrals and differential equations to checking arbitrary theorems in first-order logic.
Computer algebra systems, such as Mathematica, Maple, and Matlab, typically have large
libraries of such decision procedures and invoke them automatically, as necessary, to handle
a user's request. These systems place a premium on computation expediency and ease of use,
however, and these systems can sometimes fail to solve problems when a more configurable
implementation might succeed. Furthermore, the emphasis on expediency means boundary
conditions are sometimes overlooked, and computer algebra systems do sometimesmake mistakes
(§7.1.1).
Contemporary theorem provers are useful where a proof needs to be externally verifiable,
or where more control over the solution attempt is necessary. There are several systems, such
as Otter, NuPRL, PVS, Vampire, and SETHEO, which use heavily optimised decision procedures
typically with an emphasis on high-performance theorem proving for first-order logic. These
systems use techniques such as resolution (Robinson, 1965), "SAT" solving algorithms, and model
checking, and are useful, for example, in mission-critical applications where high confidence is
required for potential solutions.
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Higher-Order Logics and Interactive Theorem Proving
One disadvantage of the high-performance first-order logic systems is that they are
difficult to use for many areas of higher mathematics (e.g., real analysis, number theory). First-
order logic places constraints on notation which make writing such theorems unnatural. The
proofs, consequently, are extremely complicated: nearly always too difficult for a human to
understand, and frequently too immense for the systems to find automatically. An alternative,
explored in the LCF (Milner, 1972; Gordon et ah, 1979) and HOL (Gordon &Melham, 1993) systems,
is to use higher-order logics instead. Isabelle (Nipkow et ah, 2006), Omega (Melis et ah, 1999),
Theorema (Buchberger et ah, 2006), AClam (Richardson et ah, 1998), Coq, PVS, and NuPRL are
popular contemporary provers in this tradition: all offer increased expressiveness over first-order
provers, although they lose some of the nice fully-automated properties.
Decision procedures are available in most of these systems, including many of the same
techniques as in first-order provers. Resolution solvers are built-in to some of these systems, and
others have capabilities to call to other provers or computer algebra systems. Theorema is built
within a computer algebra system, Mathematica, and so the computer algebra capabilities are
directly available. These systems all typically permit an author to write additional automation
techniques, such as the simplification tactic of Isabelle (discussed in §4.2.1). Where automation
or external systems are used, however, the validity of the result is only as good as the invoked
technique: in some cases, the technique returns a proof which the prover can verify, but in other
cases, the "proof" relies on the external technique being correct — such techniques are called
"oracles".
For a large amount of the proving done in higher-order systems, however, there are no
known fully-automated techniques which apply. Each of the systems mentioned in this section
operates in an "interactive" mode, where the user can guide the system, suggesting automated
techniques or specific lemmas from a library, step-by-step, until the goals are discharged. The
result is a detailed, verifiable proof, but the process of getting there is not easy!
Proof Planning
Proofplanning (Bundy, 1988) is one of the chief ideas for how to facilitate machine theorem
proving when fully-automated decision procedures cannot be found. A schematic proof — or
"plan"— records intermediate steps or states common to certain types of problems; analogous to
some of the techniques in standard planning (§2.1.3), such plans can help determine how to break
a complex theorem into sequences of lemmas which are more easily solved.
Although some effort has been made to synthesize proof plans automatically (Melis &
Whittle, 1999; Duncan, in press), the most powerful plans remain those which are constructed by
hand for certain domains (e.g., rippling for induction, Dixon, 2006). Efforts to specify when proof
plans should be used, e.g., the Omega-Ants project, and how plans can be repaired, e.g., critics
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(Ireland et ah, 1999), have likewisemostly relied on ad hoc control strategies. These techniques have
been shown to be very effective in the domains where they have been created, but they are subject
to the limitations outlined in §2.1.4 and §2.1.5.ii. Whether expressed as decision procedures or as
proof plans, control strategies— in all theorem provers— are currentlywritten in a programming
language at the level of the prover (usually tactics as in §2.1.4) rather than at the level of the
knowledge base. In our view, this can make the control knowledge hard to understand; in
practice, control strategy code is rarely re-used across domains (it is usually re-implemented) and
rarely integrated with interactive theorem proving17.
2.4. Conclusions
The barrier that faced almost all AI research projects was that methods that sufficed
for demonstrations on one or two simple examples turned out to fail miserably when
tried out on wider selections of problems and on more difficult problems.
(Russell & Norvig, 1995)
We have noted that real-world problems need not be tractable and can rarely be solved by scaling
up solutions that worked for "toy problems" (contrary to popular expectation; §1.4.2.iii). The
inapplicability of earlyAI approaches to handle these problemswas one of the principal complaints
cited in the Lighthill Report (1973), which was "highly critical of basic research in foundational
areas [provoking] the so-called 'AI winter' " (Howe, 1994). The reaction has been a marked
transformation to applied research and incremental advances to existing theories, and labelled as:
a victory of the neats — those who think that AI theories should be grounded in
mathematical rigor — over the scruffies — those who would rather try out lots of
ideas, write some programs, and then assess what seems to be working.
(Russell & Norvig, 1995)
"Both approaches are important," the authors continue, decrying the dearth of novel ideas.
McCarthy also laments the narrow focus, where papers are "not directed to the identification
and study of intellectual mechanisms" and "work only on theories that can be expressed
mathematically in the present state of knowledge", and asserts a need for some scruffy work:
"general purpose formalisms will be invented from time to time, and, most likely, one of them
will eventually prove adequate" (McCarthy, 2000)18.
The domain of mathematical theorem proving typifies the "neat triumph": huge libraries
of theorems have been created (cf. expert systems, §2.1.1.ii), and powerful algorithms found for
a large class of problems (using search, §2.1.2; proof planning, §2.1.3; and decision procedures,
17 IsaPlanner (Dixon, 2006) is an interesting project in development to enable interactive or automated guidance of
proof plans, but currently it operates only in its own interactive shell and does not have any facility for detecting
applicability of plans.
18 We in no way wish to claim that the formalism we will present is anywhere close to being proven adequate.
Although we have a dream that—with a very great deal more work— it may do so, we will be very restrictive
in this thesis about the actual claims we make. We provide the continuation of the quotation from McCarthy
with wholehearted accord: "However, it would be a great relief to the rest of the workers in AI if the inventors
of new general formalisms would express their hopes in a more guarded form than has sometimes been the
case."
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§2.1.4), yet even the most popular and powerful provers are, at the knowledge level, based
around productions. The theoretical AI problem solving framework is the same as Logic Theorist
— unchanged for fifty years— with the enrichment of domain knowledge (introduced by expert
systems some forty years ago). It is subject to precisely the same critiques19:
(1) Difficulty in capturing "deep" knowledge of the
problem domain.
(2) Lack of robustness and flexibility.
(3) Inability to provide deep explanations.
(4) Difficulties in verification.
(5) Little learning from experience.
(Luger, 2005)
The fundamental divide between the knowledge base and the control knowledge (§1.2.2)
underscores all but one of these deficiencies20, in our view. The importance of "structural
features" in human problem solving (§l.l.l.iii; Wertheimer, 1945) could well translate to Artificial
Intelligence, as their absence is consistent in psychological experiments (§1.1) with (1), (2), and (3),
above, and their advent is postulated in corresponding theories as a key means for overcoming
(5).
An interesting exploration, in our view, would be to attempt to use an extensible set of
features to govern retrieval of cases or rules. One way of doing this is to remove the division
between "domain knowledge" and "control knowledge", and extend the retrieval / application
cycle presented in e.g., §2.2.4: a system might first do a keyword analysis or look for common
surface features; these might cue the system to search for "deeper" structural features; and then
these deeper features cue an operator or case. Although structural features are typically more
computationally expensive to detect, by treating them as domain knowledge, the system could
attempt to restrict these tests to instances when they are merited. The selection of proof plans,
productions, search strategies, or even evaluation functions could be controlled by this hierarchical
execution strategy. One could imagine a system where a feature detector might recognise a game
as chess, and so trigger a chess evaluation function, which might trigger a more specialised
evaluation function, which would then cue a lookahead search analysis in a specific region, which
then finally suggests the move. If the system is not given a chess board, none of these other steps
will take place, so the system can maintain lots of knowledge and use it very efficiently. By using
features at each step, the process may be made easier for a human to understand. Itmight even be
possible to break down evaluation functions so that they compute solely with explicit, inspectable
features.
19 In the source text, these criticisms are applied to expert systems, but we do not think mainstream provers avoid
their purview. An exception could be made for (4), as the main point of provers is the ability to verify a proof's
correctness, but we note that verification has been achieved only for a tiny fraction of the algorithms used to
find proofs.
20 The exception, again, is (4). Interestingly, this difficulty is also characteristic of human thought, as shown by,
e.g., the Wason Selection Task (§1.2.1). In those domains where it is possible, verifiability of a result is usually
sufficient.
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Another attraction of problem solving in this way is that the distinction between cases
and rules can be dropped. While it is far from certain that this is a useful thing to do, we note that
combining techniques has been fruitful in many other areas, and for both cases and rules, there
are types of knowledge for which one is preferable to the other. Following our terminology in
Chapter 1, wewill use "schema" to refer to cases or rules interchangeably, and also to other types
of control knowledge such as search strategies, evaluation functions, or feature detectors. What
emerges from this process is a generalised formulation ofmost of the problem solving approaches
explored in this chapter: setting them in a single unifying framework is attractive, as is being
able to relate it to cognitive theories. But what, if anything, does this generalisation buy us? The
generalised formulation might be too vague to be useful (and that is why it explains production
systems, planning, and CBR); or itmight be an encompassing philosophical perspective that does
not really change how anything works; or — possibly — it might suggest alternative ways of
building problem solvers whichmay have new benefits. Given that most current problem solving
systems ignore prior knowledge when guiding search or retrieval, and in the few instances where
prior knowledge is used for retrieval, its use is severely restricted, we believe that this memory-
based approach to AI problem solving has promise. As the scruffies point out, a question is
interesting only when its answer is unknown: so let us explore whether this approach buys us
anything new.
Heneveld 56
Chapter 3. Feasch— A System for Problem Solving with Features
We have seen in Chapter 1 that certain recent cognitive theories ascribe a primary role to
features in the problem solving process. In Chapter 2 we showed that there is a wide variety of
computational approaches to problem solving, with one of the main areas of difference being how
each approach chooses when to apply various actions. These control strategies are summarised
in Figure 3.1:
Technique Guidance Result
Production Rules precondition action
Search (simple) search script (e.g., depth, breadth) action, production, or state
Heuristic Best-First Search state-space evaluation function state
Heuristic Local Search action evaluation function action or production
Planning plan script action or production
Tactics tactic script action, production, or tactic
Case-Based Reasoning index case
Figure 3.1: Control Techniques in AI
Case-Based Reasoning is the only area where explicit reference to "features" is standardly made,
but there are two limitations we noted in §2.2.1: features in CBR are almost always restricted to
easily identifiable surface attributes; and the retrieved cases can be difficult to decompose and
use iteratively, e.g., with planning and search. The ability to detect "deep" structural features21
has been implicated as an important component of expertise (§1.1.2) but such features are rarely
mentioned in an AI context. The approach of heuristic evaluation functions is most compatible
with our idea, as the heuristic can attend to as complex a structural relation as the developer
chooses, but the usual purpose of evaluation functions is to rank possible actions or productions.
As such, it does not cue particular actions, but rather it evaluates all possibilities. Even when
a heuristic is used to recommend particular actions, this cueing is integral to the heuristic; any
feature it may note is incidental, and there is no scope in the theory for a separate process to
21 We do not draw a strict, formal distinction between "surface" and "structural" features, but as is common in the
literature we use these terms qualitatively. It is clear that detecting some features can require much more work
— or more knowledge— than others. Internet search engines are very good at finding "surface" literal matches,
i.e., web pages where certain words or phrases are present. They can also offer "surface similarity" pages where
related words or variant spellings are contained. However, it is a much more challenging and computationally
intensive problem to find web pages where terms occur in a certain order, where a particularmeaning of a term
is intended (e.g., "wind" a clock, not the "wind" blows), or where a set of relations holds with the re-use of one
ofmore subjects (e.g., Dan likes Daphne, but Daphne doesn't like Dan). Such "structural" features are not used
in typical search engines. (The "semantic web" can be thought of as an example where structural features are
explicitly marked up in data.) By stressing structural features for a system, we emphasise that systems should
permit substantially more flexible definitions than would be afforded by literal matches or keyword similarity
(see also §1.1.2).
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inspect the partial result and trigger alternate actions. The same absence of features (or at best,
their incidental inclusion) is true for productions, plans, tactics, and search strategies.
We identified a three-step problem solving process suggested by recent memory-based
cognitive theories: features are detected in a problem space, these features cue schemas, and the
most strongly cued schema is applied. There are similarities between this process and each of the
techniques above— and it seems likely that with some minor changes, each would be compatible
with the "feature cues schemas" process — but none of the techniques above have the same
emphasis or distinctions as this three-step process. This leads us to pose a sequence of questions.
Could this theorised three-step problem solving process be used to create a computational system,
from the ground up? Assuming that it is possible, is it significantly different from other systems?
Are there any situations where this approach might be a better choice for building a problem
solving system?
3.1. The Possibility Hypothesis (PH)
Let us begin with the first point, and reserve the latter two questions for the next two
parts of the thesis if appropriate. We wish to test what we will call "the possibility hypothesis":
(PH) Features can be the basis of an AI problem solving system.
As set out in the overview of this thesis, we take "features" to be representational units derived
from a problem state recording information about the state and typically extending the provided
description. We define them as "a known label or structured entity which can be associated with
a problem state". We specifically include features which result from sophisticated analyses of the
problem state, but not the analysis itself. A feature, as used here, is nothing more than a marker,
such as a predicate expression; all actionable knowledge— including themeans by which features
are detected — is stored in schemas. By "basis" we mean that these features are an integral part
of the system, i.e. problem solving cannot take place in the system without defining and using
at least one feature; and by an AI problem solving system we mean a computational program
which can provide an acceptable (under user-defined criteria) solution to a user-specified problem,
optionally with the user defining control knowledge in the system.
The hypothesis says nothing about schemas, for a very good reason. We define a schema
as a "knowledge element which describes an action which can be taken in a problem state";
consequently, itwould be patently impossible for a problem solving system not to use this concept!
Its identification as a top-level entity, however, we feel is important. Likewise, retrieval is not an
explicit part of this hypothesis, but we note that the use of some such process is unavoidable. (In
our formulation, knowledge retrieval is an action, and any retrieval process could be defined as a
schema.)
The reader may observe that our definition of "AI problem solving system" includes
programming languages; indeed languages such as C or Prolog are often used to develop problem
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solvers for specific domains. The emphasis in (PH) is on requiring features to be a fundamental
part of the system, and this is not the case for any programming languages or pre-existing AI
systems of which we are aware.
Of course, even if a programming language fits our definition of an AI problem solving
system, it may still be decidedly inappropriate. The TgX language, for instance, is well-suited
for writing technical reports but would be a very poor choice for a chess-playing program —
even though it is technically possible. Analogously, showing that features can be the basis of a
problem solving system is not an especially noteworthy result, nor is it intended as such; further
hypothesesmust be proposed and tested before we can establish that such a system is significantly
different from others or that it is appropriate for any class of problem solving tasks.
On the other hand, we might discover that features cannot be the basis of a problem
solving system; this disconfirmation of (PH) would be noteworthy. Several accounts of human
problem solving have posited that features play a key role. If we cannot build a computational
system for problem solving based on features, we would have an argument that these cognitive
theories are under-specified at best, and flawed at worst. Our interest in (PH) is merely to see
whether we can exclude this possibility before proceeding to the other questions above, and if
we cannot, ideally to identify concrete obstacles that prevent the abstract theories from becoming
implementable models.
3.2. The Architecture
Wewill test the possibility hypothesis by attempting to develop a problem solving system
following the feature-based approach: given a problem to solve, the system will first search
for specified features; these features will then cue schemas for problem solving; and then these
schemas will be applied to the problem, either solving it, transforming it to a new problem state,
or leaving it unchanged. Given the primacy of features and schemas, we call our architecture
"Feasch". (Both terms are used in this section as defined in §3.1; commonly, schemas will be
operators as in (2) below, although the definition includes feature detectors as in (4) below and
other as yet unspecified entities.)
In defining the specifications for our feature-based system, let us begin with the
components essential to any AI problem solving system (irrespective of the use of features):
(1) a description of a problem state
(2) a set of operators which act on problem states in a given problem domain
(or a means of generating such such operators)
(3) a means of choosing an operation from (2) for a given problem state (1)
Examples of these components were shown in Chapter 2; Newell & Simon's Generalised Problem
Solver, for example, defines (1) in a predicate logic and (2) as production rules. Component (3)
is the most complicated: it records the "control knowledge" which determines how the problem
Heneveld 59
solving system actually runs. In GPS, (3) is also encoded as production rules, where preconditions
are tested on a problem domain and then determine the operator to apply.
In feature-based problem solving, component (3) will be responsible for identifying
features in a problem state and then cueing schemas from these features. A key difference
between this approach and that of production rules can be observed here, that features are found
and explicitly recorded independently of selecting the operator. (This is not directly relevant to
testing (PH), but the question of the uniqueness of this approach — and the identification of
differing behaviour or capabilities — will become important in latter parts of this thesis.) The
explicit step of identifying features introduces two more essential components:
(4) a set of detectors which determine the presence of certain features within
a problem state in a given problem domain
(5) a place for recording derived information about the problem state
and the use of features to cue schemas implies the following expansion of component (3):
(3a) a description of how a feature detected by (4) cues schemas, by which we
usually mean operators from (2) but might include detectors from (4) or
other, yet unspecified, entities
(3b) a means of choosing a schema (such as an operation from (2)) given cues
from (3a) and derived information from (5)
We note that these six components can be divided into two groups. Some will be static
across an entire problem area— that is, they do not change between problems in the same domain
— whereas others must be defined for each individual problem. From an end-user perspective, it
therefore, makes sense to group the components into two general containers:
(6) a problem domain definition, including (2), (4), and (3a)
(7) a problem context, including (1), (5), and (3b), as well as a reference to (6)
The remainder of this section turns our attention to implementing the architecture in software;
it can be skipped, along with subsequent sections labelled "Implementation", by a reader whose
interest in programming or technical details is minimal.
3.2.1. Specification
Our first design choice was to define abstract high-level interfaces for features and
schemas, IFeature and ISchema. These interfaces are empty, apart from bookkeeping fields
and methods for things like name, id, and a pretty-printing toString representation; nevertheless,
they serve a number of useful purposes. On a theoretical level, they clarify the implementation's
connection to the cognitive theory; on a design pattern level, they support an abstract grouping
of related entities (such as components (2) and (4)) and allow methods to specify the type of
object(s) they expect in an extensible way; and on a object-oriented programming level, they
enable the system to ensure that features and schemas are used appropriately through static
type identification. Simple implementations for these objects will be presented shortly, and of
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course a programmer can extend and implement these interfaces as necessary for any particular
application. In accordance with good modular design, such an extension will require few, if any,
changes to the rest of the system.
Beyond these two interfaces, we have attempted to maintain a close correspondence
between the eight logical components identified and the formal classes used in the system. This
is done through the following eight interfaces with method signatures as below (excluding non¬
essential fields and methods such as name, id, and toString):
(1) interface IProblemState
Obj ect get (): returns a representation of the problem state (the programmer can
choose type of object depending on the domain; commonly it is a string or
predicate expression)
(2) interface IOperatorSchema extends ISchema
IProblemState run(IProblemState): transforms the given problem state,
returning a new problem (or throwing an error if the operator cannot apply)
(3a) interface IMapping
This interface is empty: IExecutor implementations will specify sub-interfaces
of IMapping depending on the requirements of a particular execution strategy
(3b) interface IExecutor extends ISchema
void onFeatureFound(IFeature, IMapping): applies the mapping for a found
feature, looking up the IMapping from the IProblemDomain if null, and then
cues the mapped schemas if appropriate
void onNodeCued(ISchema, Object): performs the appropriate action when a
schema is cued (e.g. from a mapping on a found feature); this might be to run
the schema if it is a feature detector, or inform IProblemContext if it is an
operator; the second parameter passes optional extra cue data
— {start,run,suspend,resume,getStatus}(): standard thread methods
(4) interface IFeatureDetector extends ISchema
void run (IProblemContext): tests for the applicability of one or more features in
the context's state, calling IProblemContext. onFeatureFound when a feature
is found
(5) interface IFeatureBlackboard
void put(IFeature, Object): adds a feature to the blackboard, along with an
optional second piece of information
Object get (IFeature): returns the second piece of information associated with
a feature on the blackboard, or null if the feature is not on the blackboard
List<IFeature> getFeatures(IFeature): returns a list of features on the
blackboard which match the passed feature; everything if the argument is
null, the single feature if there is an exact match, or an empty list if none
match; some implementations may support wildcard specifications
(6) interface IProblemDomain
List<ISchema> getAHSchemas (): returns the list schemas for this domain
List<—> get{0perators,Detectors} (): as above for common schema types
(7) interface IProblemContext
— getProblemjState, Domain, Blackboard} (): accessors for (1), (5), and (6)
void onFeatureFound(IFeature, IMapping): called by feature detectors; adds
the feature to the blackboard and informs listeners
— {add, remove,get, clear}FeatureFoundListener[s] (—): usual pattern for
registering classes interested in when new features are found; typically the
only listener is an IExecutor, but theoretically it could be anything that has
an onFeatureFound method
void onOperatorSchemaCued(IOperatorSchema): called from IExecutor when
an operator is cued; typically broadcasts event to registered listeners
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— {add,remove,get,clear}OperatorCuedListener[s](—): usual pattern for
registering classes interested in when operator schemas are cued; often a
user's class will listen for these events, or sometimes there are no listeners
Classes implementing each of these interfaces will be described shortly. For now, simply given
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IExecutorSchema.start()
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When a schema is cued, the
Executor determines whether to
run it or pass it to the context.
IProblemContext. IFeatureDetector.run
onOperatorSchemaCued(..) (IProblemContext, ..)
Informs listeners (such as user Run a detector on a context, ^
code) that a candidate operator has informing it if feature found,
been found for the problem state.
Figure 3.2: Execution Flow in Feasch. This diagram shows a typical execution
flow for problem solving with the Feasch architecture. Arrows indicate which
methods call to other methods: ordering requirements are shown in italics, and
conditions on the calls are described in the boxes. A pair of arrows leading to a
box indicates any number of calls, depending on the situation, and possibly made
in parallel. For ease of reading, initialisation is shown in yellow, schema-based
problem solving activity in green, and output candidate operators in blue.
To perform problem solving with the Feasch Architecture in a particular domain, the user
must define the relevant IFeatureDetector and IOperatorSchema instances, and optionally
IProblem{Domain,Context,State} implementations. For a given problem, a user's code will
typically first create the IProblemDomain and initialise it with the relevant schemas. The user's
code will then create the IProblemContext, initialised with the IProblemDomain and with the
particular IProblemState being considered.
An IExecutor is then created to control how and when features cue schemas. A variety of
standard implementations are available — representing different execution strategies — and are
described in §3.3. The IExecutor should be linked with the IProblemContext where it will run,
and itmay also be initialised with a set of IFeatureDetectors. (Alternatively, these can be obtained
from the IProblemDomain.) The feature-schema loop then begins by a call to IExecutor. start (),
which cues each of the initial feature detectors specified (either sequentially or in parallel). In
response to these cues, the IExecutor simply calls the run method on those IFeatureDetectors,
which tests for the presence of features. For each feature found, the IProblemContext is notified;
the IProblemContext then notifies the IExecutor, which applies the mapping to schemas implied
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by this feature (again, several implementations are available, discussed in in §3.3). Each of the
schemas cued by a feature is then considered by the IExecutor: if it is of type IFeatureDetector,
it is run following the same cycle as just described.
The other situation thatmay arise is that the cued schema is an IOperatorSchema instead.
This means that the architecture has identified a suitable candidate operator for the problem,
on the basis of the features and feature-schema mappings. When this happens, the IExecutor
informs the IProblemContext, which will typically call back to the user's code. Unless the user's
code specifies otherwise, the IExecutor continues to run the cued feature detectors (and informing
the IProblemContext of the cued operators) until no further features can be found. In a typical
situation, however, the user's code might suspend the IExecutor when a candidate operator is
found, and apply IOperatorSchema.run() on the problem state. This may fail, in which case the
user's code would probably resume the IExecutor, or else it results in a new IProblemState. If
the IProblemState represents a solution, the problem solving task is completed; if not, the user's
code would typically create new IProblemContext and IExecutor objects and repeat the entire
process on the new state.
3.2.2. Implementation
An advantage of defining the specifications as interfaces is that multiple implementations
can be provided for different purposes. We describe standard implementations of all interfaces
except the IExecutor/IMapping pair in this section, along with the key design choices. A set of
progressively richer IExecutor/IMapping strategies is described in the next section along with a
sample application of the architecture.
Language and Environment
We have chosen to develop the system in Java because it offers robust support for object-
oriented design, allowing us to use the essential interfaces just identified, make them public,
and create our implementations separately. This simplifies the task for a user of our system,
since she need not be aware of our implementations, but also allows her, if necessary, to create
her own alternative implementations. Furthermore, Java has mature handling of concurrency,
which we expect will be a strong advantage in cases where multiple schemas, especially feature
detectors, have to run in parallel. Good networking support and portability, as evidenced by
the large number of cross-platform Java web applications, are further reasons for our choice of
programming language.
Specifically we use the Sun Java 1.5.0 SDK (standard edition), which is the industry-
standard, because of its widespread adoption, proven stability, and interoperability features with
Java 1.4. The only 1.5-specific feature is the use of generics, both in the notation in this chapter
and in the code; this makes code more flexible and readable, and as it can be used at compile-time
to generate code compatible with Java 1.4, it does not introduce interoperability difficulties.
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All development described in this thesis has been done primarily under Linux, with
unit testing in the JUnit framework under Windows XP and Mac OS X as well as Linux. The
Eclipse IDE v3.2 was used in development, and its JAR libraries are needed in those instances
where our system is run with Eclipse graphics (e.g. the Eclipse plug-in we present in §4.3.4). For
concurrent sorted maps, we have used classes from JSR 166 which are expected to be included in
future versions of Java. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, no other third-party libraries or
packages have been used and all code is © 2007 by Alex Heneveld with all rights reserved.
Classes
To simplify the creation of a Feasch model, we provide some standard general-purpose
implementations of all the interfaces described in the previous section. The definition of features
and schemas, of course, will depend on the problem area, so we provide implementations of
IFeature and ISchema which facilitate their domain-specific instantiations.
As predicate representations are useful throughout many AI systems, we have chosen
to use this style in the SimpleFeature implementation of IFeature. This class's constructor
takes a String name followed by zero or more Obj ect arguments (which may be other features).
The toString method aids in pretty-printing such a feature, and comparators are provided for
sorting these features by name then by arguments. The class FeatureDictionary implements
IFeatureBlackboard and uses this comparator for tree-based retrieval of features.
On the schema-side, an abstract superclass BasicSchema fulfills most of the contract
methods required by ISchema. This class takes a String name and an optional String identifier
in its constructor, and provides the relevant accessormethods. (If the identifier is not supplied,
a unique random ID is chosen.) By extending this class, operator schemas and feature detectors
can be defined simply by implementing the relevant run method. By way of example, we might
implement a feature detector for whether the state is an even number as follows:





public void run(IProblemContext context) {
if (context .getProblemStateO .get () instanceof Number) {
double d = ((Number)(context.getProblemState().get())).doubleValue();
if (d/2 == Math.floor(d/2))
context.onFeatureFound(this,




If the problem state is a number representing 6.5 or -3, or if it is not a number; this detector does
nothing. If, however, the problem state is a number representing, say 200, this detector informs
the context that a predicate feature even-number (200) is found.
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For the purpose of problem solving in a particular problem domain, the relevant
schemas are usually set in an IProblemDomain. A general-purpose implementation of this
interface is provided in BasicDomain, using aList<ISchema> object for storing schemas and a
Map<String,IMapping> object for storing default mappings by String feature name. Schemas
can be added to this list through the addSchema(ISchema) method; the accessor methods
getOperatorsO and getDetectorsO provide filtered views of this list for IOperatorSchemas
and IFeatureDetectors respectively. Default mappings for features can be specified by
the addMapping(IFeature, IMapping) and putMapping(IFeature, IMapping) methods and
accessed by the getMapForFeature(ISchema, IFeature) method. The class's constructor takes
a String name which describes the domain.
Within a problem domain, an individual problem is recorded as an IProblemContext; the
class BasicContext provides a standard implementation of this interface. The constructor for this
class takes a domain-specific IProblemState (a simple generics-based implementation is provided
in BasicProblemState<E>) and a reference to the IProblemDomain, which are accessed by
getProblemStateO and getDomainO respectively. The class uses an IFeatureBlackboard (in the
class FeatureDictionary) which supplies a comparator for features of the form predicate (argl,
arg2, ..., argN) and stores features in a TreeMap for efficient lookup with wildcard support.
The onFeatureFoundmethod in this class adds features to this blackboard (called by the IExecutor
in the standard model), and the getBlackboardO method lets a feature detector or other schema
inspect the set of features found for this context. The class also provides support for adding
listeners for found features and cued operators, and handles calling to these listeners when
features are found or operators are cued.
The execution of feature detector schemas and the cueing of operators is handled
by an IExecutor implementation. Different implementations, including different mapping
strategies, may be suitable for different situations; we present three such implementations
in the next section. These implementations — and, conceivably, others — inherit from an
abstract superclass BasicExecutor which provides lifecycle methods, including suspend()
and resumeO, and a boilerplate onNodeCueddSchema s, ..) which dispatches calls to
on{OperatorSchema,FeatureDetector,Unknownschema}Cued as appropriate. In this superclass,
each of these three methods simply logs the cue; it is intended that this class be extended by
a developer's overriding these on. . .Cued methods as appropriate (executor-specific mappings
are passed in a parameter to these methods). The developer should also implement the abstract
runSingleO method, whose contract is to iteratively run the single most appropriate schema.
Together, these methods can define an execution strategy.
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Design Efficiency
Many problem solving tasks require a search through a large state space, so in designing
the architecture we have concentrated on efficiently supporting the creation of a large number
of contexts and the execution of a large number of schemas. Furthermore, the architecture will
likely be used in standalone problem-solving situations where speed is of the essence, as well as
interactive environments where control and feedback are important.
The separation of a problem domain from the context is a particularly important enabler
of efficiency: this allows a state-specific IProblemContext object to be lightweight (i.e. they can
be created in large quantity with low overhead) whilst having access to the set of operators and
feature detectors relevant to the problem area.
The use of listeners registered with the context allows support for interactive application,
by adding listeners which update the user interface, and high-throughput standalone applications,
by adding a single listener which determines whether to stop feature detection and run a cued
operator schema.
The IExecutors support suspend and resume, so applications can control the system
resources depending on their needs. Applications can rapidly switch focus among problem
states by invoking these lifecycle methods on the IExecutor for a particular IProblemContext,
or maintain several running in parallel for a best-first feature-detection strategy across multiple
states. Interactive applications, in particular, can use guidance from the end user to constrain
feature-detection to those areas which the user advises without restricting the efficiency of using
Feasch for fully-automated problem solving. Furthermore, the IProblemContext and IExecutor
implementations thatwe use both support a clear () method for when a problem state is no longer
active, so that the executor can be re-used for a different state or context without the overhead of
re-creating and initialising.
On a technical level, thread-pools are used where possible to optimise thread creation,
and the specification of formal interfaces for IFeatureDetector and IOperatorSchema means that
the expensive dynamic run-time type identification call Class. islnstance can be replaced by the
much more efficient instanceof check.
3.3. Execution Strategies: Testing (PH) on Noughts-and-Crosses
We will now turn our attention to exploring whether Feasch can actually be used for
problem solving, testing the possibility hypothesis (PH) on a rudimentary two-player game.
Before we describe the game and the domain-specific strategies, however, we must introduce the
general execution strategies available in the system.
As yet, not much has been said about the IExecutor/IMapping strategies available (3a
and 3b from the list in 3.2.1). The primary reason for this is that the choice of execution strategy
is an implementational detail not specified in the underlying theory of how features cue schemas:
Heneveld 66
although some strategy is essential for problem solving with features and schemas, there is an
essentially limitless range of possible strategies. As part of Feasch, we include three formalised
execution strategies, representing progressively richer functionality based on our consideration
of a number of problem solving tasks and several pre-existing AI techniques.
• ListExecutor runs each feature detector schema sequentially from a fixed list,
with each found feature cueing a list of any number of operator schemas; listeners
are informed on each cue to an operator schema
• WeightListExecutor runs detectors sequentially from a fixed list, but with
weights permitted in the map from features to a list of operator schemas; listeners
can at any point access a list of cued schemas ordered by total weight
• NetworkWeightListExecutor runs the highest-weighted detectors (possibly in
parallel) from a dynamic list, with features giving a weight cue to operators or to
other detectors
The first of these is the simplest strategy, and each subsequent IExecutor represents a strict increase
in capabilities. They are most easily understood in context, so in this section we describe them
with reference to a particular domain, one by one, building up to the synthesis of all capabilities
in NetworkWeightListExecutor. This strategy, the most sophisticated, is suggested as the best
default choice and, except where explicitly noted to the contrary, is used for the experimentation
in this thesis.
It should be stressed that the Feasch architecturewill workwith any implementation of the
IExecutor/IMapping interfaces, and while the ones we outline here represent our best effort, they
should not be seen as a limitation on whatmight be possible. In our exploration of the possibility
hypothesis, one issue we will have to address in the event of impossibility is the extent to which
this reflects on our implementation; consequently, in this section we will attempt to make the case
that the NetworkWeightListExecutor strategy (§3.3.3) represents a good combination of desired
functionality, and that if it has serious limitations, this in fact does raise important challenges for
the underlying theory to be more explicit about how execution happens.
The initial domain where we will test (PIT) is the familiar game "noughts-and-crosses",
also known as "tic-tac-toe". The game is played on a 3x3 grid with two players, using tokens X
and 0 respectively, who take turns placing one of their tokens in any empty square of the grid.
The first player to place three of his tokens in a line — horizontal, vertical, or diagonal — is the
winner. An example game is shown in Figure 3.3.
• 0 • ■ 0 • 00- 0 OX 00X 00X
•X- -X- -X- -X- -X- • X 0 • X0
X • • X • • X • • X X • X
Figure 3.3: A Sample Game of "Noughts-and-Crosses"
The game itself is trivial, in the sense that there are many strategies for perfect play which are
not difficult to find. For our purposes, this makes it a good initial test case. If our architecture
allows us to encode these strategies through features and schemas, and play well with some
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execution strategy, the possibility hypothesis will be confirmed for this example22. If, on the
other hand, some strategies cannot be expressed (or are extremely cumbersome to express),
we potentially have an interesting disconfirmation of (PH). We emphasise again that in this
experiment, a disconfirmation would be the more interesting result, for it would imply that the
cognitive theory is under-specified. A confirmation is less interesting since the domain is so simple,
and would merely serve to justify further exploration in more sophisticated domains. The actual
experiment is described in §3.3.3, using the most advanced executor; explorations with the other
executors are described first, to give understanding about the execution strategy and the approach.
Indeed, beyond merely testing the possibility hypothesis, these explorations will be used to collect
anecdotal evidence about how features and schemas can express problem solving strategies. In
the event that (PH) is confirmed for noughts-and-crosses, these qualitative observations will be
useful for formulating further hypotheses for testing in more complex domains.
3.3.1. A Simple List Executor Strategy
Let us begin with the following simple strategy: if any line has two identical pieces and a
blank, play there, preferring lines withmy tokens; otherwise, prefer the centre, and prefer corners
over other squares. The ListExecutor, with its simple strategy of running detectors in order and
cueing operators directly, can be used with the strategy encoded as follows:
(1) run the i-can-win detector
(2) run the opponent-can-win detector
(3) run the centre-free detector
(4) run the corner-free detector
(5) run the possible-move detector
Allfeatures indicate a square on the board and map a cue to the correspondingplay-at operator.
The ListExecutor runs these detectors in order; a successful detection informs the context of the
feature (or features) found, and here every feature cues a single schema. In our implementation,
the executor stops running when the first operator is cued, and that operator is applied to the
current game (or displayed on the screen).
To test whether the Feasch architecture successfully captures the noughts-and-crosses
strategies described, we will implement these models and run them against a purely random
player. With more complicated strategies (and the final NetworkWeightListExecutor), we would
expect perfect play, but in this simple example we will count a success if the model performs
significantly better than chance.
22 A note on the scientific validity of these experiments: the three execution strategies were developed without
consideration of noughts-and-crosses, and the results described in this section were obtained without altering
the executor classes for this domain.
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Implementation — Noughts-and-Crosses Test Platform
In implementing our tests, we use various Player classes to control the different strategies
in the Feasch architecture; the simplest of these is RandomPlayer, who uses the standard Feasch
CueOpsRandom detector; this detector randomly chooses one or more operator schemas O from the
domain and reports a feature random-cue(O) with a mapping to O. ListMain.ListPlayer uses
the detectors described above, with CueOpsRandom used as the fall-through to ensure all possible
moves get a cue if no other features are found.
The Players implement a IOperatorSchema run(T3Board) method, which applies the
relevant Feasch model to a given game state (stored in the class T3Board). A Game class tracks
progress on an initially empty board, calling each player's run method in turn until the game has
a winner (or is a draw). The Games can be run in verbose mode, to explore what is happening, or
in batch mode for high-volume testing (output is suppressed, apart from summary totals, and the
first move alternates between players for fairness). These classes, and all the execution strategies
for noughts-and-crosses, are contained in a package org. deneveld. feasch. tictactoe.
Implementation — The List Executor
Formally, the ListExecutor is an implementation of IExecutor inheriting from
BasicExecutor (described at the end of 3.2.2.ii). It is instantiated with the IProblemContext
instance describing the problem where it will run, and then feature detectors are added to the
List<IFeatureDetector> returned by the getQueuedDetectors () method (or all detectors in the
context's domain can be added by calling initFromDomainO). For each feature, a list mapping
(in SchemaListMapping) can specify which operator schemas should be cued when the feature
is found; these IMappings can either be static (set by the domain) or dynamic (computed by
the detector). By registering Listener pattern objects on the executor, a caller can be informed
whenever a feature is found (IFeatureFoundListener) or whenever an operator schema is cued
(IOperatorSchemaCued). Once this initialisation is complete, the list executor's run() method will
cycle through the feature detectors, looking for features and cued operators. The following code
(from the class RandomExample) demonstrates the use of a single "random" detector operating
with an IOperatorCuedListener that records operator schemas in the order they are cued.
IProblemDomain domain = new NoughtsAndCrossesDomain(
"noughts-and-crosses-pl", T3Board.X);
BasicContext context = new BasicContext(
new BasicProblemState<T3Board>(board), domain);
final List<IOperatorSchema> ops = new ArrayList<IOperatorSchema>();
context.addQperatorCuedListener(new IOperatorCuedListener() {









System.out.println("found "tops.size()+" candidate operators:");
for (IOperatorSchema op : ops) System.out.println(" "+op);
A few details on using the ListExecutor should be noted. It is not permitted for features to
cue anything other than IOperatorSchemas, and the optional param field in the IMapping cue is
ignored by the executor. Once the executor starts, new IFeatureDetector schemas cannot be
added to the queued detectors list. In summary, the ListExecutor is confined to simple domains
using a static list of detectors whose features send a binary cue to operators. (Other executors
overcome these limits, but the ListExecutor, being the simplest execution strategy, is easiest to
understand initially.)
The noughts-and-crosses strategy described above fits with the ListExecutor, and the
code used in ListPlayer is very similar to the code above, with two differences. The method
executor. suspend!) is invoked whenever an operator is found, and it is not resumed unless the
operator fails on the current problem state. Also, of course, a number of other detectors are added
to the executor's "queued detectors" list, in accordance with the strategy described above. Each
of these are implemented in classes contained in ListMain which implement IFeatureDetector
and extend BasicSchema, and each detector tests for the presence of an eponymous feature with
the indicated argument(s).
• i-can-win ("L", "x,y"): examines all possible lines to see if the current player
can win there on the next turn; returns L as a description of the line, with x and
y giving the absolute co-ordinates of where to play
• opponent-can-win ("L", "x,y")\ examines all possible lines to see if the
opposing player could win on the next turn; arguments are as for ICanWin
• centre-free ("r,y"): checks if the centre square is empty, detecting a feature
with arguments 1,1 if so
• corner-free ("x,y"): checks whether each corner square is empty, detecting a
feature with appropriate coordinates for each empty corner
The IOperatorSchemaPlayAt is used to add the player's token to the board (also in the tictactoe
package). The domain is configured a FeatureToMoveMapping object for each of the features above;
when a new feature is found, the executor retrieves this object from the domain, its cue method
tells the executor about the cue to the relevant play-at ("a:,y") operator, and the ListExecutor
passes this cue to the registered IOperatorCuedListeners.
Results
A test battery of onemillion games sees the simple strategy just described winning 90.41%
of its games against a random player, drawing 8.99%, and losing 0.60% (margin of error <0.029%);
for reference, in a contest of two random players each player wins 43.66%, with 12.67% of games
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Figure 3.4: Performance of List Player against Random
This simple strategy significantly outperforms the chance player. Furthermore, it was
straightforward to code the strategy in the Feasch architecture, and powerful performance was
achieved without much domain-specific code. More complex strategies, borne out of the 0.6% of
games that were lost, will prove a better experiment for (PIT), and so we delay discussion of this
experiment until §3.3.3.
The ListExecutor, since it only affords simple ordered "if-then" style processing, looks
a lot like production rules. It has the attendant benefits that the knowledge can be decomposed,
pieces evaluated independently, and alternative strategies examined easily: by removing some
of the mappings, for example, we find that ignoring the corner-free feature results in the loss
percentage rising to 5%, whereas responding to the i-can-win feature alone accounts for 80% of
the wins. A possible difference to production rules already emerges, in this languaging: the
"preconditions" are encoded independently of the mapping, and so we can speak of "acting on"
or "ignoring" a feature, and the model makes this explicit. Casually speaking, the Feasch model
seems to mirror natural ways of describing problem solving strategies, at least for this example.
Let us explore whether Feasch can be used for more complicated strategies; in particular,
since noughts-and-crosses is not difficult to solve, we would expect to be able to encode a perfect-
play strategy in our architecture. Most of the games which were lost followed a pattern where
the opponent played first and then our strategy set up two of our tokens in a line such that the
opponent, by blocking, set up two separate plays where he can win. At that point, even though
our strategy blocks one win, the opponent can stillwin at the other. We could attempt to correct for
this by coding separate features for all the known losing cases, but it would be far preferable if we
could use a heuristic that combines features when cueing operators, to prefer squares satisfying





One limitation on the List executor is that the cues are all-or-nothing; a corner being free
can cue a move in that corner, but the only way to specify that the centre is better to constrain the
order in which feature detectors are run. There is also no way to apply cues additively; that is, if
two features cue the same schema, it would be nice if that schema is then preferred to others.
The WeightList executor overcomes these limits by using numeric weights as cue
mapping a feature to a schema. Cued operator schemas are ranked by the sum of the weights that
cued them, and at the end of a run—or when an operator has a strong enough cue—the operators
can be presented to the user or tried in order, as in local best-first search.
For noughts-and-crosses, we could use the followingweights to achieve behaviour similar
to the List executor, but without relying on the order in which detectors are run:
• i-can-winO'L", "x,y") cues play-at-x-y with weight 2.0
• opponent-can-win("L", "x,y"): cues play-at-x-y with weight 2.0
• centre-freeO'x.y"): cues play-at-1-1 with weight 0.5
• corner-free("x,y"): cues play-at-x-y with weight 0.4
Some additional features which could be used to discourage the losing cases observed in the last
section are next-to-opponent, which notes that an empty square is adjacent to an opponent's
piece, and in-wasted-line, which detects if a square is in a line which already has an X and an
0 (and so that line cannot be a win for either player even before our play). From observation,
we've discovered that it is good to play near an opponent's piece, particularly adjacent along the
diagonal, except when the square is part of a "wasted line". For this example, we set the following
weights:
• next-to-opponent("x,y") cues play-at-x-y, with weight 0.4 if it is
orthogonally adjacent, and weight 0.6 if it is diagonally adjacent
• in-wasted-line("L", "x,y"): cues play-at-x-y with weight -0.3
As the reader may infer, negative weights are used to discourage the target schema. The weights
are effectively additive, so a corner square next to an opponent's piece would get the same cue as
a single feature mapping a weight of 0.8, and an edge-middle square in a line with an opponent's
piece and one of my own pieces would get an effective cue of 0.1. However, integer weights are
treated specially, and a cue of 1.0 is stronger than any number of repeated cues of 0.5: this allows
us to encode that blocking an opponent is always more important than strategy such as playing at
the corners. (Similarly, a cue of 2.0 is always stronger than repeated cues ISI < 2, so a play which
wins for us is preferred to a play which blocks an opponent. Full details of how the weights are
added is described in the next section.)
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Implementation
The class WeightListMain in the tictactoe package records the features and execution
strategy used for the model just described. The main difference between this code and the
ListMain code shown previously is that the IMapping implementation, SchemaWithWeight, sends
a double-value "weight" as the parameter when cueing a schema. The WeightListExecutor
maintains a list of the cued operator schemas and the net weights of their cues. This list can be
queried by the user at any point, so with WeightListExecutor it is unnecessary to register an
IOperatorCuedListener (as was done in the ListExecutor example) unless fine-grain control is
desired (such as to suspend the executor whenever an operator's cue exceeds a threshold, e.g. 1).
The WeightListExecutor manages the additive application of weights mapped to
IOperatorSchemas, such that new schemas cued are added to the list, sorted by weight, and
schemas receiving subsequent cues have their position in the list changed to reflect the combined
weight. Forweights <5 in the range (—1,1), the rule for adding weights is simple addition; however
weights such that |_ 161J > 1 have a special transfinite behaviour, described later.
Evaluation Functions
Another application of the WeightListExecutor is to weight candidate operators in
a manner similar to evaluation functions. As a simple example, we have implemented an
alternative noughts-and-crosses strategywhich runs a single feature detector, looking at each line
and recording a feature active-line L "blank "me nopp which counts the number of tokens
belonging to the current player and the opponent. Each active-line then maps a cue to the
operator for each blank square as follows:
• "blank = 1 and nme = 2: weight 2.0
• "blank = 1 and nopp = 2: weight 1.0
• "me > 0 and nopp > 0: weight 0
• "blank = 2 and nme = 1: weight 0.3
• "blank = 2 and nopp = 1: weight 0.2
• "blank = 3: weight 0.1
This model is called WeightListScoreRowsMain, and is compared with the previous model,
WeightListMain, in the next section.
Results
As before, we ran one million games with our models playing against a random player.
WeightListMain, with the addition of the two features near-opponent and in-wasted-line, did
significantly better than ListMain, losing only 0.07% of its games (down from 0.60%) and winning
90.96% (up from 90.41%; margin of error is 0.029%).
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The evaluation-function player WeightListScoreRowsMain, with the single-feature
weight cues, was even more aggressive, winning 90.91% of its games, but slightly less cautious,
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Figure 3.5: Performance of Weight List Players against Random
The ability to specify weights gives greater expressive power. Logically this is of course
true, because ListExecutor could be implemented as aWeightListExecutor where the weight is
constrained to be 1. Operationally, we have seen that in this domain a basic "feature list" strategy
can be extended by using weights to overcome the problems observed. TheWeightList approach
can also be used to mimic evaluation functions, giving good performance with a small amont of
code, using a single feature in the ScoreRows model.
Another point to make about this executor is that it allows detectors to run in parallel.
Because the results are cumulative, it can be interrupted at any point and the best candidates
applied in domains where there are timing limits. Efficiency can be improved by using "short-
circuit evaluation", where an IOperatorCuedListener could stop the executor whenever an
operator's weight exceeds 1.0. Alternatively, a "variable skill" player could be implemented
by enforcing time limits, so say, the noughts-and-crosses player could have an "easy" level. Small
random changes to the weights (noise) can be used to give stochastic behaviour, and a "variable
skill' player could be made worse (an "easy" level in a game) by adding noise on the weights.
While these advantages might be useful in some contexts, the main focus of a problem
solving system must be in performing well. The definition of good performance can vary, and for
noughts-and-crosses we might desire either that a player win as many games as possible, or that
the player lose as little as possible. ScoreRows has the highest win-percentage against the random
player, butWeightListMain has the best no-lose record. It should be noted that all of the strategic
players (ListMain, WeightListMain, and ScoreRows) have 100% draw records in contests with
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themselves or other strategic players; thus, from the perspective of maximising the number of
wins, the purely random player outperforms all the strategic players in head-to-head contests.
The ideal player would, if possible, have the highestwin percentage and the lowest losing
percentage against all possible opponents. To attempt to achieve this ideal, we will in the next
section take a published optimal strategy for the game and see whether it can be implemented in
the Feasch architecture.
Before trying this, let us look at some of the limitations of the WeightList execution
strategy, with reference to these example implementations. Firstly, evaluating all the detectors is
time intensive (the players in this section take about twice as long as the ListMain player); some
processing could be eliminated by the "short-circuit" approach described above, but it would be
preferable to constrain some of the detectors to run only when some features have been detected.
(If we could do this, we could even leave all the noughts-and-crosses detectors in a problem-
solving library used for many other purposes, such that they would only be activated if a feature
such as we-are-playing-noughts-and-crosses is detected.)
Secondly, and related to the above limitation, natural and artificial strategies sometimes
continue across several moves ("play at A and then on the next turn play at B") and make use
of nested conditionals ("play at A, unless the opponent played at B or C, in which case run the
specialised feature detector to check whether the opponent is trying to trap me, and if he is, play
at D"). This was seen in Chapter 2. A mature execution strategy would permit the capture of this
type of reasoning, which theWeightListExecutor does not.
Finally, the use of numeric weights leaves the model open to some arbitrariness. Where
did our weights come from? What is to say someone else wouldn't choose different values,
resulting in an incompatible model? This point will be revisited in later sections.
3.3.3. Networked Weighted Lists
What many of the limitations of the WeightList executor suggest is that it would be
attractive to arrange the detectors in "tiers", whereby certain detectors are only run if other
features are detected. The NetworkWeightList executor enables this, recording and combining
weights on operator schemas (as WeightListExecutor does) and also permitting cues to other
feature detectors. Both schema types are including them in the weight-ranked list of schemas
cued at any point, with filtered views available to show detectors only (used internally to select
which detector to execute) or operators only (available to the caller either to apply an operator or
show the candidates to a user).
This executor combines all the capabilities of the previous two executors, and offers greater
control of execution by specifying that detectors should only be attempted in the presence of
certain features. Conceptually, it allows grouping detectors into "families" which are appropriate
to certain problem sub-domains, and it allows for the expression of nested conditionals (by using
weights to cue detectors; negated conditionals, such as the "unless" clause described previously,
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can be implemented either directly, through inhibitory negativeweights on detectors, or indirectly,
through the use of explicit features for the absence of a specific feature). The NetworkWeightList
executor also permits continuations (e.g. the prior example of "play atA and then on the next turn
play at B") by allowing features to persist from turn to turn (so in this example a feature such as
just-played-at-A could cue play-at-B; it might also cue exception checking, such as "unless
the opponent played at B or C").
Since it appears to combine the various types of feature-based reasoning encountered in
our survey, it is our recommended executor for problem solving with Feasch. The next section
will describe the formal experimental conditions for testing Feasch, after which we will present
our attempt to code a perfect-play noughts-and-crosses strategy in Feasch and then the results of
this experiment.
Experiment: Does (PH) Hold for Noughts-and-Crosses?
To test the possibility hypothesis, that "features can be the basis of an AI problem solving
system", we will take a published "expert" strategy for noughts-and-crosses and see whether
it can be implemented in Feasch, using the most advanced executor NetworkWeightList. Our
system can only differentiate between schemas by differing cues from features, so ifwe are able to
encode a standard noughts-and-crosses strategy using multiple schemas or multiple features, we
will demonstrate the possibility hypothesis. The hypothesis will not be demonstrated by putting
everything into a single schema cued by a single default feature, and strong evidence (although
not definitive proof) will be given for its falsity if we are unable to achieve this task. If we are
successful, this in turnwill provide motivation for more in-depth experiments exploring whether
the feature-based approach is different to other approaches, and in particular whether it offers any
unique benefits: showing that it is possible to perform AI problem solving with features is a far
cry from showing that it might ever be desirable!
As has been noted, weaker IExecutor models have been shown to be insufficient for
some types of problem solving; as it is reasonable to assume the same may be observed for
NetworkWeightList, we can observe that the hypothesis is falsifiable, at least for the chosen
strategy. We may also find that the strategy fits in the architecture, but very awkwardly: if we
find that implementation is only possible using the trivial arrangement of a single default feature
cueing the entire strategy, we will also conclude that the hypothesis is falsified— for this strategy
— since the "feature" bears no relation to the domain. Although there is a possibility that the
hypothesis (and architecture) may still have merit for other domains or other strategies, we will
interpret such a failure, on such a basic problem solving task, as a significant disconfirmation of
the hypothesis, and we will focus on its implications for the underlying cognitive theory.
There are many different strategies for perfect play in noughts-and-crosses. As the state
space is small (on the order of 9! = 362880, less symmetries and early wins), search techniques
such as A* can solve the game in relatively small time. This approach does not generalise to
more complex problems, however, and more succinct heuristic code can also give perfect play.
Heuristic strategies have the added benefits of being easier to understand, debug, and remember.
We will take the strategy for perfect play outlined and evaluated in Ostermiller (2005), described
as follows:
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• Know the bad first moves.
Player 1. If you are going first, know the safe first moves. The trick is to avoid
the edges. The corners and the center are safe moves.
Player 2. There are two possibilities. Either player 1 took the corner, or the center.
Safe moves for player 2's first move (player 1 in center): any corner. Safe moves
for player 2's first move (player 1 in corner): centre.
• Player 1 can be ruthless. If player 1 moves in the corner for the firstmove, player
2 must take the center. If player 1 is playing against a novice, player 1 can be
ruthless and always play in the corner first. That leaves a lot of board for novice
to choose from and player 1 will win more often.
• Become an expert. The first moves (or opening book) are the hardest to figure
out. Beyond the first move, it doesn't take much ...
The strategy described leaves some of the secondary details as an exercise to the reader. We
completed the strategy as follows: The first player (X), on his second move, should check whether
he can apply the "corner traps". If O took the centre (after X took a corner), X should play in
the corner opposite his first move, and if X and O have both taken corners, X should take any
remaining corner. The second player (O), on his second move, should check whether a corner
trap is being applied, either X-O-X placed along a diagonal (play at any edge position, that is
anywhere but a corner) or O in the centre with X's in a corner and at an edge-middle opposite
(play at the corner nearest the tokens). Under any other circumstances, most naive strategies can
be used, including any of the ones described previously.
The "score-rows" technique is the naive strategy we have chosen to use when the above
strategy leaves play unspecified. This is because it is the most concise to specify, it is the
most aggressive (in terms of win percentage), and because it raises the additional challenge
of synthesising an evaluation function technique with the explicit conditional heuristic checking.
Furthermore, "score-rows" makes the second corner trap check redundant, so for simplicity we
will leave it out of our implementation.
Figure 3.6: A Feature-Based Network Strategy for Noughts-and-Crosses
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Graphically, the strategy can be visualised as in figure 3.6. In our implementation with
NetworkWeightListExecutor, each of the blue hexagons represent feature detectors, testing for
the presence of one or more features (indicated by red rounded boxes). The green boxes at right
represent the operators cued by the various detectors. The leftmost arrows show the initial weight
cues to feature detectors, and the other arrows show cuesmapped to detectors or operator schemas
when a feature is found.
Results
This NetworkWeightList strategy plays perfectly. It does not lose any games in any
competitions with any of the strategies. Its percentage against the random player — 91.9% —
is higher than any of the other strategies except ScoreRows, and in head-to-head competitions it
defeats each of the other strategies. Against ScoreRows in particular, which plays very aggressively,
it takes advantage of the recklessness which led to ScoreRows's good result against the random
player, defeating it in 39.8% of the games. (The other 60.2% of games are draws.) Against
WeightList, which lost less than 0.1% of games against the random player, it wins 13.4% of the
games (and again, the rest are draws). Full results are shown in figure 3.7.
Player 2
Random List WeightList ScoreRows Network
P1 Win 43.66% P1 Win 0.60% P1 Win 0.07% P1 Win 0.20% P1 Win 0.00%
Random Draw 12.67% Draw 8.99% Draw 8.97% Draw 6.40% Draw 8.08%
P2 Win 43.67% P2 Win 90.41% P2 Win 90.96% P2 Win 93.40% P2 Win 91.92%
P1 Win 90.41% P1 Win 0.00% P1 Win 0.00% P1 Win 0.00% P1 Win 0.00%
List Draw 8.99% Draw 100.00% Draw 100.00% Draw 100.00% Draw 59.98%
P2 Win 0.60% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 40.02%
- P1 Win 90.96% P1 Win 0.00% P1 Win 0.00% P1 Win 0.00% P1 Win 0.00%
CD
> WeightList Draw 8.97% Draw 100.00% Draw 100.00% Draw 100.00% Draw 86.65%
CL P2 Win 0.07% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 13.35%
P1 Win 93.40% P1 Win 0.00% P1 Win 0.00% P1 Win 0.00% P1 Win 0.00%
ScoreRows Draw 6.40% Draw 100.00% Draw 100.00% Draw 100.00% Draw 60.16%
P2 Win 0.20% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 39.84%
P1 Win 91.92% P1 Win 40.02% P1 Win 13.35% P1 Win 39.84% P1 Win 0.00%
Network Draw 8.08% Draw 59.98% Draw 86.65% Draw 60.16% Draw 100.00%
P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 0.00% P2 Win 0.00%
Figure 3.7: Noughts-and-Crosses Contests. The chart above shows the
results of all pairwise contests between the five noughts-and-crosses player
implementations presented here. The best performance is clearly shown by




As an AI problem solving system, the ability to write a perfect player for noughts-
and-crosses is far from impressive — but an inability to do so would have been a nail in the
coffin for Feasch. Subjectively, it was straightforward to develop the model, and, particularly
with the NetworkWeightList executor, the model seems comparatively easy to understand and
communicate. And although other methods can do the same task, e.g., search (§2.1.2) and
evaluation functions (cf. "score rows"), developing the solution in Feasch required what appears
to be quite a different process. The diagram in 3.6 is not characteristic of these other techniques,
and unlike usual search and evaluation function approaches, this diagram — and the Feasch
implementation — corresponds very closely to a human-understandable strategy. Compare the
code and diagram above with the following reference player, written in JavaScript with the same
strategy (only the most relevant portions included; taken from Ostermiller, 2006):
function perfectMove()-C
var state = getStateO;
var winner = detectWin(state);
if (winner == 0)!
var moves = getLegalMoves(state);
var hope = -999;
var goodMoves = openingBook(state);
if (goodMoves == 0)!
for (var i=0; i<9; i++){
if ((moves & (l«i)) != 0) !
var value = moveValue(state, i, turn, turn, 15, 1);













function moveValue(istate, move, moveFor, nextTurn, limit, depth)!
var state = stateMove(istate, move, nextTurn);
var winner = detectWin(state);
if ((winner & 0x300000) == 0x300000)!
return 0;
}- else if (winner != 0)!
if (moveFor == nextTurn) return 10 - depth;
else return depth - 10;
}
var hope = 999;
if (moveFor != nextTurn) hope = -999;
if(depth == limit) return hope;
var moves = getLegalMoves(state);
for (var i=0; i<9; i++)!
if ((moves & (l«i)) != 0) !
var value = moveValue(state, i, moveFor, -nextTurn,
10-Math.abs(hope), depth+1);
if (Math.abs(value) != 999)!
if (moveFor == nextTurn && value < hope)!
hope = value;









var mask = state & 0x2AAAA;
if (mask == 0x00000) return OxlFF;
if (mask == 0x00200) return 0x148;
if (mask == 0x00002 I I
mask == 0x00020 I I
mask == 0x02000 I I
mask == 0x20000) return 0x010;
if (mask == 0x00008) return 0x095;
if (mask == 0x00080) return 0x071;
if (mask == 0x00800) return 0x11C;
if (mask == 0x08000) return 0x152;
return 0;
>
Despite the apparent simplicity of the problem, this code for the solution is difficult to understand,
and we suspect it was not easy to write23. "While human players understand the winning strategy
very well, it is a challenge to translate this strategy into a computer algorithm" (Harris, 2001). It
seems to us that one attraction of Feasch is that it facilitates expressing strategies which can be
difficult or tedious to program in other systems. It seems that there is some amenability tomodular
design — because a complex strategy is implemented here by decomposing it into inspectable
and reusable entities such as the features, feature detector schemas, operator schemas, and cues
used — and there is a possibility of machine discovery for some aspects of the implementation,
such as the numeric weights which we hand-coded in this instance. These points will be explored
in subsequent chapters.
Our focus in this chapter has been to introduce the system and test the first, trivial but
essential hypothesis, that structural features can be the basis of an AI problem solving system.
The results conclusively confirm this possibility hypothesis; now let us turn to more interesting
questions and to more challenging problem domains.
23 The reader may be forgiven for suspecting that this code was deliberately obfuscated, or that we searched for
a complicated solution. We offer our assurances that this is not the case: entering "tic-tac-toe ai program" into
the Google search engine gives this as the third result, with the higher-ranking pages being a general article
about game-playing and a question about 5x5 tic-tac-toe. Simpler solutions can be written, such as by using
brute-force search, but a correspondence to understandable strategies is important to building scalable solvers
and the implementation shown here, we reiterate, is the reference code for the strategy we used. Moreover, in
our experience it is sadly indicative of how many AI systems are implemented.
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Part Two: The Expressivity of Features
Chapter 4. Feasch and the Theorem Prover Isabelle
4.1. Motivation
Having seen in Chapter 3 that a system can be built to perform problem solving based
on features, the next logical question to ask is whether this approach is actually different to other
pre-existing techniques, and if so, how. To answer this question, we have chosen to apply the
Feasch system to a well-developed area of AI problem solving where we can contrast it to a wide
array of standard tools. After considering a number of potential areas, we chose to concentrate
on formalised mathematical reasoning. This area of problem solving is extremely active, both in
academia, with dedicated research groups at over 100 universities, and in industry, where it is
an exciting and fast-growing sector. There are many varying approaches and systems for maths
reasoning, which are used in a wide variety of ways, from fully interactive to wholly automated,
and for a wide range of purposes. A number of standard techniques have been described for
expressing control knowledge, and these serve as an important focus for comparing the current
feature-based approach. Finally, if our approach does prove to be distinct in this area, it has the
potential to be useful to a greatmany people, for theorem proving technology is used by a diverse
range of communities, from research mathematics to financial security.
In this chapter, we will describe how we have integrated Feasch with a theorem proving
system, first focussing on some of the existing challenges to semi-automated theorem proving,
and then recounting the technical details of integrating the two systems. In the subsequent
chapters, we will look in depth at how our approach using features differs from other approaches,
specifically asking whether the inspectability of features is useful for proof assistants (Chapter
5), whether features have the same domain-specific utility as other techniques (Chapter 6), and
whether they can perform well in a domain where other techniques languish (Chapter 7).
4.2. About Isabelle
Within the area of mathematical reasoning, we have chosen to work with the system
Isabelle (§2.3; Nipkow et al., 2006), because it is one of the most widely used in the area, with a
good breadth of theories and a mature suite of end-user tools.
The Isabelle theorem prover is based on the HOL prover and so supports the usual higher-
order logical expressions needed to formulate and reason about typical mathematical theorems.
Theories have been developed in Isabelle for subjects ranging from complex analysis to Hoare
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logic, and tools have been released into the public domain for authoring proofs in an Integrated
Development Environment (Aspinall et al., 2006), generating human-readable versions of proofs,
and performing tactic-style planning (IsaPlanner, in Dixon, 2006). An active on-line community
provides support for the Isabelle system and formost of these theories and tools. Many automation
tactics are provided for solving and simplifying many types of expressions, and new tactics can
be added to the system for easier proof development. As all proof steps are routed through a
small verifier core which has been thoroughly examined by many researchers, the widespread
confidence in the correctness of the Isabelle system extends across the range of theories and tools
available.
4.2.1. Automation and Proof Assistants
Tactics in Isabelle
Currently, automatic theorem proving techniques in Isabelle are encoded as tactics written
in ML. These tactics can perform powerful analyses of the specific domain for which they are
written, and for many of the standard Isabelle library theories, particularly where decision
procedures apply, very good tactics are supplied.
However, tactics have a number of limitations. Firstly, they are not easy to create, for to
write a tactic, one must be familiar with the underlying ML code for Isabelle. This codebase is
very large and very complicated, and it is not nearly as well documented as the more user-friendly
end-user mode "Isar". Secondly, a tactic's behaviour is opaque; when it does not work, the output
is usually just "proof command failed"; short of examining an enormous trace log, there is no
way to observe what a tactic is doing. This makes tactics difficult to understand, more difficult to
debug, and extremely arduous to adopt for a new domain. For these reasons, it is very difficult to
extend tactics created by other developers, and as a result the Isabelle libraries consist of a small
number of tactics which have been honed for particular tasks. Although these tasks include many
commonly needed activities, there is a large area of potential automation for which no tactics exist.
The Simplifier
One particular family of tactics, simplifiers, are designed to be extensible, and the
simplifier {e.g., the tactic simp) is one of the single most powerful automation tools in Isabelle.
Powerful simplification rules (corresponding to decision procedures) are included for common
domains, reducing many expressions to canonical forms; frequently, this suffices to solve the
problem, as "1+1=2" simplifies to "true". Developers can extend its behaviour by marking
lemmas with " [simp]".
However, this technique often does more or less evaluation than is desired. If a user
wants to inspect the proof found by simp for 1+1=2, she may be troubled to learn that there is no
easy way to do this. If she wants to simplify only a part of a problem, or see why the simplifier
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is doing something unexpected, she has to get deep into the innards of the Isabelle source code.
Nor is this an idle worry: because simplification sets are designed with certain problems inmind,
they can be impractical for other uses. Sometimes it can take an uncomfortably long time to run,
and occasionally it can enter an endless loop and require interrupting or terminating the system.
The simpset can be customised, but this is also a labourious process for which documentation is
sparse. Even for experienced users, it can be difficult to spot conflicting rules. These conflicts
often lead to over- or under- simplification or to infinite loops, and the uninspectable nature of
Isabelle's simplification means these can be very hard to debug.
Because of these restrictions, most developers are circumspect about adding rules to the
simplifier. The Isabelle manual advises that users should include only canonical simplifications,
i.e., only rules which are universally desirable, and while this is sensible in practice, it means that
much useful control knowledge cannot be expressed as simplification rules.
IsaPlanner
A recent extension to Isabelle attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the use of tactics
in general and the simplifier in particular. IsaPlanner (Dixon, 2006) provides a framework for
writing proof plans (v.a. §2.3.iii, §4.2.2.ii) which resemble tactics but offer a number of advantages:
IsaPlanner provides built-in contextual information and state caches to facilitate proof exploration
(and to avoid endless loops); it allows introduction of explicit "gaps" so intermediate details can be
postponed whilst following an overall plan; and, most usefully, its behaviour is easily inspectable
and modifiable.
To date, IsaPlanner has principally focussed on automating inductive proofs, and plans
implementing the rippling heuristic (Bundy et ah, 1993) have yielded excellent results. Although
it is still in development, with documentation and the user interface still in relatively early stages,
applications to other areas are already being explored. Its syntax is similar to that of Isabelle's
tactics, and the increased functionality it offers makes it an attractive framework for guiding
theorem proving, particularly in domains where success is not guaranteed. Whereas expressing
qualitative and heuristic knowledge is not easily compatible with the approach ofML tactics (and
particularly not with simp), IsaPlanner makes this convenient. However, like tactics, IsaPlanner
takes a "top-down" approach, applying only those operators the developer explicitly included in
the plan. Because these solution plans must be encoded holistically, it can be difficult to combine
multiple plans or to reuse plan components. Also, as with tactics, there is no way for a developer
to indicate when particular plans should be used (except for comments in source code or external
documentation), and there is no way for the system to choose appropriate plans automatically.
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A Possible Role for Feasch in Automation
This problem of retrieval is one where Feasch might be able to help. If knowledge
components in Isabelle— theorems, definitions, tactics, and plans—were annotated with features,
Feasch could try to detect these features in a problem state and then retrieve and apply potentially
relevant tools automatically. The question we are asking of Feasch at this point iswhether it differs
from other approaches: if it is able to apply at this top-level, we will have some argument that it
is somehow different to the other techniques.
The exploratory results of Chapter 3 also suggest other differences. None of the
approaches described thus far provide reasoned explanations for their activity; in fact, only
IsaPlanner gives much in the way of useful feedback beyond "Proof step failed" or printing
the next proof state. We will argue in Chapter 5 that it would be difficult to use any of these
techniques to generate such explanations, requiring extensions to the code for each step in the
tactic or plan. If features are used to guide each step, we expect that this causal information will
be immediately available; regardless of whether this information is useful (although we argue
that it is), it highlights an important difference between the Feasch approach and the others. We
have also noted that the modular re-use of control knowledge can be difficult with either tactics
or plans; subsequent chapters will explore whether Feasch differs in this regard.
4.2.2. User Interfaces
Even with the most advanced tools, automated theorem proving falls far short of
replicating the expertise of human mathematicians. As a result, much work in mechanised
reasoning has focussed on the usability of systems for interactive theorem proving, where a
human user guides the proof attempt (as described in §2.3.ii). The end product of this process is a
body of formalised mathematics which has the correctness guarantees that machines can provide
but which is much more sophisticated than current systems could produce automatically.
Unfortunately, this process can be extremely tedious, as mechanised proofs require
enormous amounts of low-level detail which human mathematicians often find unnecessary24.
For this reason, there is growing interest in semi-automated theorem proving, where a system
incorporates automation techniques (such as Isabelle's simp tactic) within an interactive theorem
proving context. These systems are commonly called proof assistants, and in many ways provide
the best of both worlds: a user can observe an automated proof attempt, using its results when
they are applicable, or instead manually guide the system when the automation flounders or the
user has a good sense of the direction a proof should take.
24 Consequently, such proofs are time-consuming both to write and to read; we will discuss this objection shortly.
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Challenges to Semi-Automated Theorem Proving
Unfortunately, despite the apparent promise of the theory of semi-automated theorem
proving, their adoption amongst researchmathematicians has remained low. One primary reason
given for this is given by Bundy (2006):
After half a century, automated theorem provers are in a fairly mature state. A number
of totally automated systems, such as Vampire, Spass and E, and a number of interactive
systems, such as Isabelle, HOL, Coq, PVS, ACL2 and Nuprl, have a wide user base and
a good track record in solving difficult problems. However, the use of the systems, even
the totally automated ones, remains a highly skilled and time- consuming task. These act
as a barrier to their wider adoption. In particular, and unlike computer algebra systems,
automated theorem provers have never been popular amongst mathematicians.
In contrast to calculators and computer algebra systems, theorem proving systems cannot readily
be used for a single task: the nature of formalisation requires that all the underlyingmathematics be
coded in the systembefore it canbe used on a problem. As new theory libraries arebeing created all
the time, this barrier is diminishing, but in its place, the problem of identifying relevant theorems
grows with the number and size of libraries. One of the biggest and most time-consuming
difficulties is being familiar with the rules and tactics available in a system.
Even when libraries are available and the user is familiar with their theorem names and
other defined constructs, it is frequently the case that the amount of automation provided is
so small that the system is unhelpful for exploratory mathematics. Computer algebra systems
were adopted primarily because they automate and expedite tedious analyses, facilitating this
exploration, and not because of strong reliability or accuracy guarantees. In fact, it is well known
that computer algebra systems are unsound and error-prone, particularly at boundary situations,
but they are useful enough, and right often enough, that they are a useful tool for mathematicians
(particularly when exploring concepts which will be more thoroughly verified later if they lead
anywhere). Theorem provers, on the other hand, are predicated on formal correctness, and the
vastmajority of tactics are based on decision procedures. When they are available, they work very
well, but for more advanced (and arguably more interesting) areas of mathematics, there is no
such guaranteed automation technique. (Where these decision procedure exist, furthermore, they
are often available in more user-friendly computer algebra packages as well.) As a result, semi-
automated theorem proving environments currently do not offer much assistance tomathematical
exploration, as they are not usually geared towards approximate reasoning, with a few notable
exceptions covered in the next section.
Amore fundamental objection (Bundy, 2006) is that formal proofs are notoriously difficult
for humans to understand, due to the enormous detail they require. Whilst some mathematicians
relish this rigour in proofs (e.g., Serre, from comments made at a meeting of the Royal Society),
others are interested exclusively in the insights they afford (Cohen, same event). A consensus
view is that proofs are "a vehicle for arriving at a deeper understanding of mathematical reality"
(Aschbacher, same event), and the capability of theorem provers to drive this forward is limited.
Most interactive systems, including Isabelle, support annotations for explaining proof steps and
structuring them hierarchically, and there are a number of tools which can generate user-friendly
versions of such annotated formal proofs. Automated tools, however, do not normally provide
these annotations; in many cases, they cannot, because tactics often follow brute-force algorithms
which, although suited to the nature of computer systems, do not follow human patterns of
mathematical thinking and so fail to offer inspectability.
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The Inspectability of Proof Planning
To be attractive to a wide audience of research mathematicians, semi-automated theorem
proving environmentsmust offer functionality for easily identifying relevant theorems and tactics,
for representing approximate reasoning, and for usefully annotating the results of automated
theorem proving. One approach which solves some of these issues is proof planning, introduced
in §2.3.iii and implemented in IsaPlanner (Dixon, 2006)25. Closely related approaches have been
used in other systems, cf. "proof levels" in Qmega (Melis et al., 1999) and "schemas" in Theorema
(Buchberger et al., 2006).
A proof plan, we recall, is an outline for a proof, usually following some pattern which
has been identified as applicable to certain types of theorems. It differs from standard low-level
tactics in two ways. Firstly, a plan will tend to run across many proof steps, using logic such
as "after step 1, depending on factor A, apply step 2 or step 3 as many times as possible"; and
secondly, proof plans will commonly modify a proof goal in a way which is not a priori logically
justified, but which introduces new subgoals which have to be discharged later. Typically both
the modified proof goal and the new subgoals are simpler than the original goal. It can be helpful
to think of proof plans as capturing the human technique of reasoning "if we assume Z, then we
can simplify the proof goal and then apply (some other technique), and if that's successful we
can worry about proving Z later." Clearly such reasoning is not guaranteed to be useful, but for
many types of problems, proof plans can capture general proof techniques at a greater level of
abstraction than other formalisms. When good generalisations are found, the resulting proof plan
is often extremely powerful, e.g., solving induction problems with rippling (Bundy et al., 1993).
Many strategies that mathematicians use can be easily mapped on to proof plans, and
where this is done, the resulting proofs will follow standard, intuitive patterns. As proof plans are
usuallywritten in a hierarchicalmanner, these proofs,moreover, can usually be annotated in such a
way that they can be expanded or collapsed to varying levels of detail. These two propertiesmean
that proof plans can significantly help create machine proofs that are comprehensible, sometimes
even attractive, to the human users. Furthermore, a user can observe a plan as it executes on a
problem; if he detects a problem in the plan, say he sees that some step should be done differently,
he could interrupt the plan, manually apply the alternate step, and then resume the plan.
25 Eighteen months of this research was spent working with an earlier proof planning system, AClam (Richardson
et al., 1998), for which we developed a Java-based planning engine along the lines of Feasch. The underlying
AProlog language it used was unreliable, and shortly after its developers stopped supporting it, the AClam
projectwas cancelled. We ported our development to Isabelle, and although this took severalmore months, this
new implementation benefits from Isabelle's advantages of usability and widespread usage. It is this Isabelle
version of our work which is described in this thesis. IsaPlanner is emerging as the proof planning platform
of choice for Isabelle, and we are in discussions with Dixon et al. about integrating it with Feasch. This is
described more in §9.1.4.ii.
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Semi-Automation and Isabelle
Isabelle has primarily been an interactive theorem proving environment, and its facilities
for automation have historically been restricted to tactics implementing decision procedures.
As discussed in §2.1.4, there are several limitations inherent in the tactic-based approach; with
regards to semi-automated use, two of these limitations are especially noteworthy. Firstly, the all-
or-nothing nature of tactics means that the only aspect a user can control is their initial selection;
once invoked, there is no prospect of interacting with them. Secondly, there is no way in Isabelle
to indicate when tactics should be used.
By combining a proof planning methodology with a tactics-like syntax, IsaPlanner
overcomes the first of these limitations. The inspectability of proof planning — the fact that
a user can observe what it the system is doing — lends itself to interactive usage, in addition
to fully-automated proving. An IsaPlanner user can review each proof step in the plan (or each
step that a comparable tactic would make). Wherever a plan has disjunctive branches, they
are presented to the user as a list of possible next steps and he can select from among them.
Alternatively, the user can specify that a plan should run automatically for a fixed period of time,
after which he can review the entire space of proof exploration. At this point, he can select a state
which seems promising and continue the proof attempt from there; he might let the system resume
its automated exploration, he might manually choose among steps recommended by the plan, or
hemight specify some other proof step not in the plan. IsaPlanner plans do not currently have the
breadth of coverage of the tactics in Isabelle, but the system is a very recent one. The development
of new plans, for more types of problems in more mathematical domains, will likely increase the
usefulness — and the appeal— of semi-automated theorem provers to mathematicians.
The second limitation, however, is notbeing adequately addressed by any system ofwhich
we are aware. When a user enters a new theorem to prove, Isabelle has no means of suggesting any
automation technique or proof step. A few tactics, most notably simp (and closely related tactics,
such as auto), are applicable very generally, and it is not uncommon for users of Isabelle to attempt
"apply simp" blindly on any new state. Only afterwards, if the simplifier fails or does something
undesirable, will these users analyse the problem and attempt to identify the appropriate tool,
e.g., a domain-specific tactic, possibly with a particular theorem, or an IsaPlanner plan. If the user
can recognise what next step is appropriate — crucially, if the user is familiar with the relevant
theorems, tactics, and plans— they can type it in to the system and proceed. Rarely, however, will
the user be aware of all the relevant knowledge in the Isabelle library, and as this library is very
large, finding it can be a challenge. Identifying relevant theorems can be complicated enough, but
finding relevant tactics or plans is often even more difficult. Isabelle theorems (and definitions)
are expressed in mathematical notation, and this is usually familiar, concise, and relatively easy to
search; tactics and plans, however, have lengthy and complicated ML definitions, compounding
the problem of identifying when they are relevant. Because it is so much easier to find individual
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theorems, there is the danger that a user will ignore higher-level tactics or plans, and complete
a proof at the lowest, most tedious level even when this process has been automated. Currently,
the standard installations of Isabelle and IsaPlanner offer 80 tactics and 1 plan, so this problem is
not so severe; for theorem proving to become widely useful, however, these numbers must grow,
and as they do so, this danger will become very real.
In addition to potentially being useful for fully automated theorem proving, as suggested
in §4.2.1.iv, Feasch may be able to assist in interactive proof by recommending plans, tactics, and
theorems. If, when developing any of these knowledge entities, a developer specifies the features
of a problem state which are relevant to its usage, then the system can automatically retrieve these
entities when appropriate and present them to the user. This can be done for high-level tactics
and plans as well as for the myriad individual lemmas and theorems in the library. By presenting
candidate proof steps, Feasch has the potential of dramatically reducing the amount of searching
and the amount of typing involved in writing Isabelle proofs.
4.2.3. The Eclipse ProofGeneral Environment
We suspect that if Feasch has significant differences to other control knowledge techniques,
these differences will be related to the expressive style and inspectability of the approach. Central
to any differences, we believe, will be the solution it offers to the problem of retrieval, suggesting
proof steps on the basis of features. This could have ramifications for both automated and
interactive theorem proving, and so itwill be important to be able to evaluate Feasch with Isabelle
in both areas. Other potential differences are that Feasch, by using explicitly defined features,
might yield information about why a tactic is potentially appropriate, and that it could facilitate
the re-use of control knowledge. As a semi-automated environment will be the best arena for
exploring these prospects as well, let us survey what such environments are available for Isabelle.
We will also look at how well Feasch could be integrated in this environment, both for our system
to interact with the user and for it to interact with Isabelle.
About ProofGeneral
Far and away, the most widely used user interface for Isabelle is ProofGeneral (Aspinall,
2006). Initially developed as a plug-in for the Emacs editor, and continually supported and
updated ever since, ProofGeneral offers a powerful, easy-to-use, text-based front-end for Isabelle
(and, by using a generalised protocol, it can supports other provers as well). A typical theorem
proving session with ProofGeneral involves typing proof commands in the editor and "sending"
them to the theorem prover: if the command is applicable, it is "locked" in the display, the new
proof state is displayed, and a user can enter another command (or "undo" the command(s) just
sent and send different ones instead, e.g., if the new proof state is technically valid but not an
improvement to the previous one); if the command does not apply, the relevant error from the
theorem prover is displayed and the user can edit or replace the command. At the end of a session,
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the editor contains a file which records the final list of commands, providing new definitions,
axioms, or theorems with proofs. The file can be saved, passed along to others, reopened, and
re-executed in the theorem prover; if the file includes a proof to one or more theorems, it can be
seen to constitute a reproducible formal verification of those theorems.
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Figure 4.1: Emacs ProofGeneral
The automation components of ProofGeneral are exactly the automation components
of the underlying theorem prover, viz., Isabelle. The only "smart" assistance offered by the
environment is a text-based search through certain libraries; any additional intelligent assistance
(such as Feasch) would have to be written in Emacs Common Lisp, and developers have
understandably preferred to work at the ML level.
To effect the underlying automation techniques, e.g., simp, a user types them in like all
other proof commands; in fact, there is no semantic difference in Isabelle between the use of
complex automation techniques such as apply simp and simple rule applications such as apply
(rule theorem). IsaPlanner, likewise, is invoked by writing apply (ipp technique). This begins
a planning session in the Isabelle ML console in Emacs, where a user interacts with IsaPlanner
via a command prompt; if the session is successful, the user can display the proof, cut it from
the console window, and paste it into the prover file. As this all shows, Emacs ProofGeneral
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is strongly text-based (unsurprising due to the nature of Emacs): it offers scarcely any of the
graphical interaction features common in modern development environments.
To resolve this problem, Aspinall & Winterstein (personal communication) have been
working on a new version of ProofGeneral based on the Eclipse platform, combining a full-
featured source code editor with one of the richest set of graphical widgets. That project began to
mature at the same time that we were looking to integrate Feasch with Isabelle in a user-friendly
semi-automated environment; Eclipse ProofGeneral had the added attraction of being already
implemented, in Java, with fully-functioning routines for communicating with Isabelle (through
either process streams or socket streams), so it seemed an ideal starting point for the systems'
integration.
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proof (prove): step 1
fixed variables: xs
goal (lemma (app_Nil2), 2 subgoals);
1.[]@[] = []
2. !!a xs. xs @ [] = xs ==> (a # xs) @ [] = a # xs
[t/pe proofstate]
Figure 4.2: Eclipse ProofGeneral
Our Work on Eclipse ProofGeneral
The Eclipse ProofGeneral project ran out of funding soon after we chose to work with
it, and as it was very nearly at the stage of being usable, we implemented a number of essential
features and crucial bug fixes. Our aim in this effort was that if Feasch with Isabelle is to be
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usable, all the underlying systems must be robust; and if the entire environment is attractive and
easy-to-use, it will be easier to promote any benefits of Feasch with Isabelle that we find. This
involved a significant amount of work, particularly as the Isabelle system was also undergoing
major changes at the same time. (Our work to this end is summarised here for completeness's sake;
this section may be skipped if the reader is interested in our system and not in the development
we have done on Eclipse ProofGeneral.)
Many of the improvements we made had to do with the parsing and communications
layer. We made a number of changes to the parsing routines so that Isabelle theory files can be
handled reliably, and so that large files can be processed efficiently. Prover communications for
parsing and sending commands were removed from the display thread (where they frequently
hung the system) and routed through a new prover queue synchronised to resolve sequencing
errors. Isabelle output was occasionally not valid XML, such as when special symbols such as <
and & were used in proof goals, so we made the XML processing engine used by ProofGeneral
more tolerant of these errors.
Another major area where we extended ProofGeneral was to add the ability to query
and maintain Isabelle library information as Java data structures. Having a complete list of
tactics and theorems is useful to the Feasch system — this is why we added the feature — but
having this information also made it straightforward to provide context-sensitive on-line help and
autocompletion within the proof script editor.
lemma app assoc [simp]: " (xs @ ys) 0 zs = xs $ (ys @ zs)"
apply (induettac xs)
apply (simp add: rev
lemma revapp [simp]:
apply (induct xs)

















"List.rev == list_rec 0 ('.tlambdasx xs xsa. xsa @ [x])": Thm.
thm
Figure 4.3: Autocompletion in Eclipse ProofGeneral
Finally we created a ProverStandalone interface to the ProofGeneral SessionManager
which permits programmatic control of the theorem prover from Java without requiring the
Eclipse editor or GUI. This is useful in ProofGeneral for unit testing, and also means Java programs
can be written for controlling theorem provers, offering the Java-side benefits of high-level data
structures, multi-threading, and internet support on top of the power and robustness of provers
such as Isabelle.
All of these changes have been released to the public domain and added to the
ProofGeneral codebase. They are independent of Feasch and it is expected they will be available
in future versions of Eclipse ProofGeneral.
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4.3. Integrating Feasch with Isabelle
By integrating Feasch with Isabelle, we are interested to discover whether the use of
features and schemas offers much difference to the other techniques just described. Schemas, in
our vocabulary, include IsaPlanner proof plans, complex Isabelle tactics, and low-level theorem
applications, as well as feature detectors. Features, here, can be any attribute of a proof state
that a developer judges as worth identifying; these might be superficial attributes, such as "the
problem involves trigonometric functions", or "deep structure" aspects, such as "the conclusion
of the proposition matches the conclusion of an implication in one of the assumptions". In the
resulting system, a developer must be able to define the features, schemas, and mappings for her
domain. She could do this by writing Java code, as we did for noughts-and-crosses (Chapter 3),
with the Java code retrieving the proof state from Isabelle, running the detectors, and then calling
to Isabelle to apply cued schemas (§4.3.1). From a usability perspective, however, it would be very
much preferable to have access to Isabelle's rich semantics for proof state representation when
defining and detecting features (§4.3.2), and to permit a developer to specify her Feasch control
knowledge in the same file where she defines her theorems or tactics, using e.g., a simple scripting
language (§4.3.3). Finally, wewill wish to have a user interface component, as part of the theorem
proving session, where the schemas suggested by the control knowledge are presented to a user,
in such a way that he can easily select one, have it sent to the prover and inserted in his proof, and
then see the schemas suggested for the resulting proof state (§4.3.4).
4.3.1. Java
The first requirement for combining Feasch with Isabelle, as noted above, is to be
able to query and modify the Isabelle proof state from Feasch Java objects; this is provided
by ProofGeneral with our extensions. With this in place, we defined classes IsabelleDomain
and IsabelleContext, fulfilling the Feasch IProblemDomain and IProblemContext interfaces,
and providing prover-level and proof-state-level Isabelle functionality. The IsabelleContext
constructor, as one important example, uses the IsabelleDomain and ProofGeneral routines to
load a representation of the current goal in the Isabelle theorem prover. This representation
is stored in an IsabelleProblemState; two other important classes are GoalsHelper, which
assists in processing tree representations of Isabelle goals, and IsarCommandSchema, which stores
commands for Isabelle proofs along with a textual description. Complete descriptions of these
classes can be found in their JavaDocs.
Heneveld 92
Controlling Isabelle from Java
We will demonstrate how these classes can be used by developing a very simple feature-
schema set for automating certain induction proofs, and invoking IsaPlanner's rippling technique
if all else fails. The complete program is included on this project's web-page at http: //feasch.
heneveld.org, in the class JavaApplylnductionExample. We begin by using our ProofGeneral
ProverStandalone class to control the theorem prover. The following code snippet initialises the
theorem prover (with a precompiled theory with IsaPlanner and our code, described in the next
section) and then waits for the prover to finish all start-up processing. The ellipsis will be filled in
with code throughout this section. (The code following the ellipsis simply ensures that the session
is closed and cleaned up after use.)
public void exampleListProofO {





if (prover!=null) prover.dispose() ;
>
>
At this point, we can send Isabelle theory file commands directly to the prover using the
sendCommand method defined in ProverStandalone. The return value of this method, a
ProverCommandResponse object, gives the result of the Isabelle command; it can be printed to
standard output or queried to see whether errors occurred. In this example, we will wrap the
call to sendCommand in a method called showCommand which displays the output from the prover.
Filling in the body of exampleListProof we can write:
showCommand("theory ApplylnductionExample imports PreList IsaP begin");
showCommand ("datatype 'a list = Nil (\"[]\") "+
"I Cons 'a \"'a list\" (infixr \"#\" 65)");
showCommand("consts "+
"app :: \"'a list => 'a list => 'a list\" (infixr \"®\" 65) "+
"rev :: \"'a list => 'a list\"");
showCommandP'primrec \" [] @ ys = ys\" " +
"\"(x # xs) @ ys = x # (xs @ ys)\"");
showCommandC'primrec V'rev [] = [] \" " +
"V'rev (x # xs) = (rev xs) @ (x # [])\"");
These commands set up basic definitions for a theory of lists; they are in fact taken directly from the
Isabelle tutorial (Nipkow et ah, 2006), which then proves various simplification lemmas involving
these constructs, leading up to the theorem that rev rev x = x for any list x. Let us send the first
lemma definition to the prover, showing the corresponding output in a slanted font:
showCommand("lemma app_Nil2: Y'app xs [] = xs\"");
CMD> lemma app_NH2 [simp]: "app xs [] = xs"
proof (proveJ: step 0
fixed variables: xs
goal (lemma (app_NH2), 1 subgoal):
1. xs @ [] = xs





Using Feasch for Programmatic Control of Isabelle
The proof above is not difficult, but one still has to be familiar with the tactics in order to
use them. Feasch can be used to perform a simple feature-based analysis to identify these tactics
when theymight be appropriate. In this model,wewill use two features. The first simply indicates
whether "isabelle is active proving something" by checking whether the number of subgoals is
greater than zero. It can be defined as follows:
public class ActivelsabelleGoalDetector
extends BasicSchema implements IFeatureDetector {




public void run(IProblemContext context) {
if (( (IsabelleContext) context) .getProblemStateO .getNumSubgoals()>0)




The second feature is more intricate, as it examines ProofGeneral's ProverKnowledge
representation of the currently-loaded Isabelle libraries. This detector iterates through the
elements in the conclusion of the goal, adding elements which look like inductively defined terms
to one list and adding elements which look like variables to another. The feature "conclusion has
inductive expressions" is added if the list of apparently inductively defined terms is non-empty.
The detector also sets a mapping from the feature to an IsarCommandSchema specifying "apply
(induct var)" for each of the variables var identified. The weight of the schema is computed as
a function of the size of the conclusion and the frequency of inductive expressions.
public class InductiveExpressionDetector
extends BasicSchema implements IFeatureDetector {




public void run(IProblemContext context) {
int numlnductives = 0, numTotal = 0;
ArraySet<String> vars = new ArraySet<String>(),
terms = new ArraySet<String>();
for (Node n : GoalsHelper.getConclusion
(((IsabelleContext)context) .getProblemStateO .get())) -C
numTotal++;
if (n.val.indexOf('.')>0) {





//an entity xxx is recursively defined if it has definitions




}- else if (n. val.matchesO [A-Za-z] [A-Za-z0-9_] *") && !n. val.equals
("op") && knowledge.getltem(n.val+"_def")==null) {
//note: even better would be to add only vars which are arguments
//to the inductive terms identified above
vars.add(n.val);
>
if (terms.isEmptyO) return; //no inductively defined exprs
IFeature f = new SimpleFeature(NAME, terms, 1.Od*numInductives / numTotal );
MultiMapping map = new MultiMapping(true);
for (String var : vars)
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map.add(new SchemaWithWeight<ISchema>(new IsarCommandSchema





With these two feature detectors defined, we can now set up the domain with appropriate
mappings. For this example, let us send a cue of 0.7 to "apply auto" whenever Isabelle is active
— since it's often a good thing to try — and add a small cue of 0.1 to "pp ri" (IsaPlanner with
rippling) whenever an inductive expression is found. This small cuewill normally be smaller than
the variable cue sent by the detector above to "apply (induct var)", and themore computation-
intensive IsaPlanner technique will be reserved for situations where other approaches fail.26 The
following code sets up the IsabelleDomainwith the feature detector schemas and mappings just
described. It can be called at any point once the prover is initialised; in our file, it is invoked just
before sending the app_Nil2 lemma to the prover (in the body of exampleListProof).
IsabelleDomain domain = new IsabelleDomain(prover);
domain. addSchema(new ActivelsabelleGoalDetectorO) ;
domain.addSchema(new InductiveExpressionDetector());
domain.addMapping(new SimpleFeature(ActivelsabelleGoalDetector.NAME),
new SchemaWithWeight<ISchema>(new IsarCommandSchemaO'apply auto"), 0.7));
domain.addMapping(new SimpleFeature(InductiveExpressionDetector.NAME),
new SchemaWithWeight<ISchema>(new IsarCommandSchemaO'pp ri"), 0.1));
NetworkWeightListExecutor ex = new NetworkWeightListExecutor(null);
We will now write the code for running the executor on a particular problem state. The
following method repeatedly rims the executor, attempting to apply the cued operator schemas
and recursing on the new state, until either a proof is completed or none of the cued schemas
apply.
ProofRecord tryAutoProve(IsabelleDomain domain, NetworkWeightListExecutor ex)
throws InterruptedException, ScriptingException f
IsabelleContext context = new IsabelleContext(domain);
ProofRecord pf = new ProofRecord(context.getProblemState());
ProverCommandResponse res = null;
while (context. getProblemState () .getNumSubgoals()>0) -C
ex.switchContext(context);
ex.addDetectors(1.0, domain.getDetectors());
System.out .printlnC'RUNNING executor") ;
ex.startO; //start running the executor (in bg thread)
ex.waitForQuiet(); //then wait for it to finish
ex.release();
for (ISchemaWeightRecord sw : ex.getCuedOperatorsO) -(
if (sw.getSchemaO instanceof IsarCommandSchema) {
System.out.printIn("TRY suggested schema ,"+sw+"'");
res = showCommand( ( (IsarCommandSchema)sw.getSchemaO ). getCommandO ) ;
if (res.fatalErrorEvent==null) {










26 Currently, IsaPlanner reports that proofs are successful even when they are incomplete, so that tactic really
should be used with care! We include it in this example because it demonstrates the pattern of larger cues to
those tactics which can be more easily tried, with some cue to the lesser used tactics so that they will not be
overlooked, either by an automated prover or by a human user.
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pf.endMessage = "PROOF COMPLETED";
> else {
showCommand("sorry");
pf . steps. addC'sorry") ;




Now let us invoke the tryAutoProve tool. (As before, output in shown slanted. These commands
follow the initialisation of the domain and executor in exampleListProof, replacing the commands
for the manual proof of app_Nil2.)
showCommand("lemma app_Nil2 [simp] : V'app xs [] = xs\"") ;
CMD> lemma app_NH2: "app xs [] = xs"
proof (prove): step 0
fixed variables: xs
goal (lemma (app_NH2), 1 subgoal):
1. xs @ [] = xs
ProofRecord pf = tryAutoProve(domain, ex);
RUNNING executor
TRY suggested schema 'apply auto[0.41176/1]'
CMD> apply auto
*** empty result sequence — proof command failed
*** At command "apply" (PGIP message).
proof (prove): step 0
fixed variables: xs
goal (lemma (app_NH2), 1 subgoal) :
1. xs <9 [] = xs
TRY suggested schema 'induct on xs[0.40741/1]'
CMD> apply (induct xs)
proof (prove) : step 1
fixed variables: xs
goal (lemma (app_NH2), 2 subgoals):
1. []®[] = U
2. !! a xs. xs @ [] = xs ==> (a # xs) @ [] = a # xs
SUCCESS: suggested schema was applied; new goal is ((op = (...
RUNNING executor
TRY suggested schema 'apply auto[0.41176/1]'
CMD> apply auto
proof (prove): step 2
fixed variables: xs
goal (lemma (app_NH2)) :
No subgoals!
SUCCESS: suggested schema was applied; new goal is (No subgoals!)
CMD> done
lemma app_NH2: ?xs @ [] = ?xs
pf.print();
PROOF COMPLETED





A complete proof is found, sent to Isabelle, and returned to the user. In fact, this simple Feasch
model is able to solve all the simplification lemmas up to and including rev_rev:
lemma app_assoc [simp]: "(xs @ ys) @ zs = xs @ (ys @ zs)"
lemma rev_app [simp]: "rev(xs @ ys) = (rev ys) @ (rev xs)"
lemma rev_rev [simp]: "rev (rev x) = x"
With the addition of an analogous feature for applying case_tac, this can automate the
proof of all lemmas in Chapter 2 of the Isabelle tutorial (Nipkow et al., 2006). As the lemmas are
carefully chosen and individually not difficult, this is not in and of itself an impressive feat. It is
noteworthy, however, for two reasons. Firstly, it shows how control knowledge can be associated
with Isabelle tactics so that they can be easily identified when they are relevant: instead of a user
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having to search the libraries or the tutorial, Feasch can use this control knowledge to recommend
methods automatically. Secondly, with Java controlling the theorem prover, other high-level
automation techniques such as lazy thinking (Buchberger & Craciun, 2003) can be encoded in Java
to help with both lemma speculation and automated proving.
4.3.2. Isabelle ML
Many of Java's capabilities maybe useful for semi-automated theorem proving, including
multi-threading, data structures, and regular expression testing for features. Some features,
however, particularly those doing structural analysis of the proof state, could be done more easily
detected using the IsabelleML prover code directly. Furthermore, requiring features and schemas
to be defined in Java is undesirable because this removes the control knowledge from the Isabelle
files where tactics and rules are defined. For these reasons, we wanted to provide a mirror of
many of Feasch's capabilities within the IsabelleML session, culminating in an easy-to-use syntax
where control knowledge can be specified alongside the relevant Isabelle definitions.
We have done this by defining analogous Feasch Context and Domain structures
in ML, such that the ML Domain can store feature detectors and mappings, and the
Context records the current ProofGeneral state (or an alternate state if provided).27 Feature
detectors can then be written in ML using Isabelle proof term internals; our Java code
can then invoke these detectors by using ProofGeneral's Isabelle interface to execute "ML {*
FeaturesDomain.run_detector_on_context . . . *}". The ML domain includes methods for
storing a "top-level" set of detectors and a set of mappings defined from ML; and provides
methods for printing this information in an XML-like syntax which Java can parse. In this way,
feature detectors and mappings can be defined in the Isabelle world and made visible to Java,
so that the Java Executor can run them, optionally integrated with other Java-side schemas and
mappings.
Detectors can use a rich library of ML search and unification algorithms when testing
for features: the low-level term library in Isabelle offers routines for object-level analysis such
as computing term size, and some more advanced facilities such as type-checking and eta-
contraction. Yet more sophisticated functionality is provided by IsaPlanner, whose "focus
term" partial unification algorithms have proved very useful. We have developed extensions
to these routines which permit more flexible bi-directional unification and type instantiation,
and we have put many tasks likely to be useful for a feature analysis in a uniform front-
end package, FSUnifyTools. Of particular use are is and has, which look for entire and
containment matches between two arguments, finding all schematic variable instantiations and
— in one of the most challenging parts of the extensions — drawing type and sort inferences
27 No analogous Executor is defined, as wewill be driving the use of detectors from Java (ProofGeneral for semi-
automated use or Java standalone), but such a structure could be defined to enable a pure-ML implementation
of Feasch, e.g., as a fully automated Isabelle tactic.
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in both arguments. This is in contrast to the relevant library functions in IsaPlanner and
Isabelle, where although schematic variables can be used in the two arguments simultaneously,
certain matches may not be found, e.g., if the types of these variables (possibly complex types
corresponding to higher-order functors) are not specified on at least one side or iteratively updated.
The problem is a difficult one, particularly if efficiency is important; because in our system,
strict type-checking will necessarily be carried out later, we have made trade-offs in favour of
speed and generality. The routine "replace_vars_in_term (instantiations : (string*term)
list) target" in our library implements this, along similar lines to Isabelle's "subst_Vars",
"instantiate'', and "norm_term", but tailored for more flexible use of schematic variables and
types.
As with a lot of ML programs (in our experience), the details of the implementation are
neither interesting nor easily explained. We supply extensive examples of low-level syntax, as
well as commented code and documentation, with the source for Feasch with Isabelle in the folder
ml/. We will not describe it in great detail in this thesis, preferring instead to insulate the user
from these underlying complexities through a more user-friendly interface, described in the next
section.
4.3.3. The Feature Description Language (FDL)
For Isabelle control knowledge to be easily represented through features and schemas,
the developer should be able to define this knowledge in the same files where the relevant tactics
and rules are declared, with most types of analyses expressible simply and clearly. One of the
strengths of Isabelle is that formal mathematical knowledge is expressible with this simplicity
and clarity: this has enabled the system to be widely used, understood, and extended. Providing
the same support for the expression of control knowledge will, we expect, mean that heuristic
applicability information can be shared along with the formal definitions.
We settled on a natural-language-style syntaxwith variable unification, where for example
we can write "the conclusion contains "rev ?X"" to indicate that rev with one argument
appears in the conclusion. In this example, ?X is given the value of the argument; this might be
ignored if it is irrelevant, or it can be set as a parameter in the feature. In addition to "conclusion",
valid subjects in this grammar (left-hand-side words) are "assumption" and "goal", referring
to the respective components of the current subgoal, and "expression Expr", referring to an
arbitrary Isabelle term string Expr. (These can be preceded by an optional modifier, some or
the, which has no effect but improves readability.) Valid verbs are is, for entire matches, and
contains, for matches to a region of the source (has is provided as a synonym of contains). The
"object" of the verb (the right-hand side) is expected to be a string which can be parsed as a term
in the current Isabelle context, optionally using schematic variables such as ?X. (The same is true
for Expr on the left-hand side.) The detection engine finds all instantiations which satisfy the
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statement (unless alternate behaviour is specified, perhaps for efficiency's sake), and the detector
returns all the unique features that result.
For example, if we define a feature "assumption_has_sum ["X", "Y"]" as "(assumption
contains "?X+?Y")", when we compare it against a subgoal" [ 1+z+y = x ; a+b = 1+z ] ==>




Connectives AND and OR can be used to combine statements, and the modifier NOT can be
used to negate statements. Unification sets are carried forward in order, with the usual semantics.
Continuing the previous example, if we compared the feature definition "((assumption
contains "?X+?Y") AND (conclusion contains "?X+?Y"))" against the same subgoal as
before, only the instantiation (?X=a, ?Y=b) is returned; likewise, the definition "((assumption
contains "?X+?Y") AND (NOT (conclusion contains "?X+?Y")))" returns just the other two
instantiations.
There are three other statement forms recognised as feature definitions, useful for
complicated connective statements. The first of these, (instantiated "?X"), returns true if
?X has been instantiated (?X, of course, can be replaced by any other schematic variable, or even
any expression; currently the implementation of instantiated detects whether the expression
changes under application of unifications implied by earlier statements in the feature definition).
The second form of statement, (size "?X" TestFunction), computes the size of the instantiation
of ?X and applies it to a suppliedML TestFunction of type int -> bool (such as (fn u => u<5),
to check whether the size is less than 5; "size" is formally defined by the Isabelle system, but
usually corresponds to the intuitive definition, where x has size 1 and (x+y = Sue 0) size 6). The
third, (atomic "?X") returns true if ?Xis instantiated and its instantiation has size 1.
Instantiation checks are particularly useful to exclude degenerate unifications; if "?P ?x
?y" is matched against 0+1, possibly unifications include such expressions as (?P=Au v. u+1,
?x=0), (?P=Au v. 0+1),and (?P=Au v. v, ?y=0+l) aswell as themore obvious (?P=Au v. u+v,
?x=0, ?y=l). By checking that all terms are instantiated, or checking that ?x and ?y are atomic,
a developer can restrict features to particular desired scenarios. Note, however, that statements
are evaluated in order, so if (instantiated "?X") occurs before the statement(s) specifying IX, it
will never be satisfied.
One may also include arbitrary ML as a feature, as the size example suggests. The type
of an arbitrary feature in ML is:
(string * Term.term) list (* schematic variables already instantiated *)
-> (Term.term (* the focus subgoal (usually the first) *)
* Term.term (* all goals *)
* Feature.T list ref (* the list of features *) )
-> ((string * Term.term) list (* a resulting set of consistent instantiations *)
Seq.seq (* sequence of all possible such sets found *) )
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This is substantially more complex than the FDL syntax we have described, but it permits a user
to write more sophisticated detectors than we have allowed for, if and when required. It allows,
for example, writing a detector which examines all subgoals or which looks at the features found
thus far in the analysis.
Within an Isabelle theory file, features are defined by writing ML code "feature name
vars statement;", where name is a string specifying a feature name; vars is a list of strings
specifying the schematic variables that should be included as part of the feature (without the
? prefix); and statement is a feature definition as described above (including the possibility of
arbitrary ML code). Using the Feature Description Language and this command, we can now
define features similar to those in the previous section for a theory about lists. Our theory file
starts out as before:
theory ListFeaturesExample imports PreList IsaP
begin
datatype
;a list = Nil (" [] ")
I Cons 'a "'a list" (infixr "#" 65)
consts
app :: "'a list => 'a list => 'a list" (infixr 65)
rev :: "'a list => 'a list"
primrec
" [] 0 ys = ys"
"(x # xs) @ ys = x # (xs @ ys)"
primrec
"rev [] = [] "
"rev (x # xs) = (rev xs) ® (x # [])"
We then define two features, one which is detected whenever Isabelle has an active goal and
another which detects occurrences of rev and app in the conclusion (possibly returning multiple
features).
ML {*
feature "isabelle is active" [] (the goal is "?X");
feature "the conclusion uses recursive list expressions" ["X"]
(((the conclusion contains "rev ?X")
OR (the conclusion contains "app ?X ?Y")
OR (the conclusion contains "?Y @ ?X"))
AND (size "?X" (fn u => u=l)));
*}
The second feature definition includes arguments to rev or app, provided they are of size one.
The reason for restricting it to expressions of size one is that we are interested in identifying
variables over which induction could be performed. The test we perform is neither necessary nor
sufficient (?X could be instantiated to Nil, for example, but not to A in the expression rev A @ [])
but rather it is a simple approximation of appropriateness. In contrast to Isabelle theory items or
most tactics, features and mappings permit rapid formulation of very rough control knowledge.
A Feasch model can, of course, be refined — by the developer or by another user — but even
in a simplistic form, and without much work on the part of the developer, (such as our "uses
recursive list" feature), the approach seems to provide information about a domain that is
different to other approaches and potentially quite powerful. These themes of expressiveness and
approximate reasoning, as well as modularity and re-usability, will be explored in subsequent
chapters.
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The second definition above demonstrates also that Isabelle term expressions can be
written with valid Isabelle shortcuts; "?Y <3 ?X" is equivalent to "app ?Y ?X". The detector
returns all unique features, so for the expression "A @ B = rev ((rev B) @ (rev A))", it
will find two features, "the conclusion uses recursive list expressions (A)" and "the
conclusion uses recursive list expressions (B)".
In addition to defining features within Isabelle theory files, it is desirable to be able to
specify which detectors should be run initially and what should be cued when features are found.
The command "mapping name vars cue-listspecifies that the feature name should cue the
schemas in cue-list; the list vars consists of strings specifying variables which are assigned
the values of arguments in the feature. Whenever these variables appear as schematic variables
(i.e., prefixed by ?) in cue-list schemas, they will be replaced by the corresponding feature
argument. The cue-list is a list of (schema, weight) pairs, where weight is a real number,
and schema is of the form (ProofCommand command), where command is a string representing an
Isabelle command (such as " apply auto"); (NamedProofCommand (name, command)),where name
is a textual description of the command (such as "Use the 'auto' tactic "); (FeatureDetector
detector), where detector is a string corresponding to a feature name; or (NamedSchema name),
where name is a known schema identifier (defined either in ML or in Java). With these commands,
we can define our mappings as follows:
ML {*
mapping "isabelle is active" []
[ (ProofCommand "apply auto", 0.7),
(FeatureDetector "the conclusion uses recursive list expressions", 1.0) ];
mapping "the conclusion uses recursive list expressions" ["X"]
[ (ProofCommand "apply (induct ?X)", 0.5) ];
*}
Finally, a user can specify that a feature detector should be run initially with the command
add_top_level_schema schema. (It is also possible to specify multiple sets of top-level detectors
with the FeatureTool set of commands; for this, and for a lower-level description of the other
commands described here, see fdl.examples. ML in ml/examples.) Our Feasch model in Isabelle,
comparable to that described in Java in the previous section, is complete when we include the
command:
ML {*
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "isabelle is active");
*>
When ProofGeneral (and applications using ProverStandalone) have parsed these
commands, it has access to these FeatureDetectors and ProofCommand schemas. An executor
using the top-level schemas in the Java IsabelleDomainwill, in this case, startwith the "isabelle
is active" detector, and receive the cues for the command "apply auto", the "recursive list"
detector, and "apply (induct IX)" if appropriate (with ?X instantiated as per the recursive list
features). The method tryAutoProve would work, exactly as before, trying to prove various
lemmas using the methods cued at each proof step. Unlike in the previous section, however, the
control knowledge does not need to be described in Java; a developer can specify it at the same
time as she defines her theory.
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4.3.4. Tying it All Together: The Feature Wizard
For the Feaschmodel to bewidely useful, its execution and suggestions should be available
in the same semi-automated theorem proving environment where a user would ordinarily work.
This means it should be accessible in or alongside the ProofGeneral editor. To this end, we
developed a front-end which sits as a "view" in Eclipse, called the "Feature Wizard" and
implemented in org.heneveld.featwizpg.FeatWizMainView.
The FeatureWizard monitors the current ProofGeneral Eclipse proof script and proof state,
and whenever an unproven subgoal is active, it can invoke a Feasch Executor using detectors,
mappings, and top-level schema sets from Isabelle or Java. FeatWizMainView includes routines
similar to those presented in §4.3.1 together with graphical controls and status indicators. The
features detected and the methods (operator schemas) cued are listed in two tab panes as shown
in figure 4.4.
Feature Wizard S3 [V V 11 f ^ = □ Feature Wizard S3 [> W 3 f - = □
Goal: xs@ Q = xs Goal: xs@ Q = xs
isabelle is active Method Command Weight
the conclusion uses recursive list expressions^) apply auto apply auto 0.4118
the conclusion uses recursive list expressions(xs) apply (induct "0") apply (induct "0") 0.3333
apply (induct "xs") apply (induct "xs"; 0.3333
j Methods (|Features] j Settings ] Methods ( Features | Settings ]
Figure 4.4: Feature- and Method- List Tabs
This view can be docked in Eclipse and visible alongside the proof script editor and other views
(such as the proof state view) as shown in figure 4.2. By clicking on a method, a user can have
it inserted in the proof script editor and sent to the prover. If it can be successfully applied, the
prover remains in the new state, the new proof goal is displayed, and the user has the option
of entering further command manually or running the Feature Wizard on the new goal state. If
a cued command is selected and inserted but the prover determines it is not actually applicable
(which can happen whenmappings specify likely commands without computing logical necessity,
similar to a userwho will often try "apply auto" just in case itworks), the FeatureWizard removes
it from the editor and places a red "error" icon next to the method in the list; a user could then try
another candidate method from the list ormanually enter a command (as in normal ProofGeneral
usage).
The Feature Wizard is designed to be a "minimal impact" GUI. It can be present and
operational without requiring a user to change her working habits at all; if a user sees useful
suggestions appearing, however, she can—and we hope will—incorporate the Wizard into her
way of working. The behaviour of the Wizard can be customised in another "Settings" tab,
allowing control of such items as whether the Feature Wizard runs automatically and whether
high-scoring methods should be automatically tested and, if successful, inserted in the proof
script. These items can all also be overridden by manual clicks on toolbar commands to "run" the
executor, "stop" it, or enter fully "auto"matic mode; these commands, and experiments involving
Feasch and the Feature Wizard, are described in the next chapters.
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Chapter 5. Interactive Theorem Proving with the Feature Wizard
We will begin our exploration of the "Feasch with Isabelle" system by looking at some
of the most tedious steps in theorem proving. Nearly all proofs comprise a significant portion of
common applications of elementary logical rules: typing these in can be one of the most laborious
parts of using Isabelle. By defining features to suggest when these rules apply, the system could
propose them automatically, saving the user the time of typing, as well as the risk of typing
errors. Because it is frequently necessary to type lengthy instantiations into the applied rules, the
advantages of such a tool could be considerable.
5.1. Globally Useful Features for Isabelle/HOL
Let us start with one of the most trivial parts of the proof. Very often, the last step before
completing a goal is to tell the prover to "apply assumption"; while this is not hugely taxing for
the user, it is a reasonable expectation that a proof assistant do this automatically when possible.
We can do this with Feasch by defining a feature that "an assumption matches the conclusion",
mapped to the proof step. Because most proofs consist of many subgoals, "apply assumption" is
one of the most common steps; thus it will be useful to have it easily available for insertion. Even
if it is not difficult mathematically to identify when to use it, this is, to our knowledge, the first
time it is available interactively for Isabelle. The FDL code (§4.3.3) for this is:
feature "an assumption matches the conclusion" []
((the conclusion is "?P") AND (some assumption is "?P"));
mapping "an assumption matches the conclusion" []
[ (ProofCommand "apply assumption", 2.0) ];
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "an assumption matches the conclusion");
The "detector schema" for this feature uses the conclusion to set a schematic meta-variable and
then checks whether any assumption also matches that variable. As mentioned in §4.3.2, we have
developed specialised ML functions for this unification; one consequence of this is that ?P could
unify with an assumption and a conclusion which are not literal matches, as long as they are
unifiable through eta-contraction and expansion or by instantiating other schematic or unbound
variables {i.e., ?P will match a conclusion "3u. A u" with any of the expressions "3v. (Ax. A x) v",
"Ex A", or "3v. ?H v" as assumptions).
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5.1.1. Cueing the Obvious
In addition to "apply assumption", there are a number of other rule applications which
are often desirable whenever they are valid. Just as we tested for "an assumption matches the
conclusion", simple features are one way to record when these rules are appropriate. Looking at
sample proofs,we identified four such rule typeswhich occurwith high frequency. These deal with
conjunctions (conjl/E), implications (impI/E), universal quantifications (alll/E), existentials
(exI/E). We note that there are many other techniques which apply some of these normalisation
strategies, but for the moment we will forget about those techniques and focus on what— and
how— control knowledge can be expressed using Feasch. There will be ample comparison with
other techniques towards the end of this chapter and in subsequent chapters.
For each rule type above, there are instances where the destruction of the logical operator
is a safe and almost universally desirable thing to do. When an assumption is a conjunction of
two propositions, it is nearly always easier to remove the conjunction and make each proposition
an explicit assumption. Likewise, if there is an implication or a universal quantification in the
conclusion, or if an assumption is an existential, it is usually good to remove the relevant operator.
It is easy to identify the features to detect each of these situations, and with Feasch, they can be
encoded as follows:
feature "some assumption is a conjunction" ["P","Q","PQ"]
((some assumption is "?P & ?Q") AND (expression "?P & ?Q" is "?PQ"));
feature "the conclusion is an implication" ["P","Q"]
(the conclusion is "?P —> ?Q");
feature "the conclusion is a forall quantification" []
(the conclusion is "ALL x. ?Q x");
feature "some assumption is an existential" ["P"]
(some assumption is "EX x. ?P x");
It is also necessary to add mappings from these features to the relevant Isabelle commands,
invoking the destruction-rule or elimination-rule tactic for the logical rule. User-friendly names
for these schemas are specified, for although this is not necessary—and was not done for the
simple "apply assumption" schemas—we feel that it may increase readability and inspectability.
Using "expression" to bind additional schematic variables, as done with ?PQ above, can be useful
to this end. These names are not an integral part of the system, except as labels for the mappings,
and they can easily be suppressed in the graphical user interface (GUI) in favour of viewing
just the commands. Alternatively, a user could edit the control knowledge to use a more terse
or otherwise preferred format. However, for libraries where a user is not familiar with all the
theorems, and for novices moving to Isabelle, we suspect that a natural language description will
prove useful, and we will investigate one possible use in §5.2.
mapping "some assumption is a conjunction" ["P", "Q" , "PQ"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Separate conjunction assumption ?PQ",
"apply (erule_tac P=?P and Q=?Q in conjE)"), 1.1) ];
mapping "the conclusion is an implication" ["P","Q"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Move ?P from conclusion implication to assumptions",
"apply (rule impl)"), 1.2) ];
Heneveld 104
mapping "the conclusion is a forall quantification" []
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Remove forall quantification from conclusion",
"apply (rule alii)"), 1.2) ];
mapping "some assumption is an existential" ["P"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Instantiate assumption existential ?P.",
"apply (erule_tac P=?P in exE)"), 1.3) ];
One thing to note is that some command schemas specify instantiations (using tactics where _tac
has been appended), but that this is not necessary here for the rules applied to the conclusion (using
the low-level tactic rule, as opposed to the other low-level Isabelle tactics for rule application,
erule, frule, and drule, which apply for elimination, in a forwards direction, and in a forwards
direction destroying a used assumption, respectively). The application of these rules to the
conclusion is guaranteed to be uniquely defined, so the simple form can always be used here. This
is not always the case, and where these rules are applied to assumptions, the simple form might
be ambiguous. Isabelle will apply these rules to the first matching assumption, but specifying
the instantiations offers several advantages. This gives the user control over the rule applied, it
makes the resulting proof robust if the order of assumptions is changed, and it means the rule
application can occur more quickly.
A second point to note is that while the mappings above ensure that the associated
schemas will be cued when the detectors are run, we have not told Isabelle when to run any
of these detectors. Because these feature detectors are simple, we will specify them as top-level
schemas, meaning that they will run without being cued.
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "some assumption is a conjunction");
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "the conclusion is an implication");
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "the conclusion is a forall
quantification");
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "some assumption is an existential");
Under the hood, all that this command does is indicate that these detectors receive an initial
cue of 1.0. This value can be adjusted — this is described in comments in the ML code — but
an easier way to encode more complex behaviour is to use the NetworkWeightList executor to
chain schemas. One detector (such as "isabelle is active" from §4.3.3) can be used as the initial
trigger, and mappings added from this feature to other detector schemas, so that they are only run
when the relevant feature is detected. The chains can even be longer: for instance, the top-level
schema could cue a detector which looks for an existential anywhere in the goal, and if this feature
is found, the "some assumption is an existential" detector could be cued. This is most useful
when a detectormay be computationally expensive and necessary only in specific instances (so not
for these examples, although we will shortly introduce cases where this is useful). Note that one
feature detector must always be specified as a top-level schema, and others triggerable from this
via some sequence of detectors (or possibly other schemas, such as tools), otherwise the detectors
will never be invoked by the system.
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5.1.2. Heuristic Recommendations
These rules are frequently used in otherways where desirability ismore difficult to detect.
Using the network executor to chain schemas, and using numeric weights on mappings, we can
encode this heuristic control knowledge in Feasch. Separating conjunctions in the conclusions, for
example, is often done, but is not always necessary, and is typically delayed until after assumptions
are massaged into desired forms (so as not to duplicate this work when proving each conjunct).
As a consequence, we will use a smaller weight — 0.5 — for the mapping between the features
and schemas for this command.
feature "the conclusion is a conjunction" [] (the conclusion is "?P & ?Q");
mapping "the conclusion is a conjunction" []
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Separate conjuncts in conclusion
(to prove them separately)", "apply (rule conjl)"), 0.5) ];
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "the conclusion is a conjunction");
In general, we use the convention that a weight uj > 1.0 should be used for schemas which
are universally desirable, such as those in the previous section, and u> > 2.0 should be restricted
to those universally desirable commands which discharge a subgoal. By sending a weight of
0.5 to the command "separate conjuncts in conclusion", less than those used in the previous
sections, we ensure that this command will be ranked lower in the list. Because this commandwill
normally be done only when the others do not apply, this is appropriate. If, for example, we have
"A A B" both in the assumptions and as our conclusion, we should prefer to "apply assumption"
(u> — 2.0) rather than separate the conjunction in either the conclusion (u> = 0.5) or the assumption
(w = 1.1).
As described in §3.3.2, a Z-transfinite sigmoidal function is used for successive cues. What
this means in practice is that two cues of 1.1 will result in a combined cue which is less than a
single cue of 2.0. A cue of 1.0 followed by 0.1 gives the same net result as a single cue of 1.1,
which is greater than a single cue of of 1.0. Three cues of 0.5 is equal to two cues of 0.75, and both
are less than a single cue of 1.0. This may be hard to get used to initially, but our hope is that
users need not concern themselves overly much with finding the exact weight values. We hope
that good behaviour will result from following the convention above, using rough estimates for
the fractional part of each weight. Relying too much on precise fractional values could result in
a system which is too inflexible and inextensible — these problems and some possible solutions
are discussed in §9.1.3— but for now let us note that we recognise it as one of the most ad hoc (or
"below the line") aspects of our system. However, as they are similar to devices used elsewhere
(e.g., evaluation functions from §2.1.4 and fuzzy logic from §2.2), we expect that such weights will
be a relatively easy way to get powerful behaviour, and one with which users will be familiar.
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5.1.3. Hierarchical Executive Control
As mentioned at the end of §5.1.1, the NetworkWeightList executor can be used to
structure execution hierarchically. In subsequent chapters, for example, we will look at using
features to solve derivative and integral problems; if there is no derivative or integral in the
problem, clearly it would be a waste of resources to run any of these detectors. Using mappings
to set up a hierarchical network of schemas, we can ensure that some detectors — particularly
those which may use a lot of resources— are run only if we have found features suggesting they
are worth doing. Furthermore, the weights in the mappings influence the order in which cued
detectors are run. Our expectation— which will be explored in due course— is that this supports
and encourages the development of complex feature detectors, without impairing performance.
The last section showed how separating the conjuncts in a conclusion can be suggested
as a weaker recommendation than other rule applications. They are times, however, when it is
actually preferable to these other schemas, viz., when one of the conjuncts can be easily proved. It
would be grossly inefficient to do this type of analysis when the conclusion is not a conjunction, but
if we have already found the feature "the conclusion is a conjunction", it would be useful to
see whether either of the conjuncts can be easily proved by assumption. We encode this judicious
execution of a more complicated feature detector by defining a mapping from the simpler feature:
mapping "the conclusion is a conjunction" ["P","Q","PQ"]
[ (FeatureDetector "the left-hand conjunct of the conclusion matches an
assumption", 0.8),
(FeatureDetector "the right-hand conjunct of the conclusion matches an
assumption", 0.8) ];
We now have a hierarchical network of detectors, and the features and mappings can be defined
in a similar way as before:
feature "the left-hand conjunct of the
conclusion matches an assumption" ["P","Q"]
((the conclusion is "?P & ?Q") AND (some assumption is "?P"));
mapping "the left-hand conjunct of the
conclusion matches an assumption" ["P","Q"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Discharge conclusion left-hand conjunct ?P by
assumption", "apply (rule conjl, assumption)"), 2.0) ];
feature "the right-hand conjunct of the
conclusion matches an assumption" ["P","Q"]
((the conclusion is "?P & ?Q") AND (some assumption is "?Q"));
mapping "the right-hand conjunct of the
conclusion matches an assumption" ["P","Q"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Discharge conclusion right-hand conjunct ?Q by
assumption", "apply (subst conj_commute, rule conjl, assumption)"),
2.0) ];
Both features are needed because "subst conj _commute" is necessarywhen the it is the right-hand




As an example, consider "lemma " [ I a & c ; b I ] ==> a & b"" with the model described so
far. When the user sends this lemma to Isabelle, it is parsed, stored internally as the "current
proof state", and returned in a parsed form to Eclipse ProofGeneral. ProofGeneral then passes the
returned expression to various display components, which render it for the user to view, and to
Feasch, which begins the feature analysis. Feasch invokes the first top level schema, the detector
"an assumption matches the conclusion", sending it to Isabelle for evaluation and receiving the
reply that no feature is found. Feasch then tries the next top level schema, the detector "some
assumption is a conjunction", and finds that the feature "some assumption is a conjunction
(a,c)" is present. This is added in the "Features" view of the Feature Wizard, and because it is
mapped to the command schema "Separate conjunction assumption "a A c"", this command is
added in the "Methods" view of the Wizard. Feasch continues executing the detectors, according
to their weights (following the order they were added if the weights are the same, e.g., for top-
level detectors). When it finds the feature "the conclusion is a conjunction", Feasch adds the
feature to the "Features" view, it adds the command "Separate conjuncts in conclusion" to
the "Methods" view, and it cues the second-tier detectors for checking the conclusion's left- and
right-hand conjuncts against assumptions (with a weight of 0.8 specified in the previous section,
so these detectors will run after the other top-level detectors). The detector for the right-hand
conjunct finds that feature and recommends the relevant command for proving that part of the
conclusion. The final view of the methods is shown in figure 5.1.
• S3 > 2 a o. f ^ ° □
Goal: [|a a c; b|] »«> a a b
Method Command Weight
Discharge conclusion right-hand conjunct "a" by assumption
Separate conjunction assumption Ha ac"
Separate conjuncts in conclusion (to prove them separately)
apply (substconj^commute. rule conjl. assum






( Features | Settings |
Figure 5.1: Feature Wizard Suggestions for Conjunctions
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On a slowmachine, a usermay observe that the "Separate conjunctions in assumption"
appears in the list of methods first; however, when the "Discharge conclusion right-hand
conjunct" command is eventually cued, with a weight of 2.0, it appears higher in the list. If
the user double-clicks this highest-ranked method, it is inserted in the proof file and sent to the
prover, resulting in the revised goal " [a A c ; b] ==> a". Feasch makes only one suggestion for
this goal, "Separate conjunction assumption "a A c"" (which had also been made before), and
after that command is sent, it detects that the resulting goal can be proved by assumption. The
complete proof is now included in our theory file:
lemma "[I a & c ; b |] ==> a & b"
apply (subst conj.commute, rule conjl, assumption)
apply (erule.tac P="a" and Q="c" in conjE)
apply assumption
done
If the user began instead with the lowest-ranked suggestion, "Separate conjunctions in
conclusion", two subgoals would have resulted. When there are multiple subgoals, Feasch acts
on the first one by default, like Isabelle, although a developer could write a detector that looks at
the goal in its entirety (and users can defer the subgoal, directing Isabelle and Feasch to focus on
a different one). Here, initially selecting the lowest-ranked suggestion still leads to a successful,
albeit longer, proof; in fact, following any path of Feasch's suggestions will lead to a successful
proof in this example. For more complex problems, of course, this will not be the case. The control
knowledge will always be incomplete, and the ultimate analysis has to be the user's. The Feature
Wizard is a proof assistant; the control knowledge expressed in Feasch will hopefully be useful,
for suggesting commands and for minimising typing, but just as simp can do undesirable things,
there is no guarantee that its suggestions are good ones.
More Heuristic Control Knowledge
The caveat just noted can actually be very beneficial, because it means that a developer
can encode rough-and-ready heuristic control knowledge as well as provably correct decision
procedures. Furthermore, weights provide a measure of confidence, and even a very low
value results in a suggestion to the user; placed near the bottom of the list, they do not hide
"better" suggestions, but they are still available if these higher-ranked commands are not actually
appropriate. Likewise, on the execution side, low weights can be given to "long-shot" detectors
so that they do not hinder the "better" detectors, but they will be run eventually.
With this in mind, we can write control strategies for finding less guaranteed or more
specialised applications of the other rules: implication, universal quantification, and existentials.
We saw in §5.1.1 that some uses of these rules are highly desirable. Each is also frequently used in
other ways, where they may not be guaranteed (like separating a conjunction in the conclusion),
or where the guarantee may be uncommon but very useful when it is found (like separating a
conjunction conclusion and proving one conjunct).
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When an implication appears as an assumption, for example, a userwill sometimes try to
prove the implicant (the left-hand side of the implication) in order to obtain the consequent (the
right-hand side) as an assumption. If an implication assumption is found, a further check could
be performed— as a long-shot— to check whether the implicant matches another assumption; if
this long-shot pays out, it is easy, good, and safe to apply the commands to replace the implication
assumption by the consequence on its own. The features and schemas which achieve this are:
feature "some assumption is an implication" ["P","Q"]
(some assumption is "?P —> ?Q");
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "some assumption is an implication");
mapping "some assumption is an implication" ["P","Q"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Try proving ?P and thus obtain
?Q", "apply (erule_tac P=?P and Q=?Q in impE)"), 0.2),
(FeatureDetector "one assumption matches
the implicant of another assumption",
0.8) ];
feature "one assumption matches the implicant of another assumption" ["P","Q"]
((some assumption is "?P —> ?Q") AND (some assumption is "?P"));
mapping "one assumption matches the implicant of another assumption" ["P","Q"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Obtain ?Q by implication from assumption ?P",
"apply (erule_tac P=?P and Q=?Q in impE, assumption)"), 1.2) ];
A similar arrangement of features and schemas can be used for existential conclusions.
The existential could be instantiated with a schematic variable which will be replaced by a value
at a later time; this may be inelegant, but it is a supported and sometimes effective way of proving
a theorem. Alternatively, the user could choose (in the FeatureWizard's right-click context menu)
to insert the command into the proof script file without sending it to Isabelle. She could then
replace the schematic variable by the instantiation she wants, without having to type the rest of
the command. A long-shot analysis can be done, again as a lower priority task than the top-
level schemas, to check whether the body of the existential is matched in any assumption. If an
assumptionmatches exactly, the subgoal can be discharged. More often, the body of the existential
might match an expression contained in some assumption; in this case, there is no guarantee that
it is the right instantiation, but it frequently is in practice, and it can be useful to have it easily
available.
feature "the conclusion is an existential" ["P"] (the conclusion is "EX x. ?P
x") ;
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "the conclusion is an existential");
mapping "the conclusion is an existential" ["P"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Instantiate existential in conclusion",
"apply (rule_tac P=?P and x=\"?x\" in exl)"), 0.15),
(FeatureDetector "the existential conclusion is matched by an assumption",
0.7),
(FeatureDetector "the existential
conclusion is contained in an assumption",
0.3) ];
feature "the existential conclusion is matched by an assumption" ["Q","X"]
((the conclusion is "? x. ?Q x") AND (some assumption is "?Q ?X") );
mapping "the existential conclusion is matched by an assumption" ["Q","X"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Discharge the goal,
using ?X to instantiate existential
in conclusion", "apply (rule_tac P=?Q and x=?X in exl, assumption)"),
2.3) ];
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feature "the existential conclusion is contained in an assumption" ["Q","X"]
((the conclusion is "? x. ?Q x") AND (some assumption contains "?Q ?X")
AND (instantiated "?X") );
mapping "the existential conclusion is contained in an assumption" ["Q","X"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Use ?X to instantiate existential in conclusion",
"apply (rule_tac P=?Q and x=?X in exl)"), 0.55) ];
The code for the final feature above requires that the quantity ?X be instantiated; this is a useful
check to ensure that the assumption being matched is grounded. Although this can fail to make
some suggestions which would be right, and it can make some suggestions which are wrong, our
intuition was that this would be the right balance.28
Universal quantification assumptions are, inmanyways, similar to existential conclusions:
the challenge is to find the correct instantiation. Our control knowledge can start by suggesting
low-ranked schemas for performing the instantiation with a schematic variable, both non-
destructively and destructively. It can also queue a task for seeingwhether the conclusion matches
the body of the quantification, in which case a suitable command can be formed for discharging
the subgoal, or a part of the quantification, in which case a suggestion for the instantiation is
obtained. Double quantifications are common in practice, so we include control knowledge to
analyse whether the conclusion by abstracting two arguments or (because our features require
recommendations to be instantiated) even by abstracting only the second argument. As this
computation can be expensive — but is occasionally very useful— it is cued with a low weight.
A higher number of multiple quantifications could be handled similarly, or by writing a more
general detector, but we have not done so simply because those cases are much less common (and,
as a practice we recommend whenever the heuristics might be extended, a comment to this effect
is included in the theory file where this is defined).
feature "some assumption is a forall quantification" ["P"]
(some assumption is "ALL x. ?P x");
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "some assumption is a forall
quantification");
mapping "some assumption is a forall quantification" ["P"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Instantiate quantification assumption ?P",
"apply (frule_tac P=?P and x=\"?x\" in spec)"), 0.18),
(NamedProofCommand ("Instantiate and remove quantification assumption ?P",
"apply (drule_tac P=?P and x=\"?x\" in spec)"), 0.16),
(FeatureDetector "a quantification
assumption contains the conclusion", 0.5),
(FeatureDetector "some assumption is a double forall quantification", 0.4)
] ;
feature "a quantification assumption contains the conclusion" ["P","Q","X"]
( (some assumption is "ALL x. ?P x") AND (the conclusion is "?Q ?X")
AND (instantiated "?X") AND (NOT (expression "?Q" is "/fx. x"))
AND (expression "?P ?X" contains "?Q ?X") );
28 This underscores an important point about how the Feasch with Isabelle system can be used. We as developers
did not have to — and did not want to — consider all the cases where some features or mappings might be
cued. The Feasch model here was not intended as an exhaustive analysis or a decision procedure, but rather a
quick-and-dirty expression of our intuition about when certain commands in a certain theory might be used. An
attraction of this approach, in our view, is that developers can rapidly capture and share the heuristic knowledge
about a domain, in addition to the purely formal definitions that Isabelle otherwise allows. Even if the heuristics
are sub-optimal, they are better than nothing, and there is nothing to stop another user from exploring, refining,
and customising the heuristics so created. Such "open" community development could lead to a consensus set
of the best heuristic control knowledge or even — if available— a complete decision procedure.
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mapping "a quantification assumption contains the conclusion" ["P","Q","X"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Use ?X to instantiate quantification assumption ?P",
"apply (frule_tac P=?P and x=?X in spec)"), 0.88),
(NamedProofCommand ("Use ?X to instantiate (and remove) quantification
assumption ?P", "apply (drule_tac P=?P and x=?X in spec)"), 0.86) ];
feature "some assumption is a double forall quantification" ["P"]
(some assumption is "ALL x y. ?P x y");
mapping "some assumption is a double forall quantification" ["P"]
[ (FeatureDetector "the conclusion is contained in a double forall
quantification assumption", 0.4),
(FeatureDetector "the conclusion is buried in a double forall
quantification assumption", 0.4) ];
feature "the conclusion is contained in a
double forall quantification assumption"
["P","Q","X","Y","Ps","Pt"]
( (some assumption is "ALL x y. ?P x y") AND (the conclusion is "?Q ?X ?Y")
AND (instantiated "?X") AND (instantiated "?Y")
AND (expression "?P ?X ?Y" contains "?Q ?X
?Y") (expression "?Ps" is "°/.x. ALL y. ?P x y")
AND (expression "?Pt" is "?P ?X")
mapping "the conclusion is contained in a
double forall quantification assumption"
["P","Q","X","Y","Ps","Pt"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Use ?X then ?Y to instantiate double quantification
assumption ?P", "apply (frule_tac
P=?Ps and x=?X in spec, rotate_tac -1,
drule_tac P=?Pt and x=?Y in spec)"), 0.88),
(NamedProofCommand ("Use ?X then ?Y to instantiate (and remove) double
quantification assumption ?P", "apply (drule_tac P=?Ps and x=?X
in spec, rotate_tac -1, drule_tac P=?Pt and x=?Y in spec)"), 0.86) ];
feature "the conclusion is buried in a double forall quantification assumption"
["P","Q","X","Y","Ps","Pt"]
( (some assumption is "ALL x y. ?P x y") AND (the conclusion is "?Q ?Y")
AND (instantiated "?Y") AND (expression "?P ?X ?Y" contains "?Q ?Y")
AND (expression "?Ps" is "'/,x. ALL y. ?P x y") AND (expression "?Pt" is "?P
?X") );
mapping "the conclusion is buried in a double forall quantification assumption"
["P","Q","X","Y","Ps","Pt"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Use ?X then ?Y to instantiate double quantification
assumption ?P", "apply (frule_tac
P=?Ps and x=?X in spec, rotate_tac -1,
drule_tac P=?Pt and x=?Y in spec)"), 0.88),
(NamedProofCommand ("Use ?X then ?Y to instantiate (and remove)
quantification assumption ?P", "apply (drule_tac P=?Ps and x=?X
in spec, rotate_tac -1, drule_tac P=?Pt and x=?Y in spec)"), 0.86) ];
Being Less Formal
To finish on a simpler note, let us turn to applying the substitution rule, " [ I s = t ; Ps |]
==> P t". This is one of themost commonly used rules in Isabelle, and what we have encoded here
barely scratches the surface. If we have success with this, there is a wealth of control knowledge
— such as many of the simp rules—which could be encoded in Feasch. But there is one important
aspect of using features we have not touched upon: the psychological theories in Chapter 1
highlighted the vital role played by similarity. So far, we have looked primarily at matching and
formal unification, and while this is sufficient for the present purposes, there is little evidence
that humans reason like this. It is much more likely that approximate representations of terms, cf.
feature vectors (§2.2.2.i), play some role in deciding whether to pursue some potential matching.
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The use ofJava could be helpful here, as there is awealth of relevant code available (e.g., for
fuzzy searching on-line), and as we showed in the previous chapter, feature detectors can equally
well be written on the Java side. We will not implement this here due to the complexity of such
a systems integration, although we continue the discussion in §9.1.2. As a rough approximation,
however, still using ML we can perform one type of similarity by saying that an assumption and
a conclusion are "similar" if they can unify with "?P ?s" and "IP t", respectively, where ?P is
non-trivial and, optionally, ?s and ?t satisfy some size constraints.
This type of similarity suggests the use of the substitution rule, because ifwe can establish
the above, proving our goal is tantamount to showing "?s = ?t".
feature "an assumption almost matches a
conclusion, needing only an equality proven"
["P","s","t"]
( (conclusion is "?P ?t") AND (NOT (expression "?p" is "7.x. x")) AND
(some assumption is "?P ?s") AND (instantiated "?s") AND (instantiated
"?t"));
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "an assumption almost matches a
conclusion, needing only an equality proven");
mapping "an assumption almost matches a
conclusion, needing only an equality proven"
["P","s","t"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Assume ?s = ?t and use substitution",
"apply (rule_tac P=?P and s=?s in subst)"), 0.1),
(FeatureDetector "an equality assumption makes the conclusion match an
assumption", 0.6),
(FeatureDetector "an equality assumption makes the assumption match the
conclusion", 0.6) ];
Showing that "?s=?t" may be quite tricky, and applying subst is unpromising on this basis alone.
There is the possibility, however, that other detectors (possibly qualitative or on the Java side)
could give more support for this substitution. There will be times when the substitution is correct,
and if the user has not noticed it, or if the user does not want to type it all in, this suggestionmight
be useful. It has, however, the lowest weighting we have used so far, 0.1.
As hinted by the previous paragraph and by the final two mappings above, there will be
times when the substitution is supported by the problem. We could check whether the desired
equality is contained anywhere in the assumptions, as we did for universal quantification, but let
us here confine our analysis to the case when the equality exactly matches one of our assumptions
(possibly with commuting, rule sym). When this happens, it is almost universally a good idea to
discharge the subgoal by a particular sequence of commands:
feature "an equality assumption makes the conclusion match an assumption"
["P" , "s" , "t"]
( (conclusion is "?P ?t") AND (NOT (expression "?p" is "7.x. x"))
AND (some assumption is "?t = ?s") AND (some assumption is "?P ?s")
AND (instantiated "?s") AND (instantiated "?t"));
mapping "an equality assumption makes the conclusion match an assumption"
["P" , "s" , "t"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Discharge the conclusion by substituting assumption
?s = ?t after symmetry", "apply (rule_tac P=?P and s=?s in subst,
?s = ?t after symmetry", rule sym, assumption, assumption)"), 2.0) ];
feature "an equality assumption makes the assumption match the conclusion"
["P" , "s" , "t"]
( (conclusion is "?P ?t") AND (NOT (expression "?P" is "7.x, x"))
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AND (some assumption is "?s = ?t") AND (some assumption is "?P ?s")
AND (instantiated "?s") AND (instantiated "?t"));
mapping "an equality assumption makes the assumption match the conclusion"
["P" , "s" , "t"]
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Discharge the conclusion by substituting assumption
?s = ?t", "apply (rule_tac P=?P and s=?s in subst,
assumption, assumption)"), 2.0) ];
Finally, though it is not similarity, the rule sym is frequently useful on its own:
feature "an assumption matches the equality conclusion by symmetry" []
((conclusion is "?s = ?t") AND (some assumption is "?t = ?s"));
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "an assumption matches the equality
conclusion by symmetry");
mapping "an assumption matches the equality conclusion by symmetry" []
[ (NamedProofCommand ("Discharge the conclusion by symmetry to an
equality assumption", "apply (rule sym, assumption)"), 2.0) ];
5.2. Causal Information for Natural Language Proofs (EH1)
Although we hope that the control knowledge described in §5.1 is useful, our primary
intent has been to use it as a means for exploring how control knowledge for Isabelle can be
expressed in Feasch. One observation that has struck us is that it inherently makes available the
reasons why suggestions were made. In the conjunction example, Feasch found the feature "the
conclusion is a conjunction", and because of this, it looked for the feature "the right-hand
conjunct of the conclusion matches an assumption" and found it as well, and this was the
reason it suggested to "discharge right-hand conjunct of conclusion by assumption". This
provides some insight into why suggestions were made, it seems, and where a suggestion is used
— or where it matches the proof step the user makes, even if the user did not use Feasch was not
used to — this information could, we hypothesise, be used to provide an explanation for proof
steps.
There has been a great deal of interest in developing automated systems for natural
language generation (NLG) of proofs. The most advanced of these — P.Rex (Fiedler, 2001),
Theorema (Buchberger et ah, 2006), and ClamNL (Alexoudi et ah, 2004) — allow the user to create
descriptions at various levels of detail, and higher-level text can be quite successful at removing
the uninteresting low-level steps raised as a criticism in §4.2.2.i, often creating good readable
proofs in some domains:
"Theorem, (x + (y + z)) — ((x + y) + z) for all natural numbers x, y, and z
"The proof is by one-step induction on x. In order to complete the step case, the
conjunction is generalised by introducing a universal variable, i.e., k. The generalised
conjecture can be provenby one-step induction on y and finally the proof is completed."
(ibid.)
However, there are two limitations noted for these systems and others. Firstly, the text is normally
available only for a few domains where natural language support was explicitly developed,
presumably because there is a significant amount of work necessary to be able to create such
natural language descriptions.
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Secondly, despite the stated intention ofmany of these systems to produce "explanations",
the attempts "mostly focus in resembling the way that mathematicians write their proofs, rather
than the way that mathematicians reason during proof construction" (ibid.). We suspect that
this is because the human reasons are absent from the resulting proofs, and plausible reasons are
difficult to reconstruct for the automation techniques typically used in proof assistants. The tactics
simp and auto, for example, rely on complex decision procedures which, although very powerful,
do not lend themselves to inspectability. The only output these tactics normally produce is the
transformed goal; any indication of what they did — never mind why— is buried in the usually
enormous trace of a brute-force search. IsaPlanner, we suspect, could be annotated to provide
descriptions on multiple levels, because it is based on many of the same principles as the proof-
planning system on which ClamNL acts, but as with ClamNL, this information will not include
motivation for pursuing steps unless this is added ad hoc for every plan step.
In contrast to these typical techniques, the causal information seems to be available for
Feasch. To try to establish whether Feasch is, in fact, different to other techniques, we have defined
our first "expressivity hypothesis":
(EH1) Features provide reasoned explanations for method selection, e.g. for use in
generating natural language proofs with causal information.
Ifwe are able to transform the informationmade available by Feasch into a natural language proof
which includes these explanations, wewill succeed in showing one way that this technique differs
from others.
As a relatively simple attempt to address this question, we have devised a system for
stringing together the features that cued a schema, following the activation chain in the mapping
network. Since we have used complete sentences for each feature, and imperative sentences
for command schemas, we can use a template of natural language connectives to combine the
sentences to produce the explanation, with the following constituents (the syntax "a [ b | c ]"
means to follow a by b or c):
START1 (/) := [ "because /" I "observing that f" I "as f" ]
START2(/) := [ "we noticed that f" | "we could see that f" I
"we found that f" ]
SUBSEQ1 (/) := " and " [ START1(/) I "f" ]
SUBSEQ2(/) := " and " [ START2(/) I "that f" ]
NESTED11C/) := " and then " [ "that f" I START 1 (/) ]
NESTED12(/) := [ ", we checked and found that f" I ", we then observed that f" ]
NESTED21 (/) := [ " and then " START 1 (/) I "; next, " START1(/) ]
NESTED22C/) := [ " and then that /" I "; as a result, " START2(/) ]
COMMAND 1 (a) : = [ ", our next step was to a", ", it seemed like a good idea to a" ]
C0MMAND2((j) := [ ", so we chose to a", " and that is why we wanted to a" ]
Using these elements, our process is as follows:
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Let a be the schema which we are explaining. Let M-0' be the ordered set of features
which gave positive cues directly to a, ordered by these cues decreasing. For i e Z, let
Mb+L be the set of features / which cue the detectors that found features in M'1' such
that \/j < i.f £ Mb); let I Mb) | denote the number of elements in Mb) and define h
as the largest i such that Mb) is non-empty. Finally, let {Mq\ m[1\ ... , Mj^(4) | i}
denote the elements in Mb) in order. Define two successor-word functions as follows:
SEQ1(M^})
SUBSEQlCM^i) SEQlCM^p, (n + l)<|MW|;
SEQ2(M?li)) : =
NESTEDllCM^ 1}) SEQl(M0(i 1}) I
NESTED12(M0(i_1)) SEQ2(M^_1)) , (n + 1) > I Mb) | A i > 0;
C0MMAND1 (<j), (n + 1) > I Mb) | A i = 0.
'
SUBSEQ2(M^1) SEQ2(M^1), (n + 1) < IM^I;
NESTED21 (Mq~ 1)) SEQ1(M^_1)) I
NESTED22(M^_1)) SEQ2(M^_1)) , (n + 1) > I Mb) | A i > 0;
CDMMAND2 (a), (n + 1) > IM® I A i = 0.
The explanation for a was chosen is then given by:
START 1 (Mq^) SEQl(M0(/l)) I START2(M0(h)) SEQ2(M^))
Applying it to the conjunction lemma and the proof given above (and setting upper and lower
case appropriately), gives the following sample explanations (shown in italics):
lemma " [ | a & c ; b I) ==> a & b"
[I a A c ; b /J ==> a A b
Observing that the conclusion is a conjunction and then because the right-hand conjunct of the
conclusion matches an assumption, it seemed like a good idea to discharge right-hand conjunct
of conclusion by assumption.
apply (subst conj_commute, rule conjl, assumption)
[I a A c ; b I] ==> a
We could see that some assumption is a conjunction so we chose to separate conjunction
assumption a Ac.
apply (erule_tac P="a" and Q="c" in conjE)
[I b; a ; c /J ==> a




The explanation is readable and provides causal information about the selection of the various
steps. The study confirms the hypothesis; furthermore, no domain-specific knowledge or coding
was necessary to create this output, so the approach can be expected to apply to any area of
mathematics where features can be used. We require that features and command schemas be
encoded with our convention, that features are sentences about the problem state and command
schemas are named in the imperative mood, but we would recommend doing this anyway for
general readability reasons. With the very primitive semantics we use, and with the omission of
articles in certain schema names, the output text is far fromwinning literary awards, but there are
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a host of NLG techniques which could be brought to bear on these problems; this is intended as a
proof-of-concept, and as such it proves our hypothesis.
It is important to highlight one philosophical distinction about causation: the reasons
given by this system are the efficient cause for a step, i.e., what led to its occurrence; this contrasts
with the "explanations" typically given by other systems, which are— in all cases thatwe know of
— restricted to the final cause, i.e., why a stepworks. As the final cause is determined wholly by the
proof, there is nothing in our approach to obstruct our doing that analysis here, although given the
sophistication of some NLG proof interfaces—both in terms of semantics and navigability, e.g., by
expanding and collapsing nodes to read proofs at varying levels of detail— itwould be far more
promising to extend a pre-existing system, using the additional information provided by Feasch
to enrich the proof discourse. This could have particularly welcome applications in interactive or
tutorial systems; for although mathematicians are often happy to act at the level of final cause,
students require the efficient cause, crucially, to develop their intuition and understanding. A
button labelled "How'd ya figure out to do that?" is lacking from nearly all systems; our system
provides these reasons inherently.
What is noteworthy, from the perspective of our hypothesis, is that it is straightforward
using Feasch to get not only causal information about selection, but also human-readable natural
language explanations of that information, i.e., why a step was chosen. Neither of these prospects
are readily available from most other control knowledge techniques, and certainly not currently
available in Isabelle; we have validated (EH1), and in so doing, we have identified one marked
difference in the expressivity of control knowledge in our approach vis-a-vis others.
5.3. Interactive Theorem Proving (EH2)
The example in §5.1 demonstrated how Feasch can be used to guide interactive theorem
proving. We noted in §4.2.l.i that the tactics in Isabelle are powerful automation techniques but
are not interactive. This, in our view, is not merely because people have not tried but because
the coding of tactics usually involves a brute force search or a decision procedure. The Isabelle
mailing list periodically receives requests from users wanting to see what is going on under the
hood with tactics (often, to see what is going wrong), but the behaviour of these tactics is usually
too cumbersome even to be inspectable, and an attempt to use them for interactive problem
solving will be replete with difficulties.
IsaPlanner, we have noted, addresses some of these limitations by using proof planning
ideas with the type of programming constructs usually used in tactics. User interaction with
IsaPlanner is possible, using a command-line interface, and where an appropriate plan is available
and found by the user, this interface can be a successful means of guiding search in the framework
of the plan. There is significant user overhead in choosing to start an IsaPlanner session, however,
and the user must restart this session if he wants to switch between plans. On a practical level,
Heneveld 117
there are not yet many plans available, aside from rippling for inductive proof which works very
well on that class of problems, On a theoretical level, even if there was a large library of plans, the
fact that a specific plan must be invoked by the user for a specific problem leads to an inflexible
user experience; in practice, control knowledge for different domains will need to be combined or
interleaved, but the only way to do this in IsaPlanner would be to write a new plan specifically
for the combination of these domains.
In the previous chapters and this one, we have observed that features seem potentially
quite useful for capturing pieces of control knowledge which can be combined and re-used as
necessary. Let us now test this hypothesis:
(EH2) Features enable useful guidance for interactive theorem proving.
5.3.1. The Graphical User Interface (GUI): "Point-and-Click"
Before we describe our experiment, we should summarise the components contributed
by "Feasch with Isabelle" to the Eclipse ProofGeneral IDE (integrated development environment).
The standard ProofGeneral user interface provides two main widgets: a text editor where
commands can be typed and sent to the theorem prover, and a window where the prover's
output appears. Feasch with Isabelle provides one more view, with tabs to show either the
features found in the current problem or the current ranked list of suggested command schemas.
In interactive mode, the detectors run automatically on any new proof state and the
results are updated in the view in real-time. Double-clicking any method will suspend Feasch's
evaluation and send the chosen command both to the editor and to the prover. Right-clicking
the items gives a context menu with more possible actions, e.g., inserting a command into the
editor without sending it to the prover. There are, of course, many ways this interface could be
improved; however, we note that this seems to be the case for every IDE in history! Many of these
ideas are noted in §9.1.1 for future work, but one vital feature which is present is that it can be
turned off or ignored, and will then have no impact on the user's theorem proving activity.
5.3.2. Utility Evaluation
Even as the system currently stands, it presents ample opportunity for an evaluation of
its usefulness. This experiment, in fact, should be undertaken before significant additional work
is done, because we must still establish whether the use of features is very different to other
techniques. By investigating the applicability of Feasch to interactive theorem proving, we will
be looking to find both whether Feasch is successful where other techniques are not (and so it is
different in this respect) and whether it is promising enough to merit any further development.
Our evaluation will consist of considering how useful the suggestions are; specifically, for
how many proof steps does it eliminate or cut down user typing? Theorems in the real-world are
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rarely as simple as " [ I a A c ; b I ] ==> a A b", so as a lifesize experiment let us look at to what
extent our Feasch model is applicable to threemore complicated theorems from actual theory files:
lemma summable_comparison_test: " [ 1 3N. Vn > N. abs(f n) < g n ; summable g |]
=£- summable f"
lemma Interval_expand: " [ I Interval R ; R a ; R c ; a<b ; b<c |] =t- R b"
lemma FTC_E0_ii: "[I Vx. R x > DerivE F x = f x ; DifferentiableOn F R ;
Interval R ; R t ; R x I] =>- IntegralEO (R,t) f x = F x - F t"
The first of these rules is part of the Hyperreal library included with the standard Isabelle
distribution (used to define the real numbers). The second and third come from our foundation
of a theory of calculus, discussed later in this thesis. We chose these lemmas because they are
interesting in their own right, they can cannot be solved by the automation techniques or by simple
applications of a few other lemmas (unlike many theorems whose proofs, when formalised, use
lemmas which are spectacularly uninteresting but which lend themselves to some of the other
tactics). Being able to have interactive guidance on some of the low-level rules is particularly
useful for the second lemma, because neither simp nor auto can be used: they enter endless loops
and eventually we have to terminate Isabelle, restart it, re-process our entire theory to return to
the same point, and then try to work manually— tediously— from first principles. Each one, of
course, was proven in the context of the appropriate theories. We will not give the underlying
definitions here because they are all roughly as expected; interested users can find them with
Isabelle or in our source code on-line.
Our evaluation will consist of ranking each atomic step in the proof into one of four
categories, according to how well the Feature Wizard performs on that step:
Perfect: the step can be taken directly from the top-ranking suggestion, with all
variables fully instantiated
Good: one of the top ten ranked suggestions can be used, with any schematic variables
left in the suggested proof command being correctly instantiated by Isabelle without
any typing by the user
Fair: one of the suggestions can be used tomake the step, although schematic variables
might need to be adjusted by the user
Fail: either no suggestions were made or none of the suggestions are appropriate
Because we were evaluating the Feasch Feature Wizard as an assistant for interactive proof
authoring, we were not concerned with necessarily following the original proofs for each of
these theorems. We accepted any suggestions which contributed directly to the goal, but of course
we did not accept suggestions which either did not apply or were unnecessary in the proof. As it
turned out, the resulting proofs were very similar to the originals, apart from minor alterations in
order and the absence of simp and auto in these proofs.
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Figure 5.2 shows the results of this analysis on these proofs of length 38, 24, and 58. The
control knowledge we have developed so far gave a perfect answer in the top-ranked suggestion
on 61.7% of the proof steps. On a further 8.3% of the steps, the performance was good or fair; the
top-ranked suggestion was not appropriate, but another suggestion could be used. The right step
or steps was not found for the other 30% of the steps. Feasch indubitably is based on features,
and it is helpful at making useful suggestions for interactive theorem proving, so our hypothesis
(EH2) has been confirmed.
5.3.3. Discussion
To conclusively show that Feasch is useful, these results must be replicated on a large
body of proofs; in fact, even that would not suffice. The only real evidence is a large group of
real-world users choosing to use it on real-world problems. From this analysis, however, we have
some hope that such a goal might be achieved.
There were several interesting observations about the steps that were and were not
suggested by Feasch. Nearly all the "fails" were on commands and rules that we had not
programmed in to Feasch. A few of these were integral to HOL, e.g., disjE, but most were
from more specialised domains, e.g., real arithmetic or calculus definitions. Because the Feature
Wizard had no way of knowing about these rules, its failure here, using the simple knowledge
base described in this chapter, is unavoidable. If suitable control knowledge were to be encoded
for these other domains, we would not be surprised in the 30% fail ratio were decimated. The
experience writing heuristics for HOL in Feasch suggests that this may not be very difficult, at
least for some instances.
One unexpected result was the low distribution of steps into either the "good" or "fair"
category. Although we anticipated the number of "perfects" to be significant due to obvious
rule applications such as "apply assumption" or "erule exE", we were surprised that a relatively
large percentage of the steps— around 10%—were found by the "long-shot" detectors we coded.
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Furthermore, a cursory look at many of the "goods" and "fairs" suggests easy ways the control
knowledge could be extended to lead to "perfect" behaviour. One simple, useful detectorwould be
onewhich looks for an implication within a universal quantifier assumption, and if it finds it, cues
a detector to try tomatch the conclusion against the consequent of this implication, in order to infer
candidate instantiations. This is similar to the existing feature that "the conclusion is contained
in a double forall quantification assumption", with the useful insight that matches against
the left-hand side of an implication will only prove frustrating.
Secondly, we observed good evidence that a weaker notion of similarity would be useful.
On several occasions, we saw immediately where the rough matching should be, but Feasch
would not suggest it. Looking more closely, we noticed absolute value bars which prevented the
matching algorithm from applying: however, in the context of trying to identify a small expression
to instantiate a "forall" assumption, when the conclusion has significant structural similarity, and
it suggests a candidate expression, our features should overlook such "punctuation" as absolute
value bars. This is what we as users did, and although it is not easily done with the current ML
code, it may be easier with some of the Java facilities afforded in Feasch.
Logically guaranteed reasons for tactics have been very well studied, and the Feasch
approach will never compete with an optimised decision procedure. The control knowledge
described here is simple and basic; despite its demonstrated utility, it has been for us little more
than an exploration of the capabilities and style of the system. There is a great deal ofwork which
could be done to make the control knowledge for HOL much better. For example, the tactics auto
and simpwere used heavily in the original proof of summable_comparison_test, and they "fail" on
just 11 of the 38 steps. Feasch's performance, failing on 14, is not so shabby, given that we encoded
only a small amount of control knowledge, based only on our experience without any complex
logical or statistical analysis or attempts at optimisation. What is especially interesting, however,
is that Feasch's failures did not coincide with the automated tactics' failures. Approximately half
of the places where auto and simp failed, Feasch proposed a suggestion, often "perfectly". Some of
our long-shot detectors, crude as they were and rigid in their view of similarity, were nevertheless
capable of succeeding where the well-established, pre-existing techniques failed. By combining
the knowledge in both systems— or possibly by implementing the decision procedures in Feasch
— a much more powerful system for both automated and interactive proof could be born.
Heneveld 121
Chapter 6. Automation in Differential Calculus
Having seen that features encode control knowledge in a way useful for interactive
theorem proving,we are interested to see how theywork as a means for describing fully-automated
decision procedures. We should also broaden our focus from low-level logic to higher-level
mathematical domains, and in doing so we can also examine the modularity of this means of
expressing control knowledge.
After considering many potential areas, we focussed on college calculus as a subject
which has real-world familiarity as well as problems which range in difficulty. We were attracted
to solving derivatives as a type of problem for which a decision procedure can be applied, and
further questions — such as solving integrals — are available if something more challenging is
desired. Isabelle has a library of the reals (founded on hyperreals; implemented by Fleuriot &
Paulson, 2000) which includes a formulation of the derivative and integral operator.
6.1. A Formal Theory of Calculus
While the theory of the reals is heavily used, we discovered that the calculus operators
have not been tested so thoroughly. Many theorems we expected to find were absent, and several
months were spent finalising the theory.
The most important theorem which was missing was the first half of the fundamental
theorem of calculus. The Hyperreal library includes FTC1, roughly that f df = / (+C) (this is
commonly called the second part of the fundamental theorem, despite the name):
lemma FTC1: "[|a < b; V x. a < x & x < b —> DERIV f x :> f' (x) I] ==>
Integral (a, b) f' (f(b) - f(a))"
The first part, that d J f = /, is not a corollary of this theorem. Proving this requires showing,
among other lemmas, that continuous functions are bounded over finite regions. To simplify our
proofs, we also created a theory for intervals: "Interval R" means that R is an interval, mapping
a real argument to a boolean to determine containment; i.e., for any two points a and b such that
R a and R b, if a < x < b, then R x also holds. "Intervallnsi.de R x" means that R x holds and
that x is on the interior (i.e., there exists a neighbourhood around x where all points are in R).
Armed with these concepts and proofs in Isabelle, we developed:
lemma FTC_i: "[I Vab. R a & R b & a<b —> Integral(a,b) f (F b - F a) ;
IntervalInside R x ; ContinuousAt fx I] ==> DERIV F x :> f x"
lemma FTC_ii: "[I V x. R x —> DERIV Fx :> f x ; Interval R ; R a ; R b ; a<=b
I] ==> Integral(a,b) f (F b - F a)"
The proof of FTC_i is lengthy, and FTC_ii is trivial (we use FTC1, including it purely for the sake
of consistency of notation and naming), so both are omitted here.
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One joy encountered in building the proof of FTC_i was the gauge integral. This idea
— developed only in the last fifty years — is a generalisation of the integrals of both Riemann
and Lebesgue, with a simple and elegant definition. It was used in the original Hyperreal theory
definition, and so while it made our work substantially more difficult (e.g., than proofs would be
for the common Riemann integral), it means the resulting theories are applicable to a much wider
class of functions. Of particular note is the characteristic function \ of the rationals:
y(x)=l1>\ 0, otherwise
This is integrable in the gauge sense: the reals dominate, and on any interval f x(x)dx — 0.
But d[0]/dx = 0, and FTC_i, that the derivative of integral any function is that function, has to
be qualified with a continuity assumption. Discontinuities also affect other integrals, but if the
function is integrable in the Riemann sense, e.g., the equality in the conclusion can be qualified
merely by saying "except at the finitely many points where / may be discontinuous". With the
gauge formulation, we concluded it would make more sense to add a continuity assumption.
Another extension to the provided library we wished to make is to be able to use the
integral and the derivative as operators. The Hyperreal library defines each as a multi-argument
predicate which takes both F and / and returns true if and only if dF = / (with F and / used in the
appropriate places). We felt that having the integral and the derivative defined as truemorphisms,
mapping from real-valued functions to real-valued functions, would be much more useful, but
we also wanted to be able to reason about indefinite integrals. This introduced the complexity
of either specifying a choice of constant or representing the family of functions; we preferred the
former possibility, but as not all functions are integrable over all regions, we opted to introduce
a parameter which indicates the region of integrability (R) as a parameter of our integration
predicate and the point where the integral should take on a zero value (t). Our definitions are as
follows:
DerivE :: " (real=>real)=>(real=>real)" "DerivE F == (7.x. (THE k. DER.IV F x :>
k))"
IntegralEO :: "[(real=>bool) * real]=>(real=>real)=>(real=>real)" "IntegralEO ==
7,(R,t) f. (7.x. if (R x) then if (t<=x) then (THE F. Integral(t,x) f F) else
-(THE F. Integral(x,t) f F) else 0)"
Additionally, the THE token is a primitive in Isabelle/HOLwhich returns the unique value satisfying
its argument. Its behaviour can be unintuitive, if, say, some function is not differentiable or
integrable. Our definitions and proofs are unfortunately complicated as a result of these issues,
but their application and use is rigorously formalised (as required by Isabelle), and happily they
are easy to use.
6.2. Automated Theorem Proving (EH3)
The third expressivity hypothesis we will test is whether features can represent the type
of control knowledge used in decision procedures and other sophisticated heuristics, and whether
we can use this to solve problems automatically.
(EH3) Features can encode control knowledge for automated theorem proving.
Using Feasch in the domain of calculus, we looked specifically at taking derivatives. This is an
area where the appropriate control knowledge can automatically find solutions. How easily can
we express this control knowledge in Feasch?
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6.2.1. A Decision Procedure for Differentiation
The decision procedure for differentiation proceeds by analysing the problem at every
step and iteratively applying the rule appropriate for the top-level form of the function. In the
current experiment, we exclude implicit and partial differentiation from consideration, staying at
the level of a first-year college calculus course; these require more machinery than we wish to
develop, including algebraic decision procedures outwith the area of differentiation. The same is
true for functions such as -Jx which are not defined everywhere over R; we include the rules for
reducingmany such functions, but we do not develop the machinery for reasoning automatically
about intervals. Trying to find the derivative of explicitly defined entire functions in a single
variable is sufficient for the purposes of formally testing (EH3). We do, however, look at case
studies of its performance on other problems.
Our theory of calculus includes proofs for rules for differentiating over each top-level
connective (continuity assumptions not shown):
Rule Name Formula
deriv_const d[C\/dx = 0
deriv_id d[a;]/dx = 1
deriv_add d[/(a:) + g(x)\/dx = f'{x) + g'{x), where f'(x) = d[f(x)]/dx
deriv_minus d[-/(a:)]/dx = -f'(x)
deriv_diff d[/(z) - g(x)]/dx = f'(x) - g'{x)
deriv_mult d[/(x) * g(x)\/dx = f(x) ■ g'(x) + g(x) ■ f'{x)
deriv_inverse d[l/x]/dx = —1/x2
deriv_div ^[f(x)/g(x)\/dx = (f'(x) ■ g{x) - g'(x) ■ f(x))/g2(x)
deriv_fx_pow_n d[f(x)n]/dx = n ■ /(a;)™-1, where n £ tNl and n > 0
deriv_x_rpow_z d[/(a;)si^x^]/dx = d[e5^x^'ln^^x^]/da:, where f(x) £ R and f{x) > 0
deriv_chain d[/(p(a:))]/da: = f'(g{x)) ■ g'(x)
Figure 6.1: Rules for Solving Derivatives
To encode the decision procedure, we need to specify the features when each of these rules is
appropriate. For many of them, it is simply a case of recognising the topmost connective in the
function being differentiated. It would be very inefficient to check for each top-level connective
at every step in every proof; we therefore begin with one feature checking whether a derivative is
present:
feature "has DerivE" ["f"] (goal has "DerivE ?f");
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "has DerivE");
This top-level feature detector will cue all the other features.
Let us now look at each of the two-argument functions. Detecting their presence is
straightforward:
feature "DerivE of sum" ["f","g"] (goal has "DerivE (°/,x. (?f x) + (?g x))");
mapping "DerivE of sum" ["f","g"] [ (NamedProofCommand ("deriv_add ?f + ?g",
"apply (subst deriv_add[of ?f _ ?g])"), 1.5) ];
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feature "DerivE of mult" ["f","g"] (goal has "DerivE C/,x. (?f x)*(?g x))");
mapping "DerivE of mult" ["f","g"] [ (NamedProofCommand ("deriv_mult ?f * ?g",
"apply (subst deriv_mult[of ?f _ ?g])"), 1.45) ];
feature "DerivE of diff" ["f","g"] (goal has "DerivE (7,x. (?f x)-(?g x))");
mapping "DerivE of diff" ["f","g"] [ (ProofCommand "apply (subst deriv_diff[of
?f
_ ?gl)", 1.48) ] ;
feature "DerivE of div" ["f","g"] (goal has "DerivE (7.x. (?f x)/(?g x))");
mapping "DerivE of div" ["f","g"] [ (ProofCommand "apply (subst deriv_div[of ?f
_ ?g])", 1.43) ] ;
mapping "has DerivE" [] [ (FeatureDetector "DerivE of sum", 1.5),
(FeatureDetector "DerivE of mult", 1.45), (FeatureDetector "DerivE of diff",
1.48), (FeatureDetector "DerivE of div", 1.43) ];
Often there are many features and detectors possible. We could have instead written a single
detector which looks for expressions of the form "DerivE (%x. (?h (?f x) (?g x)))" where "size
"?h" (fn s => 3=1)", i.e., ?f is a single connective, with further tests to ensure ?f and ?g are
instantiated. The choice of how to write features is left up to the developer; what Feasch requires
is that these features — and associated detectors — be made explicit, given names, and left
independent of any expected consequential action or rule. Mappings, as shown above, are
specified separately to cue the appropriate rules on the basis of features; this is a central difference
between Feasch and other control knowledge techniques, and which we believe was crucial to the
results shown in (EH1) and (EH2). Here, making the features explicit seems an unusual step —
it is not a part of standard control knowledge techniques— but it does not significantly obstruct
our development of the differentiation decision procedure. It may be a bit more work, but let us
withhold judgment on this issue.
One theoretical advantage of defining the features as above, and not using a single detector
which examines the top-level detector (we do have alternate code for this approach), is that it is
slightly more general. If the "topmost connective" were not well-defined, as arguably it is not
when a person parses an expression {e.g., A+B +C), or in a hypothetical system where unification
is transparent across associativity, these features would apply to any of the topmost connectors.
This is also one of the reasons that slightly different weights for the different rules is used. The
other reason is for the case where a goal has several derivative expressions: we simply felt it
would be nicer to pick off the "easier" case of differentiating across a sum first. In practice, these
weights and choices do not affect our statistical results, and merely illustrate the type of design
choices one makes with Feasch.
There are two other notable two-argument connectives, both related to exponentiation.
Many theories in Isabelle assume the use of the natural numbers, where exponentiation is defined
using the token The theory of the Hyperreals defines "real power" using the token In
our system, we wish to be able to find derivatives involving either expression:
feature "DerivE of pow, int" ["f","n"] (goal has "DerivE (7.x: :real. (?f x) ~
?n)");
mapping "DerivE of pow, int" ["n"] [ (NamedProofCommand ("deriv_fx_pow_n",
"apply (subst deriv_fx_pow_n[of ?f ?n])"), 1.4) ];
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feature "DerivE of pow, real" ["f", "g"] ((goal has "DerivE (°/0x. (?f x) "" (?g
x))") AND (NOT (expression "?g" is "7.x. ?k")) );
mapping "DerivE of pow, real" ["f", "g"] [ (NamedProofCommand ("deriv_x_rpow_z",
"apply (subst deriv_x_rpow_z[of ?f _ ?g])"), 1.4) ];
mapping "has DerivE" [] [ (FeatureDetector "DerivE of pow, int", 1.4),
(FeatureDetector "DerivE of pow, real", 1.3) ];
The real power operator is only valid for certain values of g(x), and the underlying rules reflect
these requirements, e.g., as shown in Figure 6.1. We have not attempted to account for this in the
current automation strategy; proving the underlying requirements is properly a different problem,
reasoning about ranges and inequalities, and beyond the scope of the present experiment. We
have also defined features and methods for transforming expressions of the form "DerivE (%x.
k)" into the more easily differentiated form "DerivE O/.x. exp (x * (Ink)))" for positive k (not
shown).
With the two-argument connectives all defined, it is time to focus on what is arguably
the most powerful part of the decision procedure. Whenever the function being differentiated is
the composition of two functions, the chain rule can separate them into their constituent parts.
Because our feature detection language uses unification — more flexible than mere matching
— there are trivial compositions possible, viz., where one of the functions is instantiated as the
identity, so we explicitly disallow these cases.
feature "DerivE nested functions" ["f","g"] ((goal has "DerivE (7.x.
((?f::(real=>real)) (?g x)))") AND (NOT (expression "?f" is "7.x. x")) AND
(NOT (expression "?g" is "7.x. x")) AND (NOT (expression "?g" is "7.x. ?k")));
mapping "DerivE nested functions" ["f","g"] [ (ProofCommand "apply (subst
deriv_chain[of ?f ?g])", 1.3) ];
mapping "has DerivE" [] [ (FeatureDetector "DerivE nested functions", 1.3) ];
This allows us to use the primitive rules, such as deriv_is and deriv_minus in Figure 6.1,
without needing explicit rules for, e.g., d[—f(x)]/dx. (Using a two-argument chain rule and partial
differentiation, it would have been possible to do the same for the two-argument rules such as
addition, but this is rather more difficult.)
With the above control knowledge, we would expect Feasch to be able to reduce any
compound expression into elementary parts. We must also, of course, inform the system what
rules are applicable for solving particular elementary derivatives. We have proved the relevant
results for the functions in our theory; their formulation is as for deriv_const and deriv_id in
Figure 6.1 and is omitted here. The features for these, again, merely detect whether the respective
functions are being differentiated:
feature "DerivE of const" [] ((goal has "DerivE ?f") AND (expression "?f" is
"7.x, ?k"));
mapping "DerivE of const" [] [ (ProofCommand "apply (subst deriv_const)", 2.0) ];
feature "DerivE of id" [] (goal has "DerivE (7.x. x)"); mapping "DerivE of id" []
[ (ProofCommand "apply (subst deriv_id)", 2.0) ];
feature "DerivE of negation" ["f"] (goal has "DerivE (7.x. -(?f x))");
mapping "DerivE of negation" [] [ (ProofCommand "apply (subst deriv_minus)",
1.6) ] ;
feature "DerivE of sin" [] (goal has "DerivE sin");
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mapping "DerivE of sin" [] [ (ProofCommand "apply (subst deriv_sin)", 1.6) ];
feature "DerivE of cos" [] (goal has "DerivE cos");
mapping "DerivE of cos" [] [ (ProofCommand "apply (subst deriv_cos)", 1.6) ];
feature "DerivE of exp" [] (goal has "DerivE exp");
mapping "DerivE of exp" [] [ (ProofCommand "apply (subst deriv_exp)", 1.6) ];
feature "DerivE of In" [] (goal has "DerivE In");
mapping "DerivE of In" [] [ (ProofCommand "apply (subst deriv_ln)", 1.6) ];
mapping "has DerivE" [] [ (FeatureDetector "DerivE of const", 2.0),
(FeatureDetector "DerivE of id", 2.0), (FeatureDetector "DerivE of
negation", 1.7), (FeatureDetector "DerivE of sin", 1.6), (FeatureDetector
"DerivE of cos", 1.6), (FeatureDetector "DerivE of exp", 1.6),
(FeatureDetector "DerivE of In", 1.6) ];
6.2.2. GUI: "Fast-Forward" Automation
Now that our control knowledge has been encoded in Feasch, we can try to use it for fully
automated theorem proving. As part of the Feature Wizard, we have included a technique we
call " 'fast-forward' automation": it repeatedly tries applying cued methods, in their rank order,
until it reaches a state where none apply. This may be the end of the proof, in which case the
user can simply continue developing the next lemma in their theory. It might instead be a step
where Feasch with Isabelle does not have relevant control knowledge, and the user has to provide
the next step, after which automation could be resumed. Or, depending on whether the control
knowledge encoded is safe, it might be the case that the automation technique has pursued a
blind alley, the proof state is false, and the user must manually backtrack and send the proof in a
different direction.
The "fast-forward" technique does not do any state-caching or backtracking. Search is
limited to a local best-first strategy, hard-coded in the Java user interface; if a cued method fails,
our technique will try the next on the list, but if all methods in a state fail, the technique stops.
To do more requires significant work on the Isabelle ML side and on the GUI side and is not
directly relevant to our present enquiry. It would, of course, be a very useful feature, and ideas
for pursuing this, connected with IsaPlanner, are reviewed in §9.1.4.ii.
As an example, let us use this automation technique, with the control knowledge
as described above, to solve the problem of evaluating d((sin ,x)3]/dx. We invoke the "Fast-
Forward" button (a downward-pointing triangle with a line underneath, shown in Figure 6.2); it
detects the feature "has DerivE" and then the feature "DerivE nested functions", and a single
candidate command, "apply (subst deriv_chain[of "Au. u~ 3" "sin"])". The automation
tries this command but then stops, showing a red error icon next to this command.
Our algorithm does not work! By right-clicking the command to insert it in our proof,
and sending it manually, we discover that it does not apply. Positioning the mouse over the
deriv_chain rule in our proof, we can see the Eclipse ProofGeneral "hover help text" which
we developed (§4.2.3.ii). This shows us that our version of the chain rule only applies when
the derivative is being evaluated at a specific point, because for the chain rule to be valid,
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the constituent functions must be shown to be differentiable at that point. We must apply an
extensionality rule to transform the current functional equality goal, "DerivE (%. (sinx)3) =
?f", to an equality at a universally quantified point z, "DerivE (°/0. (sinx)3) z = ?f z".) We
create a lemma which helps for this29 and features to suggest it when appropriate,
lemma extAll: "(A=B) = (ALL x. A x = B x)"
apply auto
apply (rule ext)




feature "DerivE lacks quantification" ["df"] (((goal has "DerivE ?f") AND (NOT
(goal has "(DerivE ?f) ?x"))) AND (expression "DerivE ?f" is "?df"));
mapping "DerivE lacks quantification" ["df"] [ (ProofCommand "apply (subst
extAll [of ?df])", 1.5) ];
mapping "has DerivE" [] [ ((FeatureDetector "DerivE lacks quantification"), 1.5)
] ;
The mapping specifies that the feature "DerivE lacks quantification" is only checked if a
derivative is present in the goal. Looking at the deriv_chain rule, we remarked that it also
requires proving certain differentiability assumptions. Although we could use Feasch for this, the
control knowledge model for proving differentiability very closely follows the model for solving
derivatives. These goals are typically uninteresting and easy to discharge automatically, so we
will rely on a decision procedure we developed using a "simpset" for Isabelle's built-in simplifier.
We will rely on the Feasch model to use features can detect a differentiability conclusion — or
a continuity conclusion because that can often be solved by the same simpset — and cue the
appropriate simplification set of rules. Here, the Feasch approach means it is not necessary to add
these rules to the standard simplification set; this is a good thing because there are times when we
may want to keep differentiability assumptions; and if these rules were used automatically by the
simplifier, such assumptions would be removed (and in some cases worse things, such as infinite
loops and system crashes, would happen!).
feature "differentiability conclusion" ["f"] ((conclusion has "?f differentiable
?x") OR (conclusion has "DifferentiableOn ?f ?R"));
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "differentiability conclusion");
mapping "differentiability conclusion" [] [ (NamedProofCommand ("simp (only
differentiability by smoothness)", "apply (simp only: smooth_manip_ss
smooth_solve_ss differentiability_by_smoothness_ss)"),
1.5), (NamedProofCommand ("simp (add differentiability by
smoothness)", "apply (simp add: smooth_manip_ss smooth_solve_ss
differentiability_by_smoothness_ss)"), 1.0) ];
feature "continuity conclusion" ["f"] ((conclusion has "continuous ?f") OR
(conclusion has "ContinuousOn ?f ?R") OR (conclusion has "ContinuousAt ?f
?x"));
add_top_level_schema (FeatureDetector "continuity conclusion");
mapping "continuity conclusion" [] [ (NamedProofCommand ("simp (only continuity
by smoothness)", "apply (simp only: smooth_manip_ss smooth_solve_ss
continuity_by_smoothness_ss)"), 1.5), (NamedProofCommand ("simp (add
29 There may be a rule already in the library, but we could not find it. Perhaps Feasch control knowledge could
have helped with that.
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continuity by smoothness)", "apply (simp add: smooth_manip_ss
smooth_solve_ss continuity_by_smoothness_ss)"), 1.0) J;
With this addition, we try the fast-forward automation again. The system applies extAll and
then successfully applies the chain rule. After proving the differentiability assumptions, there is a
single subgoal, "Vx. DerivE (Au. u 3) (sinx) * DerivE sinx= ?f x". The FeatureWizard shows
the following for features and methods:
• £3 >xa t " " n
Goal: V*. DenvE (Au. u A 3) (sin x) * OerivE sin x « ?f x
DerivE of poor. int(3)
DerivE of sin
has DerivE(Au u " 3)
has DerivE(sin)
Methods Features Settings I
Figure 6.2: Fast-Forwarding through Differentiation
The fast-forward automation continues and the following proof is found:
lemma "DerivE (°/.x. (sin x) *3) = ?f"
apply (subst extAll [of "DerivE (?x. sin x " 3)"])
apply (subst deriv_chain[of "?u. u " 3" "sin"])
apply (simp only: smooth_manip_ss smooth_solve_ss
differentiability_by_smoothness_ss)
apply (simp only: smooth_manip_ss smooth_solve_ss
differentiability_by_smoothness_ss)
apply (subst deriv_sin)
apply (subst deriv_fx_pow_n [of "°/,x. x" _ "3"])
apply (subst sym[0F extAll], rule refl)
done
By using the schematic variable ?f in the equality, after completing the proof, Isabelle instantiates
?f as "3 * sin x (3 - 1) * cos x".
6.2.3. Evaluation and Discussion
Evaluation
We evaluated the algorithm we encoded by testing it on a wide range of differentiation
questions, including those on a published examination paper from a first-year college calculus
course. We excluded problems where functions are not explicitly defined (including inverse
functions) or where the domain of the function is less than the entire reals, although we will
discuss such problems shortly. Our system was able to solve all the problems in the test set,
including, e.g., d[2cosx + 2smx]/dx and d2[16 • f2]/dt2.
There are many systems which solve derivatives, and the basic decision procedure for it
is not difficult. As we would hope, we have shown that it is not difficult to do in Feasch either,
and we have confirmed (EH3).
• £3 >EH f " "B
Goal: Vx. DerivE (Au. u * 3) (sin x)' DerivE sin x = ?f x
Command Weight
apply (subst derlv sin) 1.6875
apply (subst derlv x pow n[of"3D 1.6429
< |< ►
!Methods! Features Settings ;
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Inspectability
We excluded problems where differentiability only holds for certain ranges: e.g., to solve
DerivE (%x. x 1/2)) 1, because the derivative of real exponentiation is only defined for positive
values, we have to show 1 > 0. This can be done by automation tactics such as simp; as we have
noted, users sometimes try this tactic without thinking when faced with a new problem state, so
always sending a cue to this method might actually be useful. In case studies where simp is added
as a method to apply when all others fail (i.e., cued by "has DerivE" with a low weight), Feasch
with Isabelle is able to solve many such "incomplete" functions.
An especially interestingbehaviour occurs, however, when the "fast-forward" automation
fails. As we saw when deriv_chain could not be applied, a user can inspect the context of
the problem solver even if our automation technique cannot be applied. By looking at this, a
developer can debug problems with the algorithm and potentially, as we did, make the necessary
improvements.
This so-called "useful failure" also occurs when the control knowledge cannot solve a
problem. Given "DerivE C/.x. x 1/2)) 1", for example, our system will proceed to the point
where it cannot prove that 1 > 0, and then stop. A user can manually discharge this goal, or
extend the control knowledge so that the goal can be solved automatically, and then continuewith
the automation. Crucially, the user can observe what the system is doing and why when it stops.
This inspectability is available at any point, while it is running and if a user interrupts it; so, if
the automation appears to be going off an a tangent, a user can interfere, manually backtrack, and
specify an alternate path.
"Useful failure" is not a property of many other automation techniques. If simp does not
apply— or does not do what is desired — there is no way for a user to repair the behaviour and
continue. The same is true for all other tactics in Isabelle, with the exception of IsaPlanner. In the
case of IsaPlanner, however, it is difficult to observe what is occurring in real-time, and it is not
possible to interrupt the process. It can be told to stop after a fixed number of plan steps, and at
that point a user can direct the planning interactively, but she is restricted to applying commands
that were specifically in the original plan. With Feasch with Isabelle, a user can take over if
the "fast-forward" fails or merely on a whim, and the technique provides information useful for
interactive proving. Combining automated and interactive applicability is not a common property
of control knowledge representations, and we suggest that it may be one benefit of this approach.
With many decision procedures, there are times when a problem simply cannot be solved.
We restricted our problem set to entire functions; decision procedures used elsewhere typically
solve a much wider class of problems. This is not because our algorithm is worse than these
other algorithms, but rather, we argue, because ours is better. To begin with, note that some
differentiation problems are very difficult to solve rigorously. Consider the derivative of (sinx)/x
at x = 0: the function is undefined at 0, so the derivative is similarly undefined. If we explicitly
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define it to have a value of 1 at that point, the derivative can be computed to be 0, but only after
proving continuity. Typical computer algebra solutions ignore these boundary conditions, and
will say that the derivative is 0 when it is actually undefined and fail to find it for the analytic
continuation!30 Even if these systems did perform the rigorous analysis that a theorem prover
offers (indeed, requires) and could detect the problem, the way automated decision procedures
are typically implemented does not facilitate a user's interacting to help on failure. In the case of
the analytic continuation, or for differentiating such functions as \fx, our approach allows a user
to manually prove the requirements that the decision procedure cannot handle.
Continuing after Failure
In a fully automated standalone environment, we have implemented a solver which uses
this control knowledge and specifically defers any goals it cannot prove. We randomly constructed
a set of 100 expressions to test, using the operators and functions in our theory (this corresponds
to all functions used in a typical college calculus course). The procedure here finds the derivative
to all 100 problems, displaying the assumptions it used which it could not prove, as shown here
(k?? stand for arbitrary constants in our randomly created problems):
lemma "DerivE (°/,x. exp (In (((kUZ)~~(cos (kEy)))-((x)"(kCJ))))) = ?f"
apply (subst extAll [of "DerivE O/.x. exp (In (kUZ ~~ cos kEy - x kCJ)))"])
apply (subst deriv_chain [of "exp" "°/,u. In (kUZ " cos kEy - u " kCJ)"])




apply (subst deriv_chain[of "In" "°/,u. kUZ ~~ cos kEy - u ~ kCJ"])
defer




apply (subst deriv_diff [of "°/,u. kUZ ~~ cos kEy" _ "°/,u. u " kCJ"])
apply (simp only: smooth_manip_ss smooth_solve_ss
differentiability_by_smoothness_ss)
apply (simp only: smooth_manip_ss smooth_solve_ss
differentiability_by_smoothness_ss)
apply (subst deriv_const)





ASSUMPTION: !!x. (°/,u. In (kUZ ~~ cos kEy - u kCJ)) differentiable x
ASSUMPTION: !!x. In differentiable kUZ " cos kEy - x " kCJ
ASSUMPTION: !!x. 0 < kUZ ~~ cos kEy - x " kCJ
PARTIAL ANSWER: lemma DerivE (°/„x. exp (In (?kUZ ~~ cos ?kEy - x " ?kCJ))) =
(°/,x. exp (In (?kUZ cos ?kEy - x ?kCJ)) * (inverse
(?kUZ ~~ cos ?kEy - x ~ ?kCJ) * (0 - real ?kCJ * x ~ (?kCJ - 1))))
*)
It computes that the derivative of eln(.kicosk2~xk3) js e}n(k1col,k-xk3).^ l—_. ^_^.xk3-1^ subject
to certain assumptions.31
Of the resulting solutions, 61 required no additional assumptions; the other 39 all involved
division, exponentiation, or logarithms, forwhich subgoals are understandable. In some instances,
30 The presence of errors in CA systems is discussed in more detail in §7.1.1.
31 This is easily verified by using elnx = x; introducing such "simplification rules" into our Feasch model is an
attractive extension.
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these subgoals could be proved manually (e.g., In ex), but in most of the randomly created
problems, the extra assumptions are necessary for a derivative to be found; they indicate the
region on which the derivative is valid, and for any solution to be found, equivalent constraints
should have been specified in the original problem. This ability to suggest ways of repairing the
theorem is a further property not generally true either of techniques in Isabelle or techniques used
in computer algebra systems.
Specialisability
Another difference is observed if we attempt to apply simp directly to the lemma. The
goal is discharged! All that it has done, however, is to instantiate ?f as the original, unsolved
expression, using the rule ref 1. Our use of Isabelle as a calculator is relatively unusual, but it
can also be quite powerful. The simplification set is designed with the common cases in mind,
but unfortunately it excludes this use. Often, in fact, the simplifier will not be appropriate for a
particular problem, but there is no way in Isabelle to specify what type of problems the simplifier
should act on.32 Feasch allows us to specify precisely when control knowledge should be used. In
fact, the choice of commands is driven by features noticed, rather than by following a specific tactic
or plan script. The use of mappings to establish a hierarchical execution permits specialisation
such that only one of the differentiation feature detectors need be run if the problem does not
involve DerivE. Furthermore, if a user does not want certain detectors or methods to be run
automatically, they can easily learn what features and mappings are being used and override
them for their situation.
Limitations
While the differentiation decision procedure was successful, it seems that the present
Feasch with Isabelle system will have some limitations on more complex decision procedures.
The procedure we encoded is "stateless", in the sense that the same algorithm is followed on
every proof state. Currently, in Feasch with Isabelle, there is no way to encode a plan step such as
A(B IC), and no means to preserve features from one proof step to the next. A stateful decision
procedure could not be implemented. Secondly, there is no way to backtrack automatically, so if
mistakes are made by the "fast forward" automation, the systemwill not recover; more generally,
search is a vital technique for problem solving, both depth-first and breadth-first, and as the simple
case of backtracking is not feasible, this poses a severe restriction on its capabilities.
Interestingly, these abilities are fundamental inmost other control knowledge techniques,
including Isabelle tactics and IsaPlanner plans. The fact that statefulness and search are basic
32 Actually, it can be done by putting appropriateness conditions as formal assumptions in a simplification rule,
but logically this is unattractive, and in practice it has the result that simp will— very inefficiently — devote
energy to proving the appropriateness conditions.
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parts of these techniques, whereas Feasch with Isabelle is quite powerful evenwithout these tools,
suggests another way that the current proposed approach differs.
We note, furthermore, that these limitations are not inherent in the Feasch system. In §9.1.4
and §10.1.2, we describe how they can be overcome using the current architecture to implement
persistent features and tiered schemas. Finding this proposed solution did, admittedly, require
some effort, and these limitations, while not insurmountable, should be recognised as aspects
of the Feasch approach which require special attention, possibly in contrast to the other control
knowledge techniques.
We write "possibly in contrast" because both tactics and IsaPlanner use specialised code in
Isabelle for recording and manipulating proof state graphs. Such a librarywould also be necessary
to have the functionality of allowing statefulness and search in Feasch with Isabelle. Creating this
code from scratch would be a major undertaking; a more attractive prospect is the incorporation
of these capabilities by integrating it with IsaPlanner, as discussed in §9.1.4.ii.
6.3. Modularity (EH4)
The final expressivity property we will investigate is whether features support modular
code development. In good design, the "pieces— the modules— are autonomous, coherent and
organised in robust architectures" (Meyer, 1997), with benefits frequently asserted for repurposing
and extending code. We will argue that most control techniques, including Isabelle tactics and
IsaPlanner plans, are not verymodular, so establishing modularity for Feaschmodelswill indicate
another difference. The specific hypothesis we will test is:
(EH4) Features contribute to modular design of control knowledge.
This is necessarily a subjective evaluation, primarily, so to attempt to address it scientifically will
require specifying the evaluation criteria beforehand and applying this to case studies.
At the outset, let us note that in traditional approaches, the "module" is the tactic, plan, or
ML function in its entirety. Steps in such a script cannot be used elsewhere— they must be copied
and pasted, or else defined explicitly as a separate module. In Feasch, modules can be viewed
at many levels: each individual feature, mapping, or method is autonomous and coherent; using
hierarchical mappings, these can be grouped so that control knowledge for some domain acts




One common standard for judging modularity is that proposed by Meyer (1997). A
modular computer program— or problem solving technique—will satisfy five criteria:
Decomposability. A program is created by decomposing a problem into smaller
subproblems solved separately.
Composability. Modules can be freely combined to produce new systems.
Understandability. Individual modules are understandable by a human reader .
Continuity. A small change in the specification will result in changes to only a few
modules, without affecting the architecture.
Protection. An abnormal run-time condition will affect only a few modules, and the
system will otherwise function robustly. (Meyer, 1997)
6.3.2. Evaluation
Let us look, in turn, at how each of these criteria stands up against the Feasch
approach. Feasch requires decomposing control knowledge into individual features and
specifying separately how these features trigger commands or other detectors. By recommending
the use of detectors on the smallest level, it further encourages the decomposition of a complex
decision procedure into features linked by mappings, as shown in the development of secondary
"long-shot" control rules for HOL. By re-using the features for the initial detection of the relevant
logical operators, these "long-shot" control rules also show composability applies to Feasch:
features can be freely linked to other detectors or commands. Our generation of natural language
explanations demonstrates that Feasch contributes to understandability, as does the observation
of "useful failure" in our use of Feasch in automation. Protection was shown in how, when
extensionality was lacking in the differentiation algorithm (§6.2.2), the technique cued the relevant
method nevertheless, and, when it failed, it looked for other possible methods; not finding any, it
returned control to the user who could repair the problem. Continuity was shown in the repair:
no changes were needed to the control knowledge modules already created, and simply adding
an additional feature and method sufficed to solve the problem.
This evaluation of our approach against standard modularity criteria appears to confirm
(EH4). The subjective nature of the criteria preclude a quantitative evaluation, and whilst
judgments of third parties would give stronger evidence, even such results would not "prove"
this hypothesis. In keeping with the philosophy of science, what is crucial is that the hypothesis
could be falsified: it is conceivable that our approach could have failed against the modularity
criteria, whereas it is clear they did not.
If we look at other control knowledge techniques, we find that many of these modularity
properties do not hold. For both tactics and plans, the control knowledge is expressed as one large
entitywhich neither encourages the user to decompose the solution nor does it permit application
or repurposing of pieces therein. The use of simplification rules demands decomposition, but there
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is no alternative way of composing these elements special to such rules; specifically, when simp
fails, the user is not given any usable feedback. The behaviour of simp in any instance can only be
understood by reading an obscure trace, and the behaviour ofmost tactics is only understandable
by looking at difficult-to-read source code. Likewise, on error, the only protection afforded to
the system is if the tactic were not applied. IsaPlanner displays the modularity properties of
understandability and protection, but for continuity, it — as with simp and tactics in general —
is necessary to stop the current application, change the high-level module (at the source level),
reload the relevant code, and re-apply. As we sawwith the extensionality rule, control knowledge
in Feasch can be added or modified at any point in the proof process. In all of these areas, it
appears the Feasch supportsmodular expression of control knowledge to a greater or equal extent
than each of the other techniques available in Isabelle.
6.4. Conclusions about the Expressivity of Features
Through the course of the last chapter and this, we have found four significant differences
in how control knowledge is expressed in the current approach as compared with other techniques.
The hypotheses we have tested are:
(EH1) Features provide reasoned explanations for method selection, e.g. for use in
generating natural language proofs with causal information.
(EH2) Features enable useful guidance for interactive theorem proving.
(EH3) Features can encode control knowledge for automated theorem proving.
(EH4) Features contribute to modular design of control knowledge.
The first, second, and fourth were found to hold, and we observed that the corresponding
statements were not generally true ofmost other techniques. The third hypothesis was confirmed
for differentiation, but we observed that there would be problems using the current system for
more complicated decision procedures; automated theorem proving is the thrust of other control
knowledge techniques— exclusively, apart from IsaPlanner. Itwould be worthwhile to investigate
enriching this capability for Feasch (§9.1.4.ii), but it is remarkable that it can be so useful with the
present limited support in this area. We can conclude, on the basis of these expressivity properties
being so different, that Feasch is a very different approach to encoding control knowledge, at least
in Isabelle. Can these differences be used to show decisive benefits of this approach? Although
some have been suggested in passing thus far, in the next section wewill turn our focus specifically
to this question.
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Part Three: The Benefits of Features
Chapter 7. Semi-Automated Theorem Proving: Integral Calculus
Feasch, we have observed, can be used for both interactive and automated theorem
proving, and furthermore it offers inspectability and modularity beyond the other techniques
available in Isabelle. For these reasons, we could expect Feasch to have particular benefits for
problem solving in mixed environments, where one or more machine agents and a human user
can all contribute to the problem solving process. This leads to a first benefit hypothesis:
(BH1) The inspectability and modularity properties of feature-based control
knowledge are beneficial to multi-agent theorem proving.
We will look specifically at complex problem solving, where perfect control knowledge, such as
decision procedures, cannot be found. An inspectable technique will permit other agents, e.g., a
human, to use partial results of problem solving. A modular technique will permit developers to
extend ormodify the pre-existing control knowledge to make it more appropriate for domains of
interest, and will permit other agents to focus on particular modules which seem appropriate.
7.1. Background to the Problem
The problem we chose to investigate for this hypothesis is indefinite integration. Integrals
are usually solved by using a small number of methods; the choice of methods, however, and the
choice of arguments used, can vary widely. Mathematicians are usually very good at choosing
an appropriate method, but the process behind this remains obscure: it is difficult to teach, it is
typically acquired by much experience, and it is very different to how machine systems work.
7.1.1. History: SAINT, SIN, and a Decision Procedure
Slagle's program SAINT, the Symbolic Automatic INTegrator, is the first and most
straightforward computer program which evaluates integrals, achieving "the level of a good
college freshman" — a very good level, in fact, solving 52 of 54 problems on the final exam
set for the first year course at MIT (1963). It works by using 26 "standard forms" for which
the solution is immediately recognised, 8 transformation rules (including linearity and linear
arguments) and 10 heuristic transformations (including trigonometric identity replacement and
various types of substitution). The transformations are applied like production rules, with the
transformation rules taking priority, and with preconditions for each determining whether the
integrand is "amenable". A goal list keeps track of the different solution paths the program is
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considering, and a cost estimation selects the most promising path at any time. Later programs,
including SIN (Moses, 1967) and Macsyma, have extended this type of automated integral solving
with better algebra handling routines, sophisticated cost estimations, and a number of more
advanced solution methods.
After 1969, however, interest in automated integrators such as these dropped off, after
the discovery by Risch that integrals can be solved theoretically using Louiville's theorem and
algebraic field extensions. Louiville's theorem, in modern language, says that if an integral can
be evaluated, as an operator from elementary functions to elementary functions, then the answer
will be a sum of one part in the original field and possibly some parts which are logarithmic over
the original field extended by some algebraic constants (Risch, 1969; Neubacher, 1992). The Risch
algorithm and the later, faster Risch-Norman algorithm use this "structure theorem" as the basis
for a method guaranteed to solve any solvable integral, by trying all the possible expressions (a
large, but finite number) which could be the integral of the presented problem.
Some modern computer algebra systems use an implementation of this algorithm as the
basis of their integration routines. The algorithm is very intricate, programmatically, however,
and many CAS programs rely on a large number of recognised solutions (a lookup table), with
a small number of methods for converting a presented problem to one of these forms. Where
the Risch algorithm is used, the systems are insensitive to boundary conditions and occasionally
return false statements, such as the following:
The statement above is true so long as n ^ 0, but a correct solution must include the
special case that f x~l dx = In x + C. A program would fail if it relied on the general solution and
instantiated it where n — 0; while mathematicians will recognise this, errors such as this could be
catastrophic if the tools are used in a mission-critical engineering application.
For its ability to reasonwith due consideration to boundary conditions, Isabelle will offer
some advantages as an environment for solving integrals. We note that these boundary conditions
have also been ignored in SAINT and other work outwith the Risch tradition; for this reason, the
current investigation could yield a useful applied system. Additionally, we note that many
expressions which are not integrable can be "partially integrated" to the point where the integral
can be expressed in terms of known "special functions". The Risch and Risch-Norman algorithms
do not apply in these cases, and although we are not specifically addressing this problem, it seems
likely that the present work could have benefits in this area.
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7.1.2. Methods for Human Integral-Solving
The first step in constructing a system for solving integrals which can function interactively
with a human agent is to identify the methods commonly used. We will base this analysis on
the first-year calculus course taught at Edinburgh University. Firstly, the integrals to several
functions are taught explicitly: xn(n ^ 1), 1/x, In x, ex, the six trigonometric functions, the three
principal hyperbolic functions, and five functions with quadratic denominators ai\xi, ailxz /
' yp+p' and sjxl_ai • These are listed, for example, on a one-page summary study sheet
for the course in calculus (Arthur, 2000) and in key tables in many textbooks and web sites.
Methods for solving these integrals should be included in our system. Additionally, the following
common integration rules are listed in the summary study sheet:
(Where F appears it is understood that it is an antiderivative of /, that is F'{x) = f(x).) The
inverse function rule is scarcely taught in the course and is not given in its indefinite form
(/ f~1(x)dx = x ■ f'1(x) — [/ f(u) du]u=^_1^)/ although inverse substitution (a type of u-
substitution below) gives the equivalent result. Other courses may treat these slightly differently,
skipping the inverse function rule, splitting linearity into two rules (addition and constant
multiplication), or calling the reverse chain rule as "derivative-divides", but this group of basic
rules is standard.
The course also teaches a number of techniques which do not rely on these integration
rules but rather on the clever use of concepts students have already learned. The first group
of these involves the replacement of an expression in the integrand with one that is equivalent.
Algebraic manipulation is the simplest type of replacement, and students learn early in the
course that they can expand, factor, or otherwise simplify algebraic expressions in an integrand.
For integrating rational functions (polynomial fractions), students learn the technique of partial
fractions: p^q\x^ is replaced by a sum of smaller polynomial fractions Ap^ + ^$j~' each of
which is hopefully easier to integrate. Manipulating the expression with trigonometric identities
(e.g., sin2 x = 1 — cos2 x and sin a; • cos a; = (sin2ar)/2) is another replacement method.
Substitution is the general technique of introducing an expression in a new variable equal
to an expression in the integrand, and then changing the integrand to be purely in the new
variable of integration. The integral is then solved, and converted back to the original variable of







the integral (say, in terms of x), and dx is replaced by an expression in du: for instance, in solving
J(x + l)2 dx one could set u = x + 1, compute du = dx, evaluate f u2 du = ^ + C, then convert
back to get + C. (This is a derivation for the linear transformation rule.) u-substitution is
taught as particularly useful with inverse functions (for / sin-1 xdx, let u = sin-1 x so x = sinu,
giving f u • cos udu) and "nasty terms" (u replaces an unpleasant expression in the integrand).
Trigonometric substitution is the introduction of a trigonometric expression for the variable of
integration (such as x = sin u), to simplify such an expression as \J1 — x2). Tangent substitution
is used to change a large polynomial fraction in trigonometric functions to a polynomial fraction
in a variable. These substitution techniques are taught explicitly in the course, with conditions
when they are normally appropriate. A final form taught in the course— themost general form of
substitution— is "implicit substitution", when some expression g{u) substitutes for an expression
f(x) occurring in the integral. (Tangent substitution is sometimes omitted from other calculus
courses.)
There are a number of other advanced techniques for solving integrals. Some can be
described as replacement or substitution, but as they are distinctly treated in the Edinburgh
course, we identify them here. (They are quite difficult, however, and we do not expect to
encounter them very frequently. They are sometimes present in other calculus courses and
sometimes omitted; likewise, there may be one or two specialised techniques not in our focus
course.) The techniques taught at Edinburgh are: expanding power series, solving recursively,
and integrating quadratic denominators. (A fourth technique, reduction, applies only to definite
integrals and so is not discussed here.) With power series, expressions in the integrand are
replaced by their Taylor or Maclaurin expansion, combined algebraically (multiplication or
composition) or split using linearity, and then converted back to a recognised combination of
functions, where possible. Solving an integral recursively means that by some method (often
integration by parts), an expression is derived relating the integral to a function of itself,
e.g., f f{x) dx = g(x) + k ■ J f{x) dx; in some cases, this expression can be rearranged to give
a solution for the integral (/ fix) dx = fiqr). The technique for integrating expressions with
quadratic denominators involves completing the square (an algebraic manipulation) to get the
integrand into a recognised form (which might be the derivative of tan-1 x).
No list of methods for mathematics can ever be exhaustive, but this list is very similar to
those in college textbooks and to the techniques which we learned at school. To summarise, the
list of methods is given below, noting an abbreviation for it that will be used as its Feasch name:
recognise solution (solve) partial fractions replacement (partial fracs)
linearity rule (linearity) trigonometric identity replacement (trig id)
inverse function rule (inv rule) substitution—u (u-subst)
integration by parts (by parts) substitution—trigonometric (trig-subst)
linear arguments rule (linear args) substitution—tangent (tan-subst)
general/reverse chain rule (chain) substitution—implicit (other subst)
factor algebra (factor) power series (pow series)
expand algebra (expand) recursive (recursive)
simplify algebra (simpl) quadratic denominators (quad den)
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7.1.3. Features for Human Integral-Solving
In contrast to these methods, where there is a general consensus in teaching, the reasons
people choose methods is very poorly understood. We performed an exploratory experimentwith
10 subjects where theywere asked to solve integrals using the speak-aloud protocol. Subjects were
asked to explain why they chose to make any step (efficient cause, cf. §5.2), in order for us to gain
an understanding about any features theymay be using. Some qualitative results— from subjects
as well as the course notes, textbooks, and other experience— are summarised as follows:
"If you've got a lot of messy algebra, try u-substitution."
"Integration by parts works well when there's a product of x or something easily
differentiable with something integrable."
"When there's an ugly fraction of polynomials, try partial fractions and then the big
gun, tangent substitutions for quadratic denominators."
Parameter Instantiation
Some of the methods require the selection of one or two parameters: for example, u-
substitution is seeded with the expression which u substitutes for, and integration by parts needs
to know which parts to split the integrand into. How people choose these parameters will require
close study, because unlike the small set of methods, there are an infinite number of possible
parameters. This question gives a good test of the two approaches because they explain this
selection process very differently. Example suggestions for choosing these parameters are:
"Use trig substitution to replace an x2 term with tan2 u."
"If the integrand has a simple derivative, try a trivial integration by parts using 1 as
the part to integrate and the integrand as the differentiation part."
Mappings
We have also, on the basis of these experiments and textbooks, identified the methods
chosen when certain features are detected. The list of features and the methods they cue is shown
in figure 7.1. Neither the list nor the mapping is conclusive, but it is an approximate basis on
which to create a Feasch model of control knowledge, and we can reasonably expect the features
and the methods to be understandable to users of our systems.
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Figure 7.1: Features for Integration Methods. From analysing human subjects,
a number of features were identified which seem to trigger the choice of method
for solving an integral.
7.2. A Feature Wizard for Integration
The majority of these methods have been encoded as rules in our Isabelle theory of
calculus. Detectors for each feature have been defined, and, aswith differentiation, their execution
is cued by a single high-level detector of IntegralEO. Mappings follow the matrix shown in
figure 7.1.
The methods not implemented involve algebraic manipulation. This is a difficult problem
for which many other techniques exist, and we will assume that another agent will be able to
handle these problems, e.g., the built-in tactic simp, a CA system such as Maple, or the human
user. Features are used to note when such methods should be applied.
7.2.1. GUI: Crossing the "Auto-Run Threshold"
So farwe have seen the "point-and-click" interface for interactive theorem proving and the
"fast-forward" automation technique. The "Settings" tab allows a user to configure the behaviour
of the wizard, including the option to enable a third aspect of the Feature Wizard graphical user
interface, the "auto-run threshold". If this is turned on, the system will automatically try to apply
a command if its cue exceeds the specified threshold.
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Goal: IntegralEO (\x. sin * ' cos xO) = ?f
Feature Wizard settings:
Q Auto-detect methods
(XI Auto-run method(s) atthreshhold
> 2 a UL
1-0
Q Automatically insert 'done'
Q Trace feature detector firing
Methods Features I Settings ;
Figure 7.2: Feature Wizard Settings. The behaviour of the Feature Wizard is
customisable in the "Settings" tab. One setting, the "auto-run threshold", is
particularly useful for semi-automated theorem proving. Any methods cued
above this threshold will be automatically inserted into the proof in an otherwise
interactive context.
We will use this option to explore the use of Feasch with Isabelle for semi-automated theorem
proving. When defining our mappings, we used the convention that a cue greater than or equal to
1.0 means that a method is good or safe to apply; by specifying this as the "auto-run" threshold,
Feasch will run these methods automatically. If these do not apply, or if there are none so strongly
triggered, the user will be presented with the lists of methods and features and can proceed
interactively.
7.2.2. Evaluation
Our control knowledge is able to solve many problems automatically, including
/(sinx)(cosx) dx and J e2x~} dx. The biggest restriction, as in the case of differentiation in
the last chapter, is the ability of the system to reduce algebraic expressions. In the problem
of fx In x dx, the system suggests integration by parts and is able to reduce the expression to
(In x) ■ — f ^ • Tp da:, but gets stuck on the "easy" part of simplifying the resulting integrand to
be |, which it would also be able to integrate. Similarly, in the case of f y/l — x2 dx, it can find the
appropriate trigonometric substitution (x = sinzi) and even evaluate the square root using simp,
but it does not know to reduce the resulting expression /(sin x) (sin x) dx to /(sin2 x) dx or how to
rearrange the identity cos2x = 1—2 sin2 x so that it could be substituted.
Importantly, for the problems that our system is unable to solve, it permits the participation
of a human agent— the user. A success of the Feasch approach— and abenefit for semi-automated
theorem proving— is that it provides suggestions to the userwhen none of the methods are ranked
with a strongweight. For instantiations, one of themost difficult parts of themany techniques, the
user can choose the rule to apply from the ranked list and manually type only the instantiation,
e.g., the u to substitute.
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Because the features are explicitly presented, a third agent could also be involved in the
process: of particular interest would be to invoke a computer algebra system to assist with the
weakness of the present system in manipulating algebra. This could, for example, analyse the
suitability of various candidates for if-substitution (u expressed as a function of x) by computing
dx in terms of du and reducing the resulting product u du. It would be interesting to explore this
prospect, but here we note that such collaborative problem solving is greatly enhanced by the
inspectability of our approach.
By altering the weights in our control knowledge, the influence of certain features can
be adjusted, with the result that the system may try techniques in different orders depending on
the problem. Users can use this capability to vary the behaviour of the system to match their
preferences. One user, for example, might prefer u-substitution:
/ (sin x) (cos x) dx = f udu u-subst, u = sin x
= ^ + C solve
• 2
_ sin x q simpl (manual/external)
Another user might set the product of two expressions in the integrand to be a strong cue for
integration by parts:
/(sinx)(cosx) dx = sin2 x — /(cosx)(sinx) dx by parts
2 / (sin x) (cos x) dx = sin2 x + C simpl (manual/external)
/ (sin x) (cos x) dx = sin2 x + C simpl (manual/external)
Yet another user may have defined control knowledge to recognise trigonometric identities, with
a strong cue sent to reduce expressions, if possible, when they occur inside an integrand:
/(sin x)(cosx) dx = / dx trig-id
= i f(sin2x)dx linearity
= i/(sinu)^ u-subst, u — 2x
= | / (sin u) du linearity
= | cos u solve
_ cos2x simpl (manual/external)
7.2.3. Conclusions
Our approach, likemany of the others, has been able to solve some very difficult problems,
fully automatically. We have been unable to get access to SAINT, SIN, or Macsyma, or to
find the actual problems used in their evaluation, so it is not possible to give a quantitative
comparison. However, our emphasis has been slightly different and, as we have not developed
significant algebra facilities, it is likely that our system alone operates at a lower level of proficiency.
There are, however, three important distinctions to our system. Firstly, it is able to reason with
boundary conclusions, automatically discharging e.g., many proofs of integrability or continuity
requirements; these are typically ignored in the integral-solving systems we have seen, and we
doubt that they are considered in SAINT and SIN (although we have not been able to find out for
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sure). Whilst we have not shown this specifically for integration, the behaviour of the system on
such problems, e.g., flnx dx, is very similar to that described in §6.2.3 for differentiation.
Secondly, a user can engage with our system interactively when automation fails or is
not desired. Furthermore, it is not difficult to see how an additional agent — such as a computer
algebra system— could be invoked to apply a method, to simplify or factor algebra (producing a
subgoal for the equality of the simplified term, whichmay be easier to solve than the simplification
alone), or even to contribute features which are more easily detected in that environment. Because
these collaborative capabilities are not available in the other integral-solving systems, we believe
that students working with Feasch, for example, would outperform a team consisting of a system
such as SAINT; we would have liked to conduct this and other experiments to provide a formal
comparison, but, as has been noted, these other systems are not available.
Finally, our system is able to communicate why methods are suggested as appropriate.
This has the benefit that a user can easily understand the control knowledge we have provided;
she can follow or decline the suggestions made by the FeatureWizard, but by knowing the reasons
the suggestions were made, she is in a much better position for making this choice. For all these
reasons, we conclude that (BH1) is shown for our system: the inspectability and modularity
properties of feature-based control knowledge are beneficial to multi-agent theorem proving.
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Chapter 8. Learning with Features
An interesting property of the Feasch approach is the introduction of an abstract layer
— the features — between the problem representation and the chosen methods. This division,
we suggest, could have benefits for learning part (or perhaps even all) of the control knowledge
automatically, reducing the amount of effort needed by a developer. Features could potentially be
learned by looking for common patterns in proof states, and methods, likewise could be learned
by looking for common patterns in proof steps. The mappings between these could be adjusted
depending on which features were found when the various methods were applied. To test this
supposition, we set up our second benefit hypothesis:
(BH2) Feasch allows the use of learning mechanisms not applicable to other systems,
simplifying the encoding of control knowledge and yielding improved
performance.
Wewill look specifically at the ability to learn mappings automatically from a corpus of proofs in
the domain of differentiation, using the features and techniques from Chapter 6. Ideas for learning
features and methods are discussed as future work (§9.1.5).
8.1. Learning Mappings from Solved Derivatives
The process we will use to attempt to learn mappings is to provide the feature detectors
and command schemas of interest and then to analyse a selection of sample proofs. By comparing
the presence of each feature against the commands applied at every step, we establish a relevance
vector for each (feature,schema) pair. These vectors are used to generate mappings which are
added to the provided control knowledge to form the test model. The test model's performance
is then evaluated on another, distinct set of sample problems.
Looking at the problem of solving integrals, we have a set of control knowledge from
Chapter 6. Writing the mappings— and choosing the weights — was one of the most mundane
parts of specifying this control; if Feasch is able to do this automatically, the developer's
job is dramatically simplified. In the domain of integration, there is an idealised goal of
optimal performance, viz., whether the decision procedure is learned. This achievement would




Our development of the calculus theory in Isabelle has yielded 19 features and
21 command schemas useful for differentiation. We constructed terms to differentiate by
taking random combinations of the functions in our theory — addition, subtraction, negation,
multiplication, division, multiplicative inverse, exponentiation (INI), exponentiation (IR), sine,
cosine, exponentiation (e), and the natural logarithm — with arguments chosen with equal
probability as either our functional variable (x) or a randomly selected constant, up to size of
10 (in Isabelle's definition, corresponding number or operators and elementary terms). We then
applied our decision procedure to take the derivative of each such term to generate a training
set of 100 sample proofs. We deferred all subgoals which could not be proved and, as noted in
§6.2.3.iii, found solutions to all 100 problems. The total number of non-deferring steps was 1117.
The applicability of each feature T was recorded by counting, for each distinct operator
schema a, three situations:
success_county: the number of steps in proofs in the training pool where a was
applied, T was detected in the state immediately prior, and all instantiations required
for a in this step were contained in T ?
incomplete_countjr CT: the number of steps in proofs in the training pool where a
was applied, T was detected in the state immediately prior, but at least one of the
instantiations required for a in this step was not contained in T
fail.county: the number of steps in proofs in the training pool where a was applied
and T was not present in the state immediately prior
At the end of training, this gives a vector [success_count,incomplete_count,faiLcount] for each pair
[feature T,operator a\. We set the weight of the mapping from T to a as
0.01 + 10 • success-count + incomplete-count
yjj? ^ \=
1 + 10 ■ success_count + 5 ■ incomplete-count + 3 ■ fail-count
This formula was chosen from experiencewith neural network and statistical learning paradigms,
as a rough mechanism for discouraging incorrect cues without eliminating correct cues, and
spreading the credit when multiple features cue a schema. The parameters have not been tuned,
although the potential for this is discussed in §8.2.
As an example, consider an operator schema that is applied a total of twelve times
in our training pool. If a particular feature is present once with enough information to
instantiate the operator schema fully and thrice with incomplete information, our vector is
[success_count=l,incomplete_count=3,fail_count=8], and the mapping from this feature to this
operator schema is computed to be (0.01 + 10 + 3)/(1 + 10 + 5 • 3 + 3 • 8) = 13.01/50 ~ 0.26.
We then set initial mapping wo.jf on a feature T using the same computation as for ury
on the vector [J/CTsuccess_county, ^/^.incomplete-county, ^/^faiLcounty].
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8.1.2. Experimentation
This process yields a set of mappings between the two control knowledge elements —
features and methods— provided. These three elements together give a Feasch model which can
be used through the Feature Wizard, semi-automatically or interactively, as discussed in chapters
4-8. For the present purposes, wewill evaluate the quality of the learning by using the automated
problem solver discussed in §6.2.3.iii, replacing the hand-coded mappings there by these the
resulting mappings. We will run the new control knowledge on a distinct set of 100 randomly
generated problems and assess the performance on three levels:
• Number of problems solved
• Percentage of these problems with assumptions generated
• Total number of steps
• Total number of method attempts
To contextualise these results, wewill compare against these results against the decision procedure
manually created in Chapter 6.
8.1.3. Results and Analysis
The resulting Feasch model using mappings learned in this way was able to solve all
the problems in the test case. The percentage of problems where assumptions were introduced
and the total number of steps were both approximately the same as for the hand-coded model—
within themargin of error—which would be expected as these numbers are primarily dependent
on the problem itself. The secondary key performance indicator is the number of mis-steps
made: here, the learnedmappings were significantlyworse than the hand-coded model, applying
1475 inappropriate steps compared with 762. It is likely that this could be improved either by
adjusting the learning algorithm or providingmore training examples, and itwould be interesting
to discover how close to perfect selection can be achieved. Although the difference is significant, it
does not represent a dramatic deviation in performance: the models are boh on the same order of
magnitude, with one wrong step on average tried before the right step. Trying one wrongmethod
is not expensive and, compared with our own experience at proving theorems in Isabelle, is quite
a good result.
Learned Mappings Hand-coded Mappings
Number Solved 100 100
Percentage with Assumptions 44% 39%
Total Steps 1160 1117
Steps Attempted 2625 1879
Figure 8.1: Performance of Learned Mappings
Based on these results, we conclude that the system is able to learn appropriate mappings,
given a large enough set of training data. The performance is slightly worse than our hand-coded
mappings, in this case, but it is surprisingly close. For sure, it is a great improvement over the
default case where no mappings are provided! This confirms (BH2).
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8.2. Discussion
This performance, we note, could likely be improved by tuning the learning algorithm.
The parameters were chosen as simple estimates and the factors as simple counts; in both areas
there is much room for improvement. More complicated techniques could also be applied in the
post-processing. In particular, we would be interested in using principal component analysis to
identify the few features most relevant to a method's selection, and then restricting the mappings
generated to those which appear to have a significant influence. We also note that there is often
only limited success which can be achieved merely by analysing data. In this experiment, for
example, there were frequently two or more methods which could have been applied, but our
analysis only considered a single application. A better approach would be to enable the system
to test hypotheses about relationships between features and methods, updating the mappings in
real-time as the system tries to apply the candidates it has cued.
Despite these criticisms, this experiment establishes that themappings do not always need
to be provided. The decision procedure for differentiation was learned merely by specifying what
commands are used and what features might be important, and by providing sample solutions.
Other approaches to learning in automated theorem proving have not, to our knowledge, achieved
such results, and we attribute the result here to the introduction of explicit features which enrich
the problem description and focus attention on the key aspects of the problem. When writing
control knowledge for a new domain, it will be much easier for a developer to describe only
potential features and ways of applying methods, without having to consider the relationship
between them. Furthermore, this could permit other types of learning to be conducted with a
more narrow focus, viz., finding new features and finding new methods, and as in the case of
the human developer, these machine algorithms also need not consider the relationship between
them. Some ideas for learning these other components— and for testing them experimentally—
are described in §9.1.5. Here, we have shown that the difficult task of learning control knowledge
is rendered easier by dividing the space of what needs to be learned. Using features as an
intermediate layer, between problem representation and problem solution, in addition to the
benefits for inspectable, semi-automatable theorem proving, allow part of the solution process to
be learned automatically.
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Part Four: The Future of Features
Chapter 9. Critical Analysis and Future Work
Our experiments have shown encouraging results for the Feasch approach, but more
importantly, they have raised a number of interesting research issues. With regards to Feasch with
Isabelle, we make specific criticisms in several areas: showing and improving usability, a focus
on syntactic features, the numeric mappings, planning capabilities, and prospects for learning. In
each of these areas, we have ideas for how future work can address the limitations discovered
thus far. More generally, we have focussed in this thesis on one application of the approach, that
of semi-automated theorem proving; we are very keen to see how it would fare in other areas,
both for computational problem solving and for cognitive modelling.
9.1. Isabelle with Feasch
An extension to this work which could be very useful is to extending the coverage of
Isabelle theories by Feasch control knowledge. Some of the difficulties we have encountered
suggest areas where this could be particularly useful, e.g., algebraic simplification (Chapter 6),
because the current techniques in Isabelle sometimes leave much to be desired: in different
situations, different types of simplifications may be appropriate, and this could be cued by Feasch
or adjusted by a user; in some instances, e.g., factorisation, it could be possible to use an external
system to suggest features which may cue certain solution strategies. The thrust of our research,
however, is on theoretical aspects of problem solving, and in this lightwe are especially interested
in using these areas in ways could further understanding and resolution of the limitations of the
current work.
9.1.1. Usability Analysis
We have found the FeatureWizard helpful, as have a number of other people in informal
settings, and we believe we have demonstrated in the course of this thesis why it is likely to be
so. However, the argument for its usability could be strengthened significantly by undertaking
some specific quantitative analyses. We would like to perform experiments with human subjects
in three areas: interactive theorem proving, semi-automated theorem proving, and developing
control knowledge. The first two areas could provide subjective data about user's experiences,
including whether they found the system helpful, aswell as objective information such as whether
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they were any faster at achieving goals than a control group using Isabelle without Feasch. Not
only would this provide additional evidence about the usefulness of our system, it could also
give us feedback about which aspects of the system are most useful and which could benefit from
attention.
The third area of usability experiments would be most interesting, as one of the primary-
goals has been to provide a framework for expressing theorem proving control knowledge, but
it would also likely be the most work. The specific questions we would be interested in here
are whether users find control knowledge expressed in FDL understandable, whether developers
can express their own control knowledge in FDL, and how well FDL control knowledge can be
extended by other users. Comparisons to other techniques would provide useful evidence about
whether our system can serve as a useful tool, and insight into the actual difficulties users have
— particularly with respect to extending other code — would be valuable to us in improving the
feature detection language.
We also have several ideas for how the current user interface could be improved to make
the entire system more usable. The first of these is to attempt to relate entities in the proof state to
the features and methods which are related to it, either using a visual cue such as colour or through
interactive feedback such as on mouse hover events. In an extension to this, it could be possible
to bring up cued methods in response to a right-click on a related portion of the current subgoal:
for example, if a user clicks on a term in some assumption, they might see a menu showing
methods which use that term, either using the entire assumption in a forwards-rule application or
cued by features which identify that term. Another idea is to add support for hierarchical proof
representations, so thatminor steps can be hiddenby a userwanting a high-level view of the proof;
this hierarchy could be suggested by features and methods, and natural language comments about
the reasons for the method selection could be included. Further potential enhancements include
being able to turn on and off predefined groups of feature detectors (called "tools", and some
support for this is in the code, though not the UI), displaying a graph of the causal hierarchy
of a particular method and of the current execution hierarchy, and easily being able to edit the
mappings and weights (e.g., using such a graph). Finally, itwould be useful to have a visualisation
ofmultiple simultaneous proof attempts in Isabelle (cf. §9.1.4)33.
9.1.2. Non-Syntactic Features
The features used in the experiments in Chapters 5 through 8 have primarily involved
syntactic abstractions of portions of the goal. Features used in human problem solving almost
certainly have a much broader range, and it would be interesting to explore the prospect of using
more varied features in an artificial context.
Geometry is one area where this is an intriguing possibility. Various programs exist for
drawing diagrams for proof states (Wilson & Fleuriot, in press;Winterstein, 2004). Detectorswhich
analyse this diagram could test for features not apparent in the syntactic problem representation,
and, in a suitable domain, it seems to us that such features might be useful for cueing schemas
whichwould not otherwise have been found. Interestingly, this appears very close to how humans
reason (ibid.).
33 ^ye created a component for this which worked with AClam, but we have not yet been able to port it due to the
challenges of representing a plan space in Isabelle. We are hopeful that this will be facilitated by IsaPlanner.
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9.1.3. Issues with Mappings: Numeric Weights and the Compositionality of Features
Turning our attention from the features to the mappings, we find two aspects of the
current approach to cueing schemas unsatisfactory. The use of numeric weights is unattractive
for many reasons, and there is frequently redundancy in the feature detectors used in Feasch with
Isabelle.
The Ugliness of Numbers
Although the architecture in Chapter 3 allows an arbitrary implementation of IMapping,
the classes we have presented all use a numeric weight. (The simplest, used in ListExecutor, is
equivalent to a universal weight of 1, so we include it in this critique.) While this technique is
commonly used, in techniques from evaluation functions to neural networks, it could be a source
of irritation amongst users. Weights in different domains could be difficult to compare, and the
resulting lack of consistency, we expect, would lead to difficulties in composing different schemas.
The resulting lack of modularity could be a significant challenge in a large system.
We have introduced some conventions, such as to use 1.0 as a divide between methods
which have some guarantee of appropriateness and those which do not, but we feel these
conventions do not go far enough. The prospect of inferring weights automatically (Chapter
8) offers some assistance to the problem, but it is necessarily sensitive to training data and such
data is not always available. Unfortunately, we do not at present have any alternatives which
would be better.
Re-using Featural Information
A second limitation of the current mapping strategy, in practice, is that it is difficult to
use information provided by features in subsequent feature detectors. While the proof command
schemas can use the instantiated arguments of the features which cue it, feature detectors in
Feasch with Isabelle cannot. We note that this is not a problem in the underlying architecture,
as the semantics for a cue to a feature detector include this information, but this information is
ignored in the ML code which invokes the feature detectors and no support for accessing it is
afforded in FDL. As a result, subsequent detectors frequently re-compute the arguments which
would have been provided by the featural cue, as in:
feature "the conclusion is a conjunction" [] (the conclusion is "?P & ?Q");
feature "the left-hand conjunct of the
conclusion matches an assumption" ["P","Q"1
((the conclusion is "?P & ?Q") AND (some assumption is "?P"));
Fixing this would not be a major change to the code, and we expect to be able to complete it in the
near future.
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9.1.4. Planning by Continuation: Persistent Features
Statefulness and Search
Wee see the most serious restriction of the current system as the lack of built-in support
for search and planning. These techniques have been instrumental in the success ofAI, and while
it is remarkable that Feasch has been useful without it, it could be far more useful if it had these
capabilities for high-level executive control (§6.2.3.v). If these capabilities are incompatible with
the approach, furthermore, we have a catastrophic challenge to its use either as a theory of human
problem solving or as an exclusive means of specifying control knowledge.
The problem can be viewed as one of statelessness: at every step in the theorem proving
process, Feasch looks at the problem state from first principles, with no knowledge of its history.
An intelligent solver will remember what it has been doing, and in either a plan or a search script,
it will also know where the last step fits in the context of the overall strategy. There is no reason
why this information could not be represented using features, and there is only one aspect of the
approach thus far which would need to be changed. Rather than clearing the features at each
new step, the system should support "persistent features" which are carried over, possibly with
some changes. Tactics and plans could thus be implemented by carrying a feature such as "we are
applying plan step A in proof state N" from one state N into the next state N + 1; if a new feature
"proof state N + 1" is added to the context of new proof states, a "continuation mapping" could
map the combination of these features to cue "do plan step B".
There are arguments that could be made for encoding tactics in this way, such as greater
flexibility and interruptibility, but we recognise that in its current form it is far from elegant It
would be worthwhile to explore, butwith a view to refining it to a point where the use of features
is natural for tactics and not, as it seems here, a laborious introduction of labels. (In §10.1.3.i,
in the next chapter, we reason quite abstractly to come up with another solution which seems
preferable.)
Using IsaPlanner with Feasch
One alternative to the use of continuations is suggested by the success of Feasch with
Isabelle in a collaborative context, as demonstrated by showing hypothesis (BFU). It would be
possible to have agents for planning or tactics analysing the problem state alongside Feasch,
with these agents keeping track of their notion of context and suggesting the next steps through
features and method cues to Feasch. IsaPlanner has particularly good support for exploring a
space of proof states, through extensive low-level ML libraries with efficient caching of states
and of individual assumptions. It also (as its name suggests) allows for specifying plans using
tacticals and permitting gaps. These are all areas where Feasch with Isabelle is lacking. If the two
approaches to control knowledge were interoperable, users would be able to express both tactical
and heuristic ideas.
Heneveld 152
One interesting aspect of such a combination is that features could be used at themeta-level
to encode the applicability of plans; a major weakness of plans and tactics in Isabelle currently
is that there has been no way to do this, but a good integration of our approach with these
approaches could yield that. Furthermore, we would expect many of the same benefits that were
observed at the proof step level to be observed at the plan level: that the reasons for selecting
plans are inspectable and extensible, and that some parts of the control knowledge for plans could
be learned automatically.
9.1.5. Learning from Experience and Analogy
Learning Mappings On-line
The last chapter illustrated howmappings can be learned by a static analysis on completed
proofs. An extension of this work could see Feasch update mappings based on what is selected in
real-time and on what is observed to succeed. This would have the advantage the proof corpora
are not required, and the system could adjust in response to what a user thinks is appropriate.
Such a system would have the attractive problem that, over time, its suggestions become more
closely aligned with a particular user and to the types of problems he solves.
Alternatively, the learning system could run unsupervised. When unattended, it could
automatically apply the methods its control knowledge suggests and then update the mappings
depending on how successful a method turns out to be. This could be interesting in either of the
other mathematical domains we have explored, solving integrals or discovering when the basic
HOL methods are appropriate.
Learning Features
In many instances, particularly in HOL, features are obvious to us from the shape of a
rule. This "obviousness" can be formally described as the conditions for a rule's applicability,
and these could be inferred without a great deal of difficulty. Every conclusion in the library, for
example, could (and perhaps should) be a feature; on every problem where they unify, the rule
suggests a means of proceeding. The space of these features could quickly become very large; an
improved capacity to learn mappings could eliminate some useless features, but there remains a
lot of work to achieve this.
The more interesting problem, to us, is how compositional or even non-syntactic features
could be learned. Pattern recognition and categorisation techniques might be useful here/but
the most promising approach, it seems to us, would be to introduce some "hidden features"
which are trained similarly to hidden layers in neural networks, with Hebbian learning and back
propagation of credit assignment. This could go some way to learning an appropriate execution
hierarchy. By continuing the neural network analogy, it might be possible to introduce a large
number of such feature nodes, without any explicit meaning, which evolve together to develop
ensemble codings potentially corresponding to more sophisticated features. The analogy between
our NetworkWeightList executor and the structure of neural networks could perhaps be used to




The final component to problem solving control knowledge, in the feature-schema theory,
is the schemas which apply. In Feasch with Isabelle, the schemas correspond very closely to
specific rules, and it would be possible to construct standard forwards-rule and backwards-rule
application schemas for each rule. Again, wewould need a powerfulmapping learning algorithm
to filter out thosewhich are not useful, but it at least suggests a way that methods could be learned.
One common technique for learning new methods is chunking (§2.1.5.i) old methods
together. In theorem proving, this has been done by looking at common sequences of proof steps
and compiling a Markov model of what steps are likely to follow a given set of predecessors
(Duncan, 2006). By including features in the analysis, this model could focus its scope to patterns
wheremethods have been chosenfor the same reasons. We hypothesise that this information would
remove noise from the analysis and lead to a richer set of generalisations.
Another approach to learning methods is top-down, by performing an inductive analysis
on entire proofs (or proofs of subgoals). By including features in the abstraction of these "plans",
we could again expectmore reliable generalisations. By encoding these plans asmodular schemas
available for any purpose, more general schemas could perhaps be used to reason about the
generalisation, applying it analogically, using it to infer new plans, or performing plan repair (cf.
critics, §2.3.iii) — in the same framework as the proof step application. The availability of causal
information (features) might furthermore be useful for constructing explanations for why such
plans (or chunked tactics) are valid, increasing confidence in good plans and allowing spurious
generalisations to be culled. (Muggleton, 1992)
Learning Methods without Learning Methods: Analogy
The top-down approach to learning methods could be very powerful, but we expect that
it will also be very difficult. It might be possible to display the same "learned skill" without
abstracting any methods. If past proofs and proof steps are stored as schemas in Feasch, the
system could use "plan continuation features" to retrieve these steps without having any general
plan or method schemas. Using analogical techniques, itmight be possible to transfer proof steps
from previous examples, adapting them and applying them to the current problem. No induction
is necessary, and the user does not need to define anymethods, but a relevant command could still
be suggested interactively or applied automatically. This, it seems to us, would be an especially
powerful capability, enabled by the use of features and schemas, which has not been possible with
other control knowledge techniques.
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9.2. Establishing a Computational Architecture
We have shown several ways that Feaschwith Isabelle could be extended, through support
for planning or learning. As these changes are not specific to Isabelle, they could be made in Feasch
alone and thereby be available in Feasch as a general architecture for problem solving. What we
have not shown, however, is that Feasch can be useful as such a general architecture. To show this,
Feasch will have to be applied to numerous other domains— by multiple groups of users. Clearly
this is well beyond the scope of the present project, but it seems to us that it could equally well
have benefits in areas very different to theorem proving. There was nothing special we had to do
to the Feasch system to use it for Isabelle, and as a framework for problem solving, we discovered
it led to a different style of expressing control knowledge and to a unique set of benefits. We will
be very interested to see whether itmight have the same result in other problem solving research
areas, and to this end we suggest two other candidate domains we would like to see explored:
natural language and game playing.34
Wewill also be interested to see what implications for the Feasch approach are suggested
by exploration in these other areas. Theorem proving led us to recognise the importance of
planning, and the resulting practical insights have contributed to the shape of our general
theoretical formulation, presented in Chapter 10. There are two particular areas where we feel
our understanding— and our framework— is incomplete: how structural features are learned,
and how explanation can feed back into the system to improve it. In the long-term, the measure of
this approach will be the extent to which it aids understanding in many areas of problem solving.
9.2.1. Natural Language and the Importance of Structure
Learning useful structural features is one of the largest challenges in AI, and psychological
theories of the processes by which people achieve this are scant. We anticipate that our system
could help with this, by making structural features an integral part of its processing, and by having
schemas as a single point of integration, so that "feature detectors" can be closely related both to
"operators" and to "cases".
One prospect for a solution is providing a background process built-in to Feasch by
which feature detectors are created automatically from encountered problems and solutions.
These could be for surface features, so that family resemblances and associationist cueing can
be facilitated for the important surface features, as well as structural features, on the basis of
the structure that enables successful schemas to apply. One suspicion we have formed, in the
course of this work, is that two orthogonal processes should govern this learning process: one
is a periodic knowledge synthesis and "clean-up" to usefully restrict the focus of activity, as
used in evolutionary programming (§2.2.2.iii) and possibly achieved by a utility ranking or by a
34 While we hope to pursue some of these questions, we would be even more pleased if the reader has been moved
by our review to investigate some of these ideas. Our system is available for such research, with code on-line
and substantially more technical documentation (and comments) there than is included in this thesis.
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dimensionality reduction; the other is an ongoing knowledge induction, where observing patterns
in experience leads to the creation of new schemas, especially for detecting structural features.
Natural language understandingwould be an interesting domain within which to explore
this, because there is a rich body of training data available, CCG's, categorical associations (e.g.,
parts of speech) learned by "clean-up", and relations between them (structural schemas, viz.,
grammar) learned by induction over sentences where words are annotated with the hypothesised
category features. To be sure, there has been a lot of research in this area, but we think there
may be scope for Feasch to promote an investigation using features and schemas. The standard
AI approaches described here, production rules and search in particular, have been spectacularly
unsuccessful at learning grammar, and most computational approaches to nature language have
used a variety of specialised techniques. If it is possible with Feasch, describing these approaches
in a unified theoretical context would be certainly be useful, e.g., for identifying synergies and
possibly new ideas and means of learning structure. While we have doubts whether such an
attempt would ultimately prove successful, we are sure that such a challenging would be a good
exercise for exploring Feasch, highlighting its weaknesses and— possibly— revealing particular
strengths.
9.2.2. Game Playing, Go, and the Importance of Explanation
Another active area of problem solving research where it would be attractive to apply
Feasch is game playing. In early studies with the game Go, we found that that generalisations on
the basis of actions alone was insufficient (Heneveld, 1999); this is a common finding, but there
are few techniques for improving the quality of these generalisations. Including features in the
analysis, we have noted, is potentially one such technique, and we would like to apply it to our
original experiment in learning schemas for Go.
The most powerful machine technique for producing good abstractions seems to us to
be explanation based generalisation (Barletta & Mark, 1988). Features, as we have discussed,
can provide the efficient reasons why schemas are chosen; this is not necessarily the same as the
final cause — why the schemas are good ones — but if the features regularly cue appropriate
schemas, the reasons are likely to be the same or similar. Thus having the causal chain of "self-
understanding" in place could lead to the prospect of being able to explain why the chains work,
in a way not unlike the self-explanation effect in psychology (§1.1.3).
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9.3. Psychological Experiments
One benefit which we hinted at, at the end of Chapter 1, is the potential use of this
architecture for cognitive modelling. Specifically, it functions along the lines of several memory-
based theories, using features for retrieval and schemas to perform the application, and so could
offer a good framework inwhich to test these theories asmodels of human cognition. With regards
to the very general notion of schemas, we recognise the argument that it can be self-defeating, but
as discussed in §1.4, further high-level distinctions do not yet seem to be mature or supported by
sufficient evidence. The use of a model would provide important specification in practice without
restricting the purview of the theory.
Our system agrees with the theories by performing associationist retrieval, using a
network of detectors that can identify both surface and structural features. Although these
detectors are only executed serially in the applications in this thesis, this is due to current single-
thread limitations of Isabelle, and the current code for Feasch supports concurrent execution
of schemas. Running detectors in parallel represents a more psychologically plausible and
computationally powerful basis for retrieval, on those machines and networks where massively
parallel processing is feasible.
Our system has not yet been tested as a cognitive architecture, and although we have
used some study of human expertise (viz., features for solving integrals; §7.1.3) to build our
computational approach, there is much more we would like to do to follow-up on our initial
inspiration from cognitive theories. Experiments will be necessary to show that the present
architecture is suitable for cognitive modelling, let alone that resulting models— using features to
cue schemas— give good fits to human data. Conducting such experiments is a high priority for
us, as we have noticed casually that Feasch does seem to solve problems as we do. With regards
to calculus alone, there are at least three areas where this modelling could be investigated:
Task Performance. Solving integrals. Novices and experts. Both aggregate and
individual.
Learning. How do subjects improve? Can it be modelled by a dualistic account of
learning new features and better associations?
Tutoring Systems. If Feasch can describe patterns of expertise, in an expressively
inspectable way — as was suggested by many of the experiments presented here —
then it may be possible to teach these patterns. If we find that our system can model
a user's activity (on "Task Performance", particularly with respect to novices), an
automated comparison against the system's model of expert behaviour could be used
to identify the heuristic control knowledge the user is lacking. Because this knowledge
is inspectable in Feasch, we hypothesise that it could be communicated to a user; if the
user improves as a result, this would support its relevance to human problem solving
and provide evidence of another benefit of it as an approach for computational problem
solving.
We are exploring working with the LeActiveMath project (http://www.leactivemath.org),
where a machine tutor combines natural language with a cognitive model to provide instruction
in solving derivatives. We are hopeful that this context may provide the opportunity to carry out
some of these experiments.
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9.3.1. Modelling Experts at Solving Integrals
Solving integrals could serve as a good domain for cognitive modelling because it is
sufficiently complicated to lead to variety among subjects but sufficiently narrow that it can be
formalised— and to a large extent has been— inChapter 7. We noted there thatnomachine system
has been able to achieve near-expert performance along the lines of human mathematicians. By
more closely analysing the process by which experts reason, this might be possible.
Feasch could be used to build a cognitive model of an individual's task performance
by attempting to find the mappings which describe that individual's method selection on the
basis of the features detected. The calculation for this could be similar to that used in Chapter
8, except here what is being learned is not the "right" solution, but one preferred way of solving
the problem. There are, of course, many ways to solve a problem, and it would be interesting to
explore the ability of a Feasch model to account for either an individual's choice or an aggregate
choice.
This investigation could also afford an opportunity to develop our understanding of how
features might be used at the plan level. In a solution attempt we have observed, the subject
periodically changed focus along what seems to be a best-first strategy:
/ (sin x) (cos x) dx
1. by parts: sin2x — /(sin x)(cos x) dx
4. by parts: f (sin x) (cos x) dx
2. u-subst, ui = (sinzHcosa:): f , u du\v JK ' J sjl-(2ui)2
3. u-subst, U2 = 2u\: \ f , "2 dv-24 J a/1-U22
5. trig-subst, u2 = sinu3: \ f cos u3du3 = \ f sin u3du3
6. recognised: = \ cos u^duy,
7. trig-id, sin2x: f dx
8. recognised: ~ c^s 2x + C
Features such as "this problem state is worse than the one before" and "none of the methods I
can think of seem promising" are examples of indications that a different state may be preferable.
Discovering how this is done by people— and how this might be done by Feasch — would be a
worthy accomplishment.
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9.3.2. Challenging the Use of Production Rules
The biggest argument that will have to be made to advocate this approach in practice will
be showing distinctive benefits over production rules. While we have argued for this on many
grounds in the course of this exposition, an experiment which gives clear and direct evidence is
highly desirable. One such experiment could be conducted with the Tower of Hanoi task, a staple
of cognitive problem solving experiments.
We have observed that subjects performing the taskwill occasionally take a disk off one
tower and then discover that it cannot be moved to any of the other towers. While this is hardly
surprising, we note that the removal of that disk is disallowed in the basic production rules
solution of Newell & Simon (1972): the operator production states that "if X is on top of A and
smaller than any disk on B, move X from A to B", but the precondition is not valid. While the
use of the precondition is computationally efficacious, it is psychologically wrong. This has been
corrected in more sophisticated cogntivemodels (Anderson, 1993) in production architectures, by
making the removal and placement two separate actions. Removing a disk has a precondition
that the disk is at the top of the source tower, and placement has the precondition that the disk
is not larger than a disk already on the target tower; in this model, the production that Newell &
Simon classed as an operator is learned through composition of the two smaller rules.
One experimentwewould like to pursue is to unfold this one more level, so that systematic
errors are made with all of the supposed preconditions. In doing so, we hypothesise that the
preconditions Anderson identifies could also be dissociated from the action. A precise formulation
of a task to explore this is as follows:
Instead of moving disks between three towers whilst obeying a size constraint, use
coloured beads which aremoved between three groupswhilst obeying a corresponding
spectral order constraint (viz., the rainbow ordering). For instance, with seven beads
coloured red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet, a yellow bead's removal
is restricted to the case where it is in a source group with no red or orange beads, and
its placement is restricted to a target group with no red or orange beads.
The preconditions that Anderson uses are ones which are easy for people to verify, possibly by
"external cognition" (i.e., the world does the work, trivialising the selection of the smallest disk by
ensuring that it is always the one on top) or by frequently used perceptual processes (comparing
size, such as when placing a disk). In our isomorph, these preconditions are much harder to
verify. The logical precondition imposed by the problem definition is no longer a trivial task, and
we suspect that people will be more likely to make mistakes.
Consequently, the preconditions that have been used in existing cognitive models —
being on top of the source and not being larger than anything on the target — would have to
be removed. We hypothesize that a production architecture model of cognition in this isomorph
would use a single action, moving X from A to B, with no preconditions, and it would account for
human performance (including improvement) solely through associative weights and chunking.
Furthermore, although the spectral constraint will likely be more difficult for subjects to learn,
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we suspect that their performance in learning the essential Tower of Hanoi solution pattern will
be similar to performance by subjects and pre-existing models for the canonical task. If these
points can be confirmed, we would show that the utility of if ... then constructs in these
cognitive models is merely an artifice of domain simplification; in other words, we would show
that production rules model merely the logical structure in a problem domain and not, as prior theories
have claimed, the human cognitive process.
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Chapter 10. Towards a New Paradigm
The breadth of the potential future work is daunting, but there are many reasons we are
encouraged. It is daunting because it means there is so much left undone by the present research,
but it is heartening because there is so much of interest left to do. That our approach has turned
up so many interesting ideas we feel is some circumstantial validation of the initial idea. That
idea, that features cue schemas for problem solving, is neither novel nor sophisticated; what we
have done that is novel, however, is to use this idea to construct a conceptual framework for a
problem solving system. In the domain where we have explored it, the achievements have been
compelling, and we are thrilled by the fact that we can envisage so many extensions, further
experiments, and other potential applications.
For us, the Feasch system as described so far represents the first step in exploring a larger
abstract formalism for problem solving. We have been able to address many of the issues raised
in the last chapter, in what we feel are elegant ways, at this abstract level. It is the product of
substantial reflection and analysis, and its first offspring has proven useful in our experiments to
date, but there is far too little evidence to argue that it is in any sense the "right way" to think
about problem solving. It is purely speculative and philosophical — readers who strongly prefer
scientifically grounded theories are recommended to skip directly to the conclusions, §10.2—but it
has been very useful to us. There is a rich diversity of approaches to problem solving in computer
science and cognitive science, but very little in the way of high-level synthesis. For us, this
formalism conceptually unifies the diverse approaches, providing a paradigm in which they can
be understood, contrasted, and ultimately combined. We hope it may be similarly useful for the
reader, but we stress that there are no guarantees, only illustrations, and that this speculation is
ancillary to the core hypotheses we have presented and tested.
10.1. The Feature-Schema Architecture
The classic general problem solving architecture has been that proposed by Newell and
Simon (1972), presented earlier in §2.1.land included again here:
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At the time, this architecture represented state-of-the-art thinking, where methods are chosen and
applied to a problem state within a state-space. It is still useful for problem domains where all
methods are on the same level (i.e., all methods directly changing the state space), but in large
problem solving systems, this is rarely the case. Planning, for example, is a challenge to express
in this diagram, for planning strategies do not act on the problem state but change focus within
the problem's state-space. Newell and Simon discuss this, presenting a two-level formulation
and recognising the need for this interplay between them. They note that there may be "new
solution possibilities or demands that cause the problem solver to interrupt its current activities
to try different ones", but their architecture fails to account for this interplay.
Their architecture also makes an explicit divide between "general knowledge" and
"method store". This is questionable because methods are themselves a form of knowledge,
the physiological evidence for this split is ambiguous (§1.2.3), and the same processes are used
to retrieve both. Furthermore, general knowledge will almost certainly influence the method
selection, although no provision for this is made in the diagram. Even the distinction between
"method selection" and "method application" is misleading, for in all cases the method selection
will itself be performed by some method, and in mostmodels, there will be many methods which,
when applied, have the effect of selecting other methods.
Method-chaining and general knowledge play a crucial role in "interpretation", which
they define as the process of fitting a situation to a method. Apart from the distinct initial
"translation" step in their model (which will use many of the same methods and techniques),
they imply that these mechanisms are integral in "the structure of the method". In practise, they
are needed for the "selection" process as well, and more often than not they are implemented as
distinct methods (such as unification) which will be used by other methods.
Everything is a method, in the sense that for most problems solving systems, the most
interesting aspect is the method (or procedure) by which it works. Newell and Simon write:
Thus the theory focuses on the method: a collection of information processes that
combine a series of means to attain an end, or at least to attempt to attain an end.
The distinctions between "translation", "selection" and "application", and between "general
knowledge" and "method store" are often not relevant, and the distinctions drawn in figure
10.1 seem to us to provide more obfuscation than clarity about how actual problem solving
implementations are operating.
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10.1.1. The Schema Model
With this inmind, we recast the diagram of Newell and Simon to conflate everything from
the diagram (apart from the problem state, input, and output) into a single entity labelled "apply
schema", shown in figure 10.2. Schemas can be production rules or cases, or methods, strategies,
scripts, frames, or heuristics. If there are other problem solving techniques that we do not yet
know about, they can be included as schemas as well. It is deliberately completely open-ended,
but at the highest level of abstraction it seems better to ignore the numerous distinctions which
have been drawn (and which often, in practice, obscure a system's behaviour). We will refine this
"apply schema" entity later, after describing the rest of our high-level model.
Figure 10.2: The Schema Model. Newell and Simon's General Problem Solver
model can be recast as above to make use of context and to generalise over
methods, cases, and strategies.
The one new entity introduced in the diagram is that of "context". This is related to
the idea of "change representation" from figure 10.1, but substantially broadened. Although the
notion of "change representation" is attractive from a Gestalt psychology point of view, in a logical
sense it is unsatisfactory because any change to a problem state involves changing something in
its representation. It is often a subjective judgment whether the representational system is changed
or the problem state is changed (within the same representational system); and in practice it makes
very little difference which is changing. What is vital, however, is being able to record information
associated with a state but not integral to the state itself and to pass this information between
schemas. "Change representation" hints at this importance, but somethingmore general is needed
to capture the complexity of altering and enriching the description of a problem.
In our framework, the "context" associated with a state can include a description of
what schemas have been tried, what schema has just been applied, or what schema should be
applied next. It can also include derived information about the problem state, such as a diagram
(Winterstein, 2004), a mental model (Johnson-Laird, 1983), or meta-level reasoning information
(Bundy, 1983). It may also include contextual information that guides the interpretation of a
problem, such as whether it is a a formal logic problem (as was originally intended in the Wason
Selection Task, §1.2.1), a situated problem (Gick &Holyoak, 1980), or a deontic problem (Cosmides,
1989).
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To clarify the distinction between "Update State" and "Update Context", we define that
the state is a concise representation of theminimal ornear-minimal information needed to uniquely
capture a situation in a problem. Changes to the state change the problem situation in a significant
manner, and they can only be effected by operators specified by the problem domain. Contextual
information, on the other hand, has no effect on the problem state; it can be updated by the schemas
without restriction by the domain, recording any information which a schema finds (often derived
from the problem state) which might be useful to it or other schemas. On an implementational
level, the separation of context encourages control strategies and heuristics (implemented here as
schemas) to make the information that they derive and use explicit, so that it can be re-used if the
state is revisited or if another schema could benefit from the same information, and so that it can
be inspected by an observer and more easily discussed. This separation also allows methods to
gather a large amount of information without changing the problem state, simplifying both the
number and the size of states encountered in the course of solving a problem.
The benefit of this formalism is that it more generally describes what actually happens in
the vast number of problem solving systems. It begs the question of what representation is used,
but we feel this is another benefit35: this should be a design choice the user can make, depending
on what is appropriate for the domain at hand or the goal of the model. The user should not be
forced by the architecture into using a representation that is not natural, and as yet there is no
standard, universally applicable representation. Our implementations in this thesis have used
predicate logic, but this aspect is purely "below the line" of what is theoretically important.
Various AI systems and cognitive models will often use their own specific representations
and vocabularies; they may use different representations for the problem state, the context, and
the schemas. These systems vary in the choice of representation — and they have enormous
variation in the "apply schema" component, discussed next — but the three-part split, of state,
context, and schemas, applies to nearly all of them. It is for this reason that this high-level model
is interesting, despite the ambiguity of the component called "schema".
Types of Schemas
Most systems and models draw sharp distinctions within the category we call schemas,
using entities referred to by various names: methods, heuristics, rules, cases, productions,
experience, control knowledge, tactics, plans, etc. In our diagram, so far, we have conflated
everything that does work into "schemas". We have — intentionally — left this category very
general, in order to highlight that all such entities (methods, strategies, cases, or productions) used
in problem solving approaches fit a common pattern: either they change the problem state, they
change the context, or they are used by other schemas. As soon as this category is restricted, e.g.,
35 Leaving the user completely unaided with respect to representation is not in their interests, and we provide
support for a common standard — predicate logic — as used throughout this thesis. This representation has
its limitations, however; our claim here is that it is a benefit of our framework that it is not dependent on this
choice of representation.
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by insisting that productions be used, the class of problem solving techniques which the model
describes is reduced. Keeping it vague — at the highest level — establishes a framework for
a modular, object-oriented architecture design, which although still general, can become useful
once specific types and instances of schemas are identified. There are many different opinions
about what types of schemas should be distinguished, but by using this high-level model, these
different types can be accommodated in the same system.
We begin with three types of schemas which we found were commonly used inAI systems
and cognitive models.
Operator Schemas. The lowest level of schemas are those which directly change the
problem state. Often these are tightly constrained by the problem domain, and as a
result are very domain-specific, such as "move block X from Y to Z" in the STRIPS
planner (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971). Some domains are very common, however, giving rise
to some very familiar Operator Schemas. Logic is one example, wherewewouldwould
expect Operator Schemas for e.g., the formal rule of modus ponens (forward-chaining),
"if we know P => Q, and P is in the problem state, then add Q to the problem state".
Experience Schemas. Another major class of schemas consists of those which simply
record knowledge about a domain. They do not say anything about how the knowledge
is applied, but may be used by other schemas to transform the problem state or enrich
the context. A statement of the form P => Q, such as "If someone is a man, then he
is mortal", is one example of this type of schema, and might be used by a Forward
Chaining Operator Schema. Many production rule systems encode knowledge in this
type of schema, such as declarative knowledge in expert systems, and axioms and
lemmas in theorem proving. Case-based reasoning is another domain that uses what
we describe as Experience Schemas, either entire records of a specific experience or
partially abstracted records. In cognitive psychology, this type of schema includes
those identified by Chi et al.'s for physics models (1981) and in various folk worlds
(see §1.1).
Guidance Schemas. The largest and most interesting category of schemas are those
which select Operator Schemas and guide how they will apply. Often, these will use
experience schemas as a guide, as inmatching schemas, such as predicate logic unification
or structure-mapping analogy (Gentner, 1983). Other times, guidance schemas will be
a defined order in which other schemas will be tested and applied, such as tactical
expressions in theorem proving ("use Methodl then Method2 or Method3, or else
Method3 thenMethod4 repeatedly"; as in §2.1.4), or the Prolog approach of sequentially
looking at definitions in a Prolog program. More generally, strategies such as those
described by Polya (§1.3) are contained in this class, including, in theorem-proving,
the technique of contradiction, and in any goal-directed domain, working backwards
and subgoaling. Heuristics are Guidance Schemas which may rank other schemas
in the domain, storing the scores in the context and then choosing the best one, as in
cost-benefit schemas such asmeans-end analysis and hillclimbing, and in "availability"
schemas where rankings of other schemas will be based on the recency, frequency, and
success rate of past applications (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
Many examples of problem solving techniques can be described in terms of these schema types
and some representation of both state and context. We emphasise, however, that these categories
are approximate, and schemas can often be implemented in one or another category depending
either on a particular system's requirements or a particular developer's preference for a given
domain. What is useful about the Schema Model is that it introduces vocabulary to distinguish
between various implementations. The essential distinction we draw between these three types
of schemas is that operator schemas act on the problem state, experience schemas store data but no
code for how they are used, and guidance schemas can run, often updating context or using other
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schemas. The distinction between these types of schemas often corresponds to important design
choices about how problem solving information is represented. From the intent ofmodular design,
we recommend that schemas be put into the briefest, most general, and most reusable form. This
can sometimes be a difficult choice to make; we suggest, following principles of modular software
design, that new schemas should use other schemas as much as possible rather than duplicate
functionality that exists elsewhere.
One benefit of recording knowledge in the most modular, reusable way is that these
schemas may then be analysed and abstracted to form new schemas. This introduces a fourth
type of schema:
Learning Schemas. Learning may happen by making new experience schemas from
problem solving attempts, by creating generalised experience schemas from several
specific experience schemas, by creating a guidance schema from experience schemas,
by forming macro-operators from other operator schemas, inter alia.
There are very many learning techniques described in the literature, but again an advantage of
incorporating them as schemas in this model is that their activity can be described in the same
formalism as problem-specific solving activities. In a system, it could run concurrently and, if
implemented in a modular way, techniques could potentially be applied, easily and off-the-shelf,
to knowledge in other problem domains in the same system.
10.1.2. Planning and Search
Searching and planning are extremely important aspects of problem solving which are
not shown in the Newell and Simon formalism, though they say vaguely that they can be treated
as "sub-problems". In the Schema Model, they can be quite neatly expressed by considering that
planning takes place by applying Planning Schemas on a space of all possible problem states
(the state-space level), which pass problem states to schemas which act on problem states (the
problem-state level). This can be viewed as a nested version of figure 10.2, shown in figure 10.3.
For depth-first search, the introduction of a "space of all states" is not needed; it can
be accomplished by schemas storing a copy of the current state before calling other schemas,
iteratively, on updated states. It is cleaner, however, for the schemas to run quickly without using
recursion (storing information about what has been done, and how to continue, in the context
of the state), and this requires the introduction of a state-space (sometimes called the problem
space, search space, or planning space). This is cleaner because control is returned quickly to
the outermost schema, which will typically have the greatest flexibility, in selecting schemas to
apply. This follows another principle of modular design, that the control architecture should be
shallow, analogous to an "event-handling loop", and should allow for interruption as recognised
by Newell and Simon (§10.1). This can correspond to psychological accounts of executive schemas
such as the danger schema: if engaged in the Tower ofHanoi task when a fire breaks out, a subject
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Figure 10.3: Planning in the SchemaModel. Planning (and its frequent isomorph
search) can be expressed as a two-tiered Schema Model where Planning Schemas
act in a state-space (not shaded) and can call other schemas to act in a particular
problem state (shaded).
What the introduction of a state-space does is to allow schemas to analyse the entire space
of problem states. This is necessary for best-first search to identify which state seems best at
any given point, and for more advanced planning schemas such as A* search (Pearl, 2000) and
hierarchical task network planning (Nau et ah, 1999). It is also essential for such activities as
loop avoidance and identifying duplicate states, as well as more sophisticated techniques like
identifying analogous states or state sequences, recognising portions of state-space which are
steadily getting worse ("ballooning"), and pruning entire regions of the state-space at one time
(as in the IV-queens problem). This leads to the introduction of another category of schemas:
Planning Schemas. Specialised schemas for working in a "state-space", the tree or
graph of problem states encountered during a problem solving activity, usually passing
problem states from the "state-space level" where the Planning Schemas apply to a
distinct "problem-state level". Examples of these schemas include search strategies
/ planning techniques (depth-first, iterative deepening, best-first, A*, minimax / a-
fi, HTN) and optimisation techniques (identifying duplicates, pruning unproductive
regions of state space).
As shown in figure 10.3, Planning Schemas will often select a problem state and pass it
to a non-planning schema in the problem-state level (shaded in the figure); this will often result
in a new state (which the Planning Schema will add to the problem space) or in updated context
for that state. Planning Schemas often will also note the most recent state found in the context at
the state-space level. This information is useful because some Planning Schemas do not simply
select a state and pass it to the problem-state cycle, but instead act directly on the state-space,
Heneveld 167
and sometimes the context of what has been done recently is important in these optimisation
techniques. A loop avoidance schema, for example, can look at the recently introduced state and
determine whether it is a duplicate of any of its ancestors in the state-space, and mark it as failed
if it is. Another example of Planning Schemas which act on the state-space are critics (Ireland et
al, 1999), which will look at a recent failed schema application in the domain of theorem proving
and determine whether some repair can be effected.
In §9.1.4, we suggested that planning could be implemented using features which persist
in the context from one state to the next, and where these features cue the continuation of the
plan. The analysis here suggests that an alternative implementation might have distinct state and
context representation for the plan level and the problem level. This corresponds better to how
planners are implemented, including IsaPlanner, and we prefer it (although we find a further
improvement below).
This modular approach to planning allows different planners to be easily swapped by a
developer; if one planning technique is very efficient in most cases but, say, in certain situations
gets trapped in a local extrema, a developer might try to use that efficient planning schema to
solve a problem, and then, if it does not succeed, manually apply a more powerful but difficult
one. Or she could develop a "mixed" Planning Schema, which automatically tries the efficient
schema first and the more powerful one only if necessary. Looking back to the class of Learning
Schemas, by allowing them to be provided as modular entities in a system, our formalism could
permit them to be applied to planning schemas so that such amixed schema could itself be learned
automatically.
Situated Planning
There is an alternate way to formulate planning in the Schema Model: the possible states
encountered in search (the shaded region in figure 10.3) can be viewed as part of the context of the
state-space. This becomes useful when the entire problem solving system is embodied, e.g., in a
robot, and where itwill ultimately makes changes in some external environment. In other words,
the "Update State" component of figure 10.2 could mean to perform an action in the real world; in
such a system, the planning must be done in a virtual environment, and the actions effected after
a plan is created with sufficient confidence.
In this model, both the "state-space" and the internal representation of the current
"problem state" are aspects of the context, and the different types of schemas (Operator, Guidance,
and Planning) act on relevant entities either in the state or in the context. Situated problem solving
will typically use virtual forms of operator schemas to manipulate an internal representation of
the problem state, and the corresponding physical operator schemas will be used to modify the
outside world after a plan has been found. Grounding problem solving systems in real-world
situations can pose additional challenges (such as reconciling the virtual representationwith what
actually happens), but the results tend to be more robust and more faithful to theories of cognition
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than systems which act purely in artificial problem domains. The real-world applicability of such
systems is an additional, practical reason to address these concerns.
The entire virtual representation, in such systems, can be considered as "context" which
the system uses to enrich its understanding of the actual world. However, within this internal
context, notmaking the problem state and the state-space explicit can obscure the importance of a
particular focus at a particular level of problem solving. For this reason, we distinguish between
"problem state", "state-space", and the "outside world". Depending on the focus of the model
as determined by schemas, the "Update State" component can refer to any of these levels. This
could be illustrated in a three-tier "tower" of schema models with the outside world set beneath
planning and the problem state shown in figure 10.3; another representation, paying heed to the
observation that "state" at one level is merely part of context at the lower level, is to use three
levels of cycles, hanging off the "Apply Schema" component and illustrating also the relationship
between the contexts of the different levels. This is shown in figure 10.4.
internal states are part of the context of the surrounding state.
Although the "tower" visualisation shown earlier is simpler, we prefer the "multi-cycle"
formulation shown here because we feel it more naturally represents situated systems and cross-
level events such as interruption/refocussing (such as if a fire breaks out). Both, however, convey
the need to support problem solving at multiple levels, both make these levels explicit (for the
examples of planning and situated problem solving), and both illustrate how these can be achieved
within our formalism.
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10.1.3. Features in the Schema Model
Our formalism has so far not introduced the key ingredient in the problem solving system
we have developed in the course of this thesis: features, i.e., aspects of a problem situation
which may not correspond to the raw units of a problem representation but which play a role in
determining the response. This is because we wish to show that the formalism is useful not just
for describing the Feasch system, but as a widely-applicable means to describe many problem
solving systems.
We relate the Feasch system to our formalism by introducing a particular Guidance
Schema, viz. the "Feasch Executor Schema", which follows the three-step process of detecting
features in the problem state, retrieving schemas based on the features, and successively applying
the most strongly cued schemas. This schema runs as the top-level "apply schema" box in Figure
10.2, as shown in Figure 10.5.
Figure 10.5: The Feasch Executor Schema. A general schema guides the selection
of schemas based on features and a feature-schema map.
This correspond to the IExecutors introduced in Chapter 3. One more category of schemas
follows:
Feature Detector Schemas. New features can be detected, by analysing the current
state and the associated context, and added to the current context. The Executor will
use these features to cue other schemas.
Planning and Situatedness with the Feasch Executor Schema
If we combine the Feasch Executor Schema in Figure 10.5 with the multi-level formalism
in Figure 10.4, an interesting solution emerges for the "statefulness and search" limitation of the
Feasch with Isabelle system (§9.1.4.i). Feasch might act at the problem state level (as Feasch with
Isabelle does currently), or at the state-space level (for planning and search), or even at the outside
world level (when the system is capable of interacting with the external world). Features can
be used to keep track of the internal notion of which level is being used, ensuring that schemas
appropriate there are selected. For instance, a feature in the state-space contextmight indicate that
"I justmade state N"; thismight trigger a Guidance Planning Schema for depth-first, which could
suggest the feature "look at problem state N", which would in turn focus the current problem
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state on what the planning state-space has recorded as state N. The Feasch Executor would then
generate and respond primarily to that problem state and features in its context; say that after
further examination "state N does not look good", the context of the state-space could be updated
with a feature to that effect. This, together with the "I just made state N" feature, could trigger
back-tracking. If, backtracking a level, the parent stateM also looks bad, a feature might be added
to the context saying that "the whole branch from state M looks pretty bad", and the model might
then abandon depth-first search and try a best-first search or a plan script, possibly one cued by
features detected in states M and N.
In general, a planning schema will update the contextwith an indication that a particular
hypothetical problem state has been identified. The Feasch Executor will respond to that feature
by focussing feature detection and schema selection on that state; if the activation level of these
schemas is low, however, features from the planning level might result in the activation of a
Planning Schema. If features stop giving strong support for one Planning Schema {e.g., depth-first
search), an alternative schema {e.g., best-first search) might be activated; this allows planning
techniques to be mixed, with different ones applied as different situations dictate. Of course,
if other features are noticed — such as a fire breaking out — it may send a very strong cue to
schemas at an even higher level— such as an "evacuate the building" schema. State duplication
is a more likely example, and in any good search algorithm in Feasch, such a Feature Detector
Schema would be included at the planning level, cueing appropriate remedies such as to abandon
that branch of the search tree or update the internal representation so that multiple paths to the
state are recorded in a state-space graph. In a more elaborate example, a feature at the problem
state levelmight recognise a feature that "we're close but it doesn't quite work" {e.g., "we're in the
right order but on the wrong target pole" in Tower ofHanoi); this might trigger a known Planning
Schema for plan repair, or if the history of steps is also described as features at the planning level,
a specific past experience might be triggered {e.g., where, in the past, the same or a similar pattern
led to the tower being built on the wrong pole, and the problem was resolved by changing the
pole used on the initial move).
10.1.4. Relation to OtherWork
What we find useful about this formalism is that it allows many techniques to be
represented using the same vocabulary and the same theoretical architecture. Different techniques
for planning and search can be represented as schemas which can invoke any Guidance Schema or
Operator Schema. A plan might call to apply a production rule, and if it fails it might invoke the
Feasch Executor. Conversely, the Feasch Executormight determine that a particular plan is called
for, or a certain low-level action, or even a case-based reasoning schema, if available. Strategies
for problem solving can be conceptualised in a unified framework, and although this is far from
being an implemented system where these are all compatible, it is a necessary first step. There
may be other ways of synthesising these various techniques, but we have shown at least one way
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that such an attempt could be made. Showing the compatibility of, e.g., analogy within ACT-R,
was an inordinately difficult— and ultimately unconvincing— undertaking (§1.2.3). While this
armchair analysis offers even less in the currency of evidence, it offers substantially more in the
currency of modularity and flexibility. It provides a framework for problem solving in which
components for search, planning, learning, and Feasch can all coexist and interact.
The initial steps in this paradigm have revealed a ripe area of research questions, and
given that there is always more to be understood in science, one of the best measures of a theory
is how much new research it generates. There has been a wealth of new techniques in cognitive
science and Artificial Intelligence since Newell & Simon described their General Problem Solver
(1972) — many of them precisely because of their introducing a general architecture and specific
challenges; but there has been a dearth of dramatically different rival architectures, grounded
in philosophy and psychology and applied to psychology and computation. SOAR and ACT-R
are architectures so grounded, but they continue what is essentially the same production rules
approach. With Feasch — and with the further abstraction herein— we shape a true alternative,
This paradigmatic view of problem solving offered insight into how planning and search could
be incorporated into the original system we designed, where features cue schemas in a stateless
problem solver. We found the resulting ideas much more attractive, in our eyes, than the solution
we originally imagined (i.e., the multi-level formalism seems much more principled than the use
of persistent features, §9.1.4.i), and we look forward to extending Feasch along these lines. How
well this extension pans out remains to be seen, but it is merely one suggested research direction
we have found (admittedly our favourite). What is more important, as the exploration of Feasch
with Isabelle showed, is that the cross-fertilisation of problem solving ideas can lead to interesting
systems with novel, useful properties. We hope that this formalism can encourage and support
such creativity.
10.2. Concluding Thoughts
There is indisputably much more work required to show either that the framework we
present is useful as a general computational approach or that it has clear relevance to modelling
psychological problem solving. We are hopeful that many of these ideas are both interesting
and feasible, and we believe that the initial study of the ideas in specific problem areas has been
promising. What we have tried to demonstrate in this initial investigation is that making features
explicit— and emphasising structural features in particular — yields an interesting approach to
problem solving, and specifically that:
It is possible. By creating the Feasch system and showing that a noughts-and-crosses
player can be easily implemented therein (Chapter 3), we established our possibility
hypothesis, (PH) features can be thefoundation ofan AI problem solving system.
It is uniquely different to other approaches. As used in Isabelle, we discovered
many expressivity properties of using features and schemas which are not true of other
ways of encoding control knowledge. These are that features (EH1) provide reasoned
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explanations for method selection, e.g., for use in generating natural language proofs with
causal information; (EH2) enable useful guidancefor interactive theorem proving; and (EH4)
contribute to modular design ofcontrol knowledge. The one hypothesis which was found to
be difficult with Feasch— (EH3) encoding control knowledgefor automated theorem proving
— is the only one which strongly holds for tactics and IsaPlanner.
We have contrasted our approach with control knowledge techniques which are representative
of widely-used approaches (in our view, they are among the best in the literature, because they
permit the expression arbitrary tactics, and can be developed alongside the mathematical theories).
Crucially, the underlying Feasch system did not need to be changed in any way to permit our
implementation or to demonstrate the expressivity properties. As a result it seems likely that
these expressivity properties could generalise to other domains.
Of specific applied benefit to the Isabelle community, Feasch with Isabelle yields a means
of expressing heuristic control knowledge which is easy to write and easy to understand. If
a developer formulates this control knowledge, in addition to new definitions and theorems,
our system can use it to assist the user in at least four ways: semantically, by showing features
detected in a problem space and the commands these features typically cue (§5.2); interactively,
where a user can "point-and-click" on suggested methods (§5.3.1); automatically, through the
"fast-forward" button (§6.2.2); and semi-automatically, with the "auto-run threshold" (as well as
any modifications a user might choose to make) determining which high-confidence commands
are applied automatically and which more questionable commands are left for the user to apply
at her discretion (§7.2.1). We showed how this is difficult with many standard techniques; we note
further that these heuristics support parallel execution, which is also difficultwith most standard
techniques but increasingly important in real-world computations. This led to the first major
benefit we claim for our approach:
(BH1) The inspectability and modularity properties of feature-based control knowledge
are beneficial to multi-agent theorem proving.
We then showed how, by defining only the features and methods relevant to
differentiation, our system was able to discover the mappings which comprise the decision
procedure for the domain. This showed the second and final major benefit we claim:
(BH2) Feasch allows the use of learning mechanisms not applicable to other systems,
simplifying the encoding of control knowledge and yielding improved performance.
In the course of this thesis, we have developed a problem solving framework Feasch;
extended the public-domain theorem proving interface Eclipse ProofGeneral; created a powerful
new means of expressing control knowledge for the Isabelle theorem prover, with a GUI and its
own Feature Description Language, using Java and ML; completed several proofs for an Isabelle
theory of calculus, providing control knowledge in our system for differentiation and integration;
and devised a learning agent for this control knowledge. Each of these components is available
from the project web page, http: //feasch.heneveld. org, and we expect several will be useful
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to a wider audience. Projects — some by ourselves and some by third-parties — are under way
using one or more of the components we have developed.
We have also identified several further areas and potential benefits: extending the
capabilities of Feasch with Isabelle and the support for it; assessing Feasch in other problem
domains; and, if such examinations yield further encouraging results, trying to extend the power
of Feasch as a general framework. Apart from the experimental evidence of the usefulness of
the approach to theorem proving in Isabelle, we believe that our theoretical considerations may
also make a substantive contribution to the theory of problem solving. We have generalised a
cognitive theory, where features cue the retrieval of schemas, shown that it applies very usefully in
one concrete and difficult domain, and argued that it encompasses, in theory, a greatmany problem
solving techniques. Showing applicability inmany domains, far beyond theorem proving, will be
essential to establish that the proposed architecture is good generally, and consequently wewill be
particularly interested to see what happens when attempts are made to extend its capabilities for
learning (§9.1.5), planning (§9.1.4, §10.1.3.i), and cognitive modelling (§9.3). Having found certain
benefits in the domains where it has been tried, viz., for modular control knowledge development
and for learning, however, we have convinced ourselves— and we hope also the reader— that it
provides a promising perspective to the problem of problem solving.
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